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Foreword
On March 11, 2011, a massive earthquake and the resultant tsunami struck the
Tohoku area of Japan, causing serious damage to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant and the release of a significant quantity of radionuclides into the
surrounding environment. This accident underlined the necessity of establishing
more comprehensive scientific research for promoting safety in nuclear technology.
In this situation, the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute (KURRI)
established a new research program called the “KUR Research Program for Scien-
tific Basis of Nuclear Safety” in 2012.
Nuclear safety study includes not only the prevention of nuclear accidents but
also the safety measures after the accident from a wider viewpoint ensuring the
safety of residents. A long time is needed for the improvement of the situation, but
the social needs for the reinforcement of nuclear safety increases rapidly. The
advancement of disaster prevention technology for natural disasters such as earth-
quakes and tsunamis, the reinforcement of measures for the influence of accidents,
and the reinforcement of the safety management of spent fuels and radioactive
wastes are demanded, not to mention the reinforcement of nuclear reactor safety.
Also demanded are the underlying mechanism investigation and accurate assess-
ment for the effect of radiation on the human body and life. As with all premises,
detailed inspection and analysis of the accident are indispensable.
In the Research Program for the Scientific Basis of Nuclear Safety, an annual
series of international symposia was planned along with specific research activities.
The first in the series of symposia, entitled “The International Symposium on
Environmental Monitoring and Dose Estimation of Residents after the Accident
of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations [sic],” was held on
December 14, 2012, concerning the radiological effects of the accident on the
public. Also the second was held on November 28, 2013, dealing with nuclear
back-end issues and the role of nuclear transmutation technology after the accident
of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP. The results covering a wide range of research
activities were reported and discussed in the symposium and were published at the
request of many people, with open access.
v
Following these symposia, the third annual symposium in this series, entitled
“Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Risks after the Accident of TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations,” was held on October 30, 2014, related
to the safety evaluation of nuclear power plants which was being performed in
Japan for natural external hazards. The regulatory framework has been based on the
deterministic approach so far, but it has been pointed out that many uncertainties in
natural external hazards such as seismic motion and tsunami should be considered.
Thus the symposium has dealt with the uncertainties in the safety evaluation,
probabilistic risk assessment of earthquakes and tsunamis, fault displacement
hazard evaluation, risk of nuclear systems, risk communication, and so on.
This publication summarizes the current status of the methodology for the
assessment of nuclear risks of serious consequence, low-probability events, which
has been presented and discussed during the symposium. It will contribute to better
understanding and further discussion of the issues.
On behalf of KURRI, I wish to thank all the contributors to this publication as
well as the reviewers. KURRI also hopes that this publication will promote further
progress in nuclear safety research and will contribute to the reduction of public
anxiety after the accident.
Hirotake Moriyama




The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, which occurred in
March 2011, has strengthened the safety evaluation of nuclear power plants in cases
of natural disasters. New safety regulations have been instituted on the basis of a
deterministic approach aimed at absolute safety, such as the requirement of safe
sites in the case of tsunamis and the prohibition of installation of especially
important facilities on the outcrop of an active fault. Because many uncertainties
exist in natural phenomena such as earthquakes and tsunamis, a risk concept for
seismic motion and tsunamis beyond a design basis is indispensable.
Under such circumstances, an international symposium “Earth quake, Tsunami
and Nuclear Risks After the accident of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Stations” was held in Kyoto, Japan, on October 30, 2014. This symposium
was hosted by the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute under the “KUR
Research Program for the Scientific Basis of Nuclear Safety.”
The topics of the symposium included uncertainties in the safety evaluation of an
earthquake and tsunami, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for earthquake and
tsunami, risk in a nuclear system, and risk communication.
This book includes some of the presentations at the symposium. The main topics
of the book are (1) Active faults and active tectonics important for seismic hazard
assessment of nuclear facilities, (2) Seismic source modeling, simulation, and
modeling techniques indispensable for strong ground motion prediction, and
(3) PRA with external hazards and risk communication.
All the articles in this book were peer-reviewed by specialists in the relevant
fields and are listed in the Contents as Cooperators. The editor would like to thank
all the authors and these cooperating specialists who worked so hard to publish this
book. I hope this volume will provide readers the opportunity to consider the future
direction of nuclear safety in the face of natural disasters.
Osaka, Japan Katsuhiro Kamae
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Examination of the Correlation Between
Tectonic Landforms and Shallow Subsurface
Structural Datasets for the Estimation
of Seismic Source Faults
Takashi Kumamoto, Masatoshi Fujita, Hideaki Goto, and Takashi Nakata
Abstract Estimation of the magnitudes of future earthquakes produced by faults is
critical in seismic hazard assessment, especially for faults that are short in extent
compared with the thickness of the seismogenic layers of the upper crust. A new
seismogenic fault model for earthquake size estimation was constructed by com-
bining (a) new assessments of the precise location and distribution of active faults
from aerial photograph analysis and (b) estimations of subsurface structures from
geological, gravity, and seismicity datasets. The integrated results of (1) tectonic
landforms determined from aerial photographs, (2) geologic data showing the
distribution of geologic faults, (3) Bouguer gravity anomaly data over wavelengths
of 4–200 km, and (4) seismicity data were superimposed on geographic information
system (GIS) data around the nuclear power plants in Japan. The results indicate the
possible occurrence of large earthquakes, because the lengths of the subsurface
earthquake faults were estimated to be longer than the length of the surface faults if
subsurface structures were included.
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The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (HERP) published the
“Method of long-term evaluation of active fault (preliminary version)” (HERP
[1]), a new integrated method of active fault assessment for seismic hazard analysis.
Several problems were highlighted in this report, with two being of particular
importance. First, the surface ruptures of some recent intraplate earthquakes in
Japan were shorter than the source fault of the earthquake in the subsurface.
Second, it is necessary to update Matsuda’s “5 km rule” [2], the current reference
criterion of fault gap distance for assessing if neighboring faults rupture simul-
taneously, which is widely used for seismic hazard analysis in Japan.
The HERP [1] also included some ideas for improvement and methods to solve
the problem of the mismatch between surface and subsurface fault lengths for
moderate to large earthquakes. One example is to incorporate subsurface structural
datasets such as geologic maps, gravity anomaly data, and instrumentally observed
seismicity data with the surface distribution of active faults deduced from aerial
photograph analysis to better estimate subsurface earthquake source faults.
Preliminary results of the new method of comparing surface and subsurface
structures are outlined here, especially for the areas near nuclear power plants in
Japan. We conducted aerial photograph analysis to identify tectonic landforms and
created fault distribution maps. Datasets representing subsurface structures in the
study areas were overlain on the maps using geographic information system (GIS)
techniques. We then estimated (a) the length of earthquake source fault for isolated
faults with short surface lengths and (b) the possibility that neighboring surface
faults would rupture simultaneously due to subsurface continuity.
1.2 Data
The reference criteria and legends for the aerial photograph analysis in this study
are the same as those in the “Active Fault Map in Urban Area” published by the
Geospatial Information Authority of Japan [3], and cross-check rule is also applied
for the analysis. The top section of Fig. 1.1 (1)–(14) shows the distribution of active
faults in the study areas determined by aerial photograph analysis. The rectangles in
each section indicate a second-order map grid (scale 1:25,000) from the Geospatial
Information Authority of Japan and show the areas of detailed aerial photograph
analysis in this study. The numbers of the top sections in Fig. 1.1 indicate the
corresponding identification in Table 1.1. The middle left section shows the distri-
bution of “Active faults in Japan” (RGAF [4]), and the middle right section shows
the distribution in the “Digital Active Fault Map of Japan” (Nakata and Imaizumi
ed. [5]) for comparison. As the same criterion was used for the “Digital Active Fault
Map of Japan” and this study, there is little difference in the results.
A total of 249 active faults were identified in this study (Table 1.1), with 78 of
these partially or completely corresponding to faults identified in “Active faults in
Japan” (RGAF [4]). Among the remaining 171 faults, 164 were 10 km or shorter in
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Fig. 1.1 Distribution of active faults (top: this study, middle left: RGAF (1991), middle right
(Nakata and Imaizumi [5])) and subsurface datasets (bottom left: 1 mgal contour of Bouguer
gravity anomaly, bottom right: observed seismicity) of 14 subjected areas
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Table 1.1 Surface and subsurface fault length in Fig. 1.1 and Fig. 1.2
Site ID This study RGAF (1991) Geology Gravity Seismicity
Tomari 1 3.6 – 5.0 – –
Tomari 2 1.7 – 3.4 – –
Tomari 3 8.8 – 14.4 14.4 –
Tomari 4 0.9 – – – 6.3
Tomari 5 1.3 – – – –
Tomari 6 1.6 – 3.5 – –
Tomari 7 1.3 – – – –
Tomari 8 6.4 12.0 – 15.5 –
Tomari 9 2.6 – 5.7 – –
Tomari 10 2.5 – – – –
Tomari 11 4.7 6.0 – – –
Tomari 12 3.2 6.0 4.7 7.1 –
Oma 13 1.6 3.0 – – –
Oma 14 1.2 3.0 3.5 3.5 –
Oma 15 7.6 – 10.8 – –
Higashidori 16 1.7 – – – –
Higashidori 17 2.0 – – – –
Higashidori 18 5.6 – 25.6 26.7 –
Higashidori 19 2.7 – – – –
Higashidori 20 6.1 – – – –
Higashidori 21 1.5 – – – –
Higashidori 22 3.9 7.0 – – –
Higashidori 23 9.9 4.0 25.6 26.7 –
Higashidori 24 3.9 – – – –
Higashidori 25 1.5 4.0 4.1 – –
Higashidori 26 1.0 – – – –
Higashidori 27 1.2 – – – –
Onagawa 28 3.2 – – – –
Onagawa 29 2.1 – 4.4 – –
Onagawa 30 2.0 – – – –
Onagawa 31 1.8 12.0 5.6 – –
Onagawa 32 2.8 12.0 8.5 8.5 –
Onagawa 33 12.3 8.0 12.5 – 16.5
Fukushima 34 7.3 – 12.7 – –
Fukushima 35 20.3 55.0 67.5 36.1 –
Fukushima 36 1.5 – – – –
Fukushima 37 1.7 – – – –
Fukushima 38 4.9 – – – –
Fukushima 39 7.1 – – – –
Fukushima 40 1.7 – – – –
Fukushima 41 2.1 55.0 67.5 36.1 –
Fukushima 42 3.3 55.0 67.5 – –
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Site ID This study RGAF (1991) Geology Gravity Seismicity
Fukushima 43 1.6 55.0 67.5 – –
Fukushima 44 8.1 55.0 67.5 25.8 –
Fukushima 45 8.3 15.0 13.5 16.9 –
Fukushima 46 9.1 10.0 67.5 25.8 –
Fukushima 47 3.6 – – 25.8 –
Fukushima 48 8.7 – – 17.9 –
Fukushima 49 7.6 6.0 8.0 – –
Fukushima 50 3.6 – – – –
Fukushima 51 1.3 – – – –
Fukushima 52 7.0 5.0 19.3 – –
Fukushima 53 6.8 6.0 16.9 18.2 28.9
Tokai 54 0.9 – – – –
Tokai 55 0.5 10.0 – – –
Tokai 56 1.8 – – – 5.6
Tokai 57 3.0 – – 26.0 –
Tokai 58 6.0 – – 26.0 –
Tokai 59 3.2 – – – –
Tokai 60 6.8 7.0 11.7 23.9 –
Tokai 61 1.1 – – – –
Tokai 62 8.4 – 12.1 – –
Tokai 63 1.7 – – – –
Tokai 64 2.2 – 10.3 – –
Tokai 65 0.6 – – – –
Tokai 66 1.1 – – – –
Tokai 67 2.0 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 68 0.8 – – 12.6 –
Kashiwazaki 69 2.1 4.0 3.2 – –
Kashiwazaki 70 1.5 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 71 11.3 15.0 16.8 – –
Kashiwazaki 72 6.4 5.0 14.5 – –
Kashiwazaki 73 10.0 – 14.4 – –
Kashiwazaki 74 5.0 11.0 13.3 31.8 –
Kashiwazaki 75 11.5 7.0 16.2 16.2 –
Kashiwazaki 76 1.8 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 77 1.5 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 78 1.0 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 79 4.6 – 9.0 – 9.6
Kashiwazaki 80 0.3 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 81 0.3 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 82 0.7 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 83 1.1 3.0 – 8.9 –
Kashiwazaki 84 1.0 – – – –
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Site ID This study RGAF (1991) Geology Gravity Seismicity
Kashiwazaki 85 1.0 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 86 0.5 – 1.8 – –
Kashiwazaki 87 0.2 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 88 7.6 – 12.2 12.2 –
Kashiwazaki 89 2.2 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 90 3.3 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 91 13.3 – – – 20.2
Kashiwazaki 92 2.7 5.0 5.8 5.4 –
Kashiwazaki 93 0.8 – – – –
Kashiwazaki 94 1.3 – 4.4 – –
Kashiwazaki 95 2.9 – 6.7 – –
Hamaoka 96 1.2 – – – –
Hamaoka 97 1.6 – – – –
Hamaoka 98 0.6 – – – –
Hamaoka 99 0.3 – – – –
Hamaoka 100 0.7 – – – –
Hamaoka 101 1.0 2.0 – – –
Hamaoka 102 1.3 3.0 – – –
Hamaoka 103 0.7 – – – –
Hamaoka 104 0.5 – – – –
Hamaoka 105 1.9 3.0 – – –
Hamaoka 106 1.5 2.0 – – –
Hamaoka 107 0.8 1.0 – – –
Hamaoka 108 1.9 – – – –
Shika 109 0.5 – – – –
Shika 110 4.3 2.0 7.4 – –
Shika 111 2.3 – – – –
Shika 112 1.6 – – – –
Shika 113 2.6 – – – 6.4
Shika 114 1.5 – – – –
Shika 115 1.3 – – – –
Shika 116 1.1 – – – 2.8
Shika 117 1.5 – – – –
Shika 118 3.4 – – – 4.6
Shika 119 5.7 – – – –
Shika 120 3.9 3.0 6.2 – –
Shika 121 6.3 2.0 – – –
Shika 122 2.8 – – – –
Shika 123 1.3 – – – –
Shika 124 4.7 4.0 7.4 – –
Shika 125 1.5 – – – –
Shika 126 3.6 – – – –
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Site ID This study RGAF (1991) Geology Gravity Seismicity
Shika 127 1.0 2.0 – – –
Shika 128 1.1 – – – –
Shika 129 1.9 3.0 – – –
Shika 130 3.8 3.0 24.6 24.6 –
Shika 131 3.7 9.0 24.6 24.6 –
Shika 132 33.3 45.0 50.2 50.2 –
Tsuruga 133 2.5 12.0 11.6 – –
Tsuruga 134 7.0 – – 9.6 –
Tsuruga 135 5.7 10.0 7.2 – –
Tsuruga 136 0.5 – – – –
Tsuruga 137 8.7 13.0 – – –
Tsuruga 138 5.0 – – – –
Tsuruga 139 2.0 – – 4.4 –
Tsuruga 140 3.2 – – 11.7 –
Tsuruga 141 23.4 37.0 33.9 35.6 –
Tsuruga 142 1.8 – – – –
Tsuruga 143 1.0 – – – –
Tsuruga 144 12.9 4.0 – 18.1 –
Tsuruga 145 4.4 – – – –
Tsuruga 146 2.3 – – – –
Tsuruga 147 3.5 – – – –
Tsuruga 148 1.2 – – – –
Tsuruga 149 6.5 13.0 9.6 12.2 –
Tsuruga 150 13.3 – – – –
Tsuruga 151 3.8 – – – –
Tsuruga 152 7.0 9.0 – – –
Tsuruga 153 4.3 – – – –
Tsuruga 154 6.2 11.0 – – –
Tsuruga 155 8.6 – – – –
Tsuruga 156 4.4 6.0 – – –
Tsuruga 157 4.5 25.0 8.5 – –
Tsuruga 158 2.1 – – – –
Tsuruga 159 2.8 25.0 5.1 – –
Tsuruga 160 6.9 7.0 – 18.5 –
Tsuruga 161 3.6 7.0 – – –
Tsuruga 162 2.5 – 8.0 – –
Tsuruga 163 2.4 3.0 – – –
Tsuruga 164 2.4 – – – –
Tsuruga 165 1.2 – – – –
Tsuruga 166 0.9 – – – –
Tsuruga 167 4.6 – – – –
Tsuruga 168 6.7 4.0 – – –
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Site ID This study RGAF (1991) Geology Gravity Seismicity
Tsuruga 169 3.0 – – – –
Tsuruga 170 2.3 – – – –
Tsuruga 171 1.8 – – – –
Tsuruga 172 1.6 – – – –
Tsuruga 173 5.3 6.0 – – –
Tsuruga 174 2.5 – – – –
Tsuruga 175 1.9 – 2.6 – –
Tsuruga 176 5.7 10.0 – – –
Tsuruga 177 8.0 7.0 – – –
Tsuruga 178 1.5 10.0 – – –
Tsuruga 179 14.8 15.0 18.9 – –
Tsuruga 180 17.5 9.0 20.9 – –
Tsuruga 181 0.4 – – – –
Tsuruga 182 2.2 – – – –
Tsuruga 183 3.1 – – – –
Tsuruga 184 0.3 – – – –
Tsuruga 185 8.0 – – – 11.6
Tsuruga 186 2.5 – – – –
Tsuruga 187 1.3 – – – –
Tsuruga 188 2.2 – – – –
Tsuruga 189 3.9 – – – –
Tsuruga 190 9.8 – – – –
Tsuruga 191 2.1 – – – –
Tsuruga 192 4.4 – 4.9 – –
Tsuruga 193 1.4 – – – –
Tsuruga 194 1.9 – – – –
Tsuruga 195 2.7 – 3.3 – –
Tsuruga 196 23.5 – 28.1 27.5 –
Tsuruga 197 3.8 – – – –
Tsuruga 198 8.7 – 13.9 16.7 –
Tsuruga 199 14.4 – – 15.6 –
Tsuruga 200 18.1 15.0 21.0 31.8 –
Tsuruga 201 2.6 – – – –
Tsuruga 202 7.9 – – 16.0 –
Tsuruga 203 1.8 – – – –
Tsuruga 204 1.4 30.0 14.0 – –
Tsuruga 205 2.1 – – 9.3 –
Tsuruga 206 13.7 – – 17.5 –
Tsuruga 207 1.5 – – – –
Tsuruga 208 1.1 – – – –
Tsuruga 209 2.3 – – – –
Tsuruga 210 0.7 – – – –
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Site ID This study RGAF (1991) Geology Gravity Seismicity
Tsuruga 211 1.5 2.0 – – –
Tsuruga 212 4.4 20.0 – – –
Tsuruga 213 3.0 – – – –
Shimane 214 31.7 22.0 36.8 40.0 –
Shimane 215 2.1 2.0 – – –
Shimane 216 0.8 – – – –
Shimane 217 1.3 – – – –
Shimane 218 1.8 – – – –
Shimane 219 4.7 – – – –
Shimane 220 1.5 – – – –
Shimane 221 1.4 – – – –
Shimane 222 4.0 – – – –
Shimane 223 2.7 – – – –
Shimane 224 5.2 – – – –
Shimane 225 2.7 – – – –
Shimane 226 5.0 6.0 10.6 15.0 –
Shimane 227 10.8 – – – –
Shimane 228 3.0 3.0 – – –
Shimane 229 3.3 – – – –
Shimane 230 7.2 – – – –
Shimane 231 1.4 – – – –
Shimane 232 0.8 – – – –
Shimane 233 1.3 – – – –
Shimane 234 4.9 – – – –
Shimane 235 1.7 – – – –
Shimane 236 2.2 – – – –
Ikata 237 2.4 4.0 6.8 – –
Genkai 238 6.6 – 12.5 – –
Genkai 239 1.4 2.0 – – –
Genkai 240 3.0 1.0 – – –
Genkai 241 3.8 6.0 – – –
Genkai 242 9.2 – – – –
Genkai 243 3.1 – 12.5 – –
Genkai 244 2.8 – 11.3 – –
Genkai 245 4.1 – 8.1 – –
Sendai 246 9.9 – 17.8 29.8 –
Sendai 247 5.6 – – – –
Sendai 248 11.6 14.0 14.5 14.5 –
Sendai 249 9.2 – 11.1 13.3 –
ID corresponds to the top figure in Fig. 1.1
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length. Attribute data such as fault slip type, certainty level, and tectonic landforms
recognized from aerial photograph analysis are provided in GIS; these digital GIS
data will be published via the Internet in the near future.
The geological map used in this study was the “Seamless Geological Map of
Japan at a scale of 1:200,000 DVD edition” published by the Geological Survey of
Japan [6]. Figure 1.2 shows the composite maps of the study areas superimposed on
the fault lines of the top section of Fig. 1.1. The color legend of the geological map
is the same as that of the “Seamless Geological Map,” but is omitted here due lack
of adequate space to include the 387 classifications. Please refer to the original
legend. We focused on the correspondence between active surface faults and
geological boundaries in Fig. 1.2.
The Bouguer gravity anomaly datasets were taken from the “Gravity CD-ROM
of Japan, Ver.2” published by the Geological Survey of Japan [7]. We selected an
assumed density of 2.67 g/cm3 and applied 4–200 km band-pass filter processing to
eliminate the effects of long wavelengths due to plate subduction. The contour
interval in the bottom left section of Fig. 1.1 is 1 mgal.
The seismicity data for the bottom right sections of Fig. 1.1 were taken from the
Japan Meteorological Agency’s integrated hypocenter database. Data used were
from between 1987 and 2011, to maximize accuracy of depth. We selected earth-
quakes with depths 20 km, within the seismogenic layer of the upper crust, as our
focus was on intraplate earthquakes.
The distribution of active faults (top section of Fig. 1.1) was superimposed on the
geological map (Fig. 1.2), the gravity anomaly contours (bottom left section of
Fig. 1.1), and the shallow seismicity map (bottom right section of Fig. 1.1) to estimate
the length of subsurface earthquake faults according to our selected criteria.
1.3 Analysis Methods
The superimposed GIS datasets were visually compared to estimate the length of
the subsurface earthquake faults, particularly the extension of short faults on the
surface and connections between neighboring faults. Subjectivity is inevitable in
visual observation, but in order to be as objective as possible, we applied the
following general conceptual criteria.
Figure 1.3 (a) is a schematic diagram detailing how to judge the correspondence
between active faults identified by aerial photograph analysis and geological
boundaries in the geological map. Attention was paid to the accuracy of these
maps because of the map scale difference. If the surface fault line (solid line)
matches the location and strike of the geological boundary and the latter is longer,
the length of the subsurface earthquake fault is estimated from the length of a series
of geological boundaries (dashed line).
Figure 1.3 (b) shows a schematic model for assessing the correspondence
between active faults identified by aerial photograph analysis and gravity anomaly
data. If the surface fault line is situated in an area of dense contour line distribution
(where a change in subsurface structure is interpreted), the length of the subsurface
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Fig. 1.2 (continued)
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earthquake fault (solid line) is estimated from the length of a portion of the dense
contour line distribution (dashed line).
Figure 1.3 (c) shows a schematic diagram for determining the correspondence
between active faults identified by aerial photograph analysis and seismicity data. If
the surface fault line (solid line) is situated in an area with a dense distribution of
seismicity, the length of the subsurface earthquake fault is estimated from the
length of a portion of a series of seismicity data (dashed line).
Fig. 1.2 Geological map (GSJ [6]) of 14 subjected areas overlaid with distribution of active faults
of this study
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1.4 Results and Discussion
Total 230 active faults with 10 km or shorter length in Table 1.1 were subjects in
discussion since these faults were excluded from the National Seismic HazardMaps
for Japan by HERP. Among these, 79 faults showed an increase in subsurface
length due to linkages with neighboring faults, and the remaining 151 showed no
clear correspondence. Table 1.1 shows the identification in Fig. 1.1, the lengths of
Fig. 1.3 Schematic
diagram how to judge the
correspondence between
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the surface faults in this study, the lengths in of the faults in the “Active Fault
Book,” and the estimated lengths in this study from comparisons with the geo-
logical map, gravity anomaly contour data, and seismicity data.
The results of this study indicate that the average ratio and standard deviation
between the lengths of active faults estimated on the surface and the subsurface is
7.1 and 7.3 for the geologic data, 8.4 and 4.2 for the gravity data, and 4.7 and 3.3 for
the seismicity data, respectively. Although the variances are large, still much
attention should be paid to this surface and subsurface structural relation to
compensate for small amount of surface displacement due to short active faults.
In addition, this new approach might effect the so-called “5 km rule” (Matsuda [2])
for grouping and linking active fault strands on the distribution maps since neigh-
boring faults on surface with 5 km or longer gap/step may become connected if
subsurface structures show a series of continuity.
Figure 1.4 shows an example of the relationships between the lengths of the
surface fault determined by aerial photograph analysis and the estimated subsurface
fault lengths for the three datasets in Table 1.1. This figure shows that (1) the
estimated length of the subsurface fault is longer than the length of the surface fault,
(2) the variance increases if the surface fault length shortens, (3) there is no clear
correlation between surface and subsurface fault length for those faults with 10 km
or shorter surface lengths, and (4) the maximum estimated subsurface fault length is
approximately 30 km, that is, twice of seismogenic layer (upper crust). This
indicates that faults with short surface length compared to the width of seismogenic
layer still have the potential to produce large earthquakes. Though the potential
earthquake magnitude of active faults with short surface length cannot be estimated
solely by the surface fault length, Fig. 1.4 shows some clues of maximum length of
Fig. 1.4 Relation between





datasets in Table 1.1
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subsurface fault of 30 km which might relate to both the width of seismogenic layer
and the aspect ratio of fault plane.
1.5 Future Challenges
Because aerial photographs were the primary data source for determining surface
faults in this study, the study was limited to onshore active faults; no offshore active
faults were considered. However, the extension of onshore faults offshore is crucial
for seismic hazard assessments for nuclear power plants in Japan. An example is the
Tomari nuclear power plant in Hokkaido, where the possibility of extension and
linkage of the 32 km long onshore Kuromatsunai fault system to neighboring
offshore faults results in a total fault length of 164 km (Asahi newspaper, 2012/3/9).
Nakata and Goto [8] demonstrated a new method for recognizing offshore faults
by applying digital bathymetry data to create stereoscopic figures resulting in a
seamless connection with onshore faults. It is important to develop surface and
subsurface datasets for active faults both onshore and offshore for nuclear power
plant seismic hazard assessments and to assess the potential of future earthquakes
using multiple integrated data sources.
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Chapter 2
Multivariate Statistical Analysis
for Seismotectonic Provinces Using
Earthquake, Active Fault, and Crustal
Structure Datasets
Takashi Kumamoto, Masataka Tsukada, and Masatoshi Fujita
Abstract Seismotectonic zonation for seismic hazard assessment of background
faults and earthquakes by the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion
(HERP [1]) is based on the results of the seismotectonic boundaries of Kakimi
et al. [2]. However, several unsolved problems, such as map scale, remain in this
approach for better prediction of the magnitude and frequency of blind earthquakes.
The aim of this study was to construct a new quantitative and objective seismo-
tectonic province map for the main islands of Japan (Honshu) for rational earth-
quake size estimation of blind faults and earthquakes. The resolution of the map
was set as the second-order map grid of ca. 10 by 10 km of the Geographic Survey
of Japan. Then, the parameters of (1) observed seismicity, (2) distribution of active
faults converted to earthquake moment release rate, (3) width of the seismogenic
layer, and (4) Bouguer gravity anomaly were assigned independently to each grid
for principal component analysis. The first principal component of the principal
analysis in this study represents the degree of tectonic activity for both the north-
eastern and southwestern Honshu islands. The resulting principal component scores
were then applied to a cluster analysis to conduct quantitative classifications, and
the result provided three and nine seismotectonic provinces in the northeastern and
southwestern Honshu islands, respectively.
Keywords Seismotectonic province map • Principal component analysis • Cluster
analysis
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Two types of intraplate earthquake are independently considered when constructing
National Seismic Hazard Maps for Japan. One is earthquakes with a specific active
fault, such as the 1995 Hyogo-ken-nambu (Kobe) earthquake of MJMA 7.3 (magni-
tude of the Japan Meteorological Agency), for which the results of tectonic land-
form analysis and trenching surveys are used for evaluation. The other is
background earthquakes, such as the 2000 Tottori-ken Seibu earthquake of MJMA
7.3 and the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake of MJMA 7.2, for which no
surface observation data are available for magnitude and frequency evaluation
(HERP [1]). Instead, both the earthquake statistics model of the Gutenberg-Richter
relationship for magnitude and frequency estimation and the seismotectonic prov-
ince map for counting observed moderate to small-sized earthquakes for the
earthquake statistics are needed for hazard assessment. The HERP (2009) referred
to the tectonic province map of Kakimi et al. [2]. This map was constructed by
examining the density of active faults and earthquakes, focal mechanism of earth-
quakes, and the general tectonic setting. The tectonic boundaries of this map are
shown in Fig. 2.1. Then, the magnitude for the maximum-size background earth-
quake was determined by referring to the historical earthquake records, and the
frequency of this earthquake was calculated from the Gutenberg-Richter relation-
ship and instrumentally observed seismicity. However, the following unsolved
problems remain for application of the tectonic province map to the National
Seismic Hazard Maps for Japan:
1. The main purpose of the tectonic province map of Kakimi et al. [2] is to evaluate
the maximum-size earthquake, including an earthquake with a specific fault.
2. The scale of the map is 1:2,000,000, which is too small to discuss boundary
locations.
3. The regulation for setting boundaries was based mainly on the subjective
analysis of experienced researchers under the reference datasets mentioned
above.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to construct a seismotectonic province map by
quantitative and objective methods. For this purpose, we adopted the following four
datasets: observed seismicity, the distribution of active faults, the lower limit of the
seismogenic layer, and the Bouguer gravity anomaly.
The statistical methods adopted in this research for the multivariate analysis are
principal component analysis and cluster analysis. The spatial resolution for the
analysis was set as the second-order map grid of ca. 10 by 10 km of the Geographic
Survey of Japan. Then, the four datasets were compiled for each grid, and the
principal component loadings were calculated for the cluster analysis. Finally, the
boundaries of the tectonic province map were depicted by referring to the result of
the cluster analysis.
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2.2 Data and Method
To construct the seismotectonic province map by the principal component analysis,
we parameterized the observed seismicity, distribution of active faults, lower limit
of the seismogenic layer, and Bouguer gravity anomaly as explained below.
Fig. 2.1 Boundaries among seismotectonic provinces after Kakimi et al. [2]. Circles show
intraplate blind earthquakes during 1926–2011
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2.2.1 Observed Seismicity (Fig. 2.2a)
For the instrumentally observed seismicity data, we extracted earthquakes of
magnitude 4.0 or larger with depths of 20 km or shallower during 1926–1995
from the Japan Meteorological Agency’s integrated hypocenter database. Next,
aftershocks due to large earthquakes of magnitude 6.0 or larger in the same period
were excluded by the method of the Public Works Research Institute [3]. Then, the
magnitude MJMA of each earthquake in a grid was converted to seismic moment Mo
[dyne-cm] by the Eq. (2.1) of Takemura [4].
LogMo ¼ 1:2 MJMA þ 17:7 ð2:1Þ
Finally, the logarithmic summation of the seismic moments of the earthquakes per
year in the grid was calculated as a parameter of the observed seismicity (Fig. 2.3a).
Fig. 2.2 Original parameters for the principal component analysis: (a) seismicity, (b) distribution
of active faults, (c) lower limit depth of the seismogenic layer, and (d) inclination of Bouguer
gravity anomaly
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2.2.2 Distribution of Active Faults (Fig. 2.2b)
In order to include the long-term averaged seismicity data with thousands to tens of
thousands of years, that is, almost identical to the average recurrence period of
active faults in Japan, the distribution map of active faults was used in the principal
component analysis. The seismogenic fault distribution database of Okino and
Kumamoto [5], which is a recompilation of the Digital Active Fault Map of
Japan (Nakata and Imaizumu, eds., [6]), was used. The length of each seismogenic
fault L (km) was converted to MJMA by Mastuda’s Eq. (2.2) [7] and then
reconverted to seismic moment Mo by equation (1).
Fig. 2.3 Parameters assigned to the second-order map grid (scale 1:25,000) for the principal
component analysis: (a) logarithmic seismic moment release rate per year, (b) logarithmic seismic
moment release rate per 1k year, (c) weighted average lower limit depth of the seismogenic layer,
and (d) averaged inclination of the Bouguer gravity anomaly
2 Multivariate Statistical Analysis for Seismotectonic Provinces Using. . . 35
LogL ¼ 0:6MJMA  2:9 ð2:2Þ
Next, the seismic moment Mo of each seismogenic fault was divided by the
averaged recurrence interval derived from trenching surveys or empirical equa-
tions, and the seismic moment release rate per 1000 yr was calculated.
If the seismic moment release rate of a seismogenic fault is assigned to grids that
are cut through by the seismogenic fault, the contrast between a grid with the
seismogenic fault and a neighboring grid without the seismogenic fault becomes
too large. A trial test with such contrast clarified that severe bias results in the
principal component analysis. Therefore, the seismic moment release rate of such a
grid was redistributed to the neighboring eight grids by using the Gaussian
weighting function. This procedure corresponds to the consideration of subsidiary
faults around the main traces of a seismogenic fault, which is omitted in the
seismogenic fault distribution database (Okino and Kumamoto [5]). Finally, the
logarithmic summation of seismic moments of earthquakes per 1000 yr in the grid
was calculated for a parameter of the distribution of active faults (Fig. 2.3b).
2.2.3 Lower Limit of the Seismogenic Layer (Fig. 2.2c)
As the first order subsurface structural parameter, the lower limit of the seismogenic
layer D90 was adopted in this study. The D90 shows the 90 % depth among
instrumentally observed seismicity in a 0.025–0.2-degree grid (Seismotectonics
Research Group ed. [8]). This lower limit of the seismogenic layer data relates to
the seismogenic fault width and shows locality in Japan. Interpolation with the
weight of the reciprocal of a distance to a grid was applied to the D90 data, and the
parameter for the principal component analysis was created (Fig. 2.3c).
2.2.4 Bouguer Gravity Anomaly (Fig. 2.2d)
Bouguer gravity anomaly data are corrected to indicate subsurface density struc-
ture, and many reports show that the specific large inclination of the Bouguer
gravity anomaly corresponds to the distribution of active faults (e.g., Hagiwara
ed. [9]). Thus, the data of the assumed density of 2.67 g/cm3 with 1 km resolution
from the Gravity CD-ROM of Japan Ver.2 (Geological Survey of Japan [10]) were
adopted in this study for the second subsurface structural parameter. The average
inclination in a grid was calculated for the principal component analysis (Fig. 2.3d).
Because the unit of each parameter was different, the correlation matrix method
was used in the principal component analysis. As a result, principal component
loadings, eigenvalues, coefficients of determination, cumulative coefficients of
determination, and principal component scores were calculated for four parameters.
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2.3 Result and Discussion
Figure 2.4 shows the first, second, third, and fourth principal component loadings
for the four parameters of observed seismicity, distribution of active faults, lower
limit of the seismogenic layer, and Bouguer gravity anomaly in (a) the northeastern
Honshu, (b) southwestern Honshu, (c) Kyushu, (d) Hokkaido, and (e) Kanto dis-
tricts resulting from the principal component analysis.
The first principal component loadings (F1) in Fig. 2.4a of northeastern Honshu
showing a 34 % proportion indicate that the observed seismicity, distribution of
active faults, and Bouguer gravity anomaly parameters have positive values and
that the lower limit of the seismogenic layer has a negative value. This result means
that the short-term observed seismicity matches well the estimated long-term
Fig. 2.4 The first to fourth principal component loadings for seismicity, active faults, lower limit
depth of the seismogenic layer, and inclination of the Bouguer gravity anomaly of each region
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averaged seismicity from active faults. In addition, those areas where the density of
the observed seismicity and distribution of active faults are both high show a
relatively thin seismogenic layer and complex subsurface structure deduced from
the Bouguer gravity anomaly. Thus, we consider that the first principal component
might indicate the degree of tectonic activity.
The results of the relations between the principal component loadings and four
observed parameters of (b) southwestern Honshu and (c) Kyushu in Fig. 2.4 show a
similar tendency. Thus, we expect that the spatial distribution of the first principal
component loading relates to the seismotectonic provinces and adopted it as a
parameter for the following cluster analysis. However, to the contrary, the first
principal component loading (F1) in Fig. 2.4d of Hokkaido showing a 33 %
proportion indicates that the lower limit of the seismogenic layer and the Bouguer
gravity anomaly parameters are large positive values and that the remaining
parameters are relatively small. Additionally, the first principal component loadings
(F1) in Fig. 2.4e of Kanto indicate a different tendency from the other districts,
showing that the first principal component loadings of the observed seismicity and
Bouguer gravity anomaly parameters are largely negative. The reason for the
different results for the Hokkaido and Kanto districts might relate to the distance
between the district and plate boundary axis. The closer distance of the Hokkaido
and Kanto districts results in complexity of the deep part of the tectonic structure,
such as the depth and the shape of the subducting oceanic plate and the related
seismicity and gravity anomaly.
Hereafter, cluster analysis is applied to the first principal component scores of
northeastern Honshu and southwestern Honshu, respectively, from the viewpoint of
the tectonic meaning of intraplate shallow earthquakes and active faults as judged
from the principal component loading results (Fig. 2.4). The statistical distances
among grids in each district were measured by the group average method, and
clusters were calculated in similarity order. The number of clusters is after that of
Kakimi et al. [2], and four and six were set for northeastern Honshu and south-
western Honshu, respectively (Fig. 2.5). The result shows that each cluster in both
northeastern and southwestern Honshu distributes with strong spatial relation,
although no parameter regarding contiguity was involved in the principal compo-
nent analysis. Thus, the similarity of the first principal component score based on
the objective index of statistical distance is considered to have usefulness for
considering the spatial correlation of tectonic provinces.
Then, the tectonic province boundaries were set at the cluster boundaries
between areas of clusters with the same category, as shown in Fig. 2.6a for
northeastern Honshu and Fig. 2.6b for southwestern Honshu. The exception was
the case of isolated cluster patches consisting of 10 or fewer grids, which were
subjectively determined to be ignored or incorporated into a neighboring cluster by
the shape and size of each patch. The following describes the distinctive features of
our results (Fig. 2.6) and the tectonic province map of Kakimi et al. [2] (Fig. 2.1).
Northeastern Honshu was divided into two large seismotectonic provinces by
Kakimi et al. [2]. This boundary is located at the eastern foot of the Ou-Backbone
Mountain Range and partly overlaps with west-dipping reverse fault systems, such
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Fig. 2.5 Result of the cluster analysis using the first principal component loadings. Four and six
clusters are shown for northeastern and southwestern Honshu, respectively
Fig. 2.6 Boundaries among the seismotectonic provinces defined in this study: (a) northeastern
Honshu island with three provinces and (b) southwestern Honshu island with nine provinces
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as the Kitakami lowland west boundary fault system and the Fukushima basin west
boundary fault system. To the contrary, our result (Fig. 2.6a) shows that northeast-
ern Honshu is divided into three large provinces. The eastern boundary is located
10–50 km eastward of the eastern foot of the Ou-Backbone Mountain Range, and
the western boundary is located 10–50 km westward of the western foot of the
Ou-Backbone Mountain Range, where the Yokote basin east boundary fault system
and other east-dipping reverse fault systems are identified. Therefore, the two
parallel boundaries in this study involve the Ou-Backbone Mountain Range and
separate from both outer provinces with relatively low seismicity. This result is
consistent with the idea that the Ou-Backbone Mountain Range was uplifted by the
conjugate reverse fault system beneath the mountain ranges. From the viewpoint of
our result, the background of the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake is then
located in a province with high density of seismicity and active faults.
In this study, southwestern Honshu was divided into nine seismotectonic prov-
inces (Fig. 2.6b), and the number of provinces is the same as that of Kakimi
et al. [2]. There are three major differences in southwestern Honshu between
Fig. 2.6b and Fig. 2.1: First, in Kakimi et al. [2], the Median Tectonic Line
(MTL), the longest and one of the most active fault systems in Japan, is excluded
from the province as an exception of the specific fault and overlaps the boundary
between the outer and inner zones of southwestern Honshu. However, our objective
calculation results in a province involving the MTL without exceptional consider-
ation, influenced mainly by the density contrast of the active fault distribution
(No. 9 of Fig. 2.6b). Second, in Kakimi et al. [2], the seismotectonic boundary
between the Kinki district with a high density of seismicity and active faults and the
Chugoku district with a low density of each is located at the Yamazaki fault system
and its extensions. This boundary excludes the background earthquake of the 2000
Tottori-ken Seibu Earthquake from the province with a high density of seismicity
and active faults. To the contrary, our result (Fig. 2.6b) shows that the boundary is
located westward by 20–30 km in the southern section and 50–80 km in the
northern section. Thus, both the source fault of the 2000 Tottori-ken Seibu Earth-
quake and the Shimane nuclear power plant site in the Shimane Peninsula are
included in the same seismotectonic province of the Kinki district where the high
density of seismicity and active faults are observed. Third, the Chugoku district is
divided into two seismotectonic provinces corresponding to the density difference
of active fault distribution (Fig. 2.3b, whereas it is one large province in the map of
Kakimi et al. [2].
2.4 Future Challenges
In this study, a new quantitative and objective seismotectonic province map for
improvement of background earthquake assessment was constructed by combining
the four datasets of observed seismicity, distribution of active faults, lower limit of
the seismogenic layer, and Bouguer gravity anomaly and the statistical methods of
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principal component analysis and cluster analysis. The resulting map in Fig. 2.6
shows different tectonic province boundaries and the necessity of a different
explanation regarding the 2000 Tottori-ken Seibu Earthquake and the 2008 Iwate-
Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake, which represent large background earthquakes. Future
improvement is still needed in regard to ways to estimate the largest magnitude and
associated frequency of background earthquake in a rational and objective seismic
hazard assessment, not only in each province but also at the site of a nuclear power
plant.
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Chapter 3
Multiple Regression Analysis for Estimating
EarthquakeMagnitude as a Function of Fault
Length and Recurrence Interval
Takashi Kumamoto, Kozo Oonishi, Yoko Futagami, and Mark W. Stirling
Abstract Multiple regressions are developed using world earthquake data and
active fault data, and the regressions are then evaluated with Akaike’s Information
Criterion (IEEE Trans Autom Control, 19(6):716–723). The AIC method enables
selection of the regression formula with the best fit while taking into consideration
the number of parameters. By using parameters relevant to earthquakes and active
faults in the regression analyses, we develop a new empirical equation for magni-
tude estimation as Mw ¼ 1:13logLsþ 0:16logRþ 4:62.
Keywords Multiple regression analysis • Magnitude • Fault length • Recurrence
interval
3.1 Introduction
Many empirical equations for estimating earthquake magnitude have been devel-
oped in Japan. The most famous of these is the so-called Matsuda’s Equation [2],
which is widely used for constructing seismic hazard maps of Japan (e.g., The
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion [3]). Matsuda’s Equation
(Eq. 3.1) below is based on 14 earthquakes dated from the 1891 Nobi earthquake
(MJMA 8.0: Japan Meteorological Agency magnitude) to the 1970 Southeastern
Akita Prefecture earthquake (MJMA 6.2).
T. Kumamoto (*)




Shikoku Electric Power CO., Inc, Marunouchi 2-5, Takamatsu 760-8573, Japan
Y. Futagami
National Research Institute for Cultural Properties, Tokyo, Ueno Park 13-43, Taito-ku, Tokyo
110-8713, Japan
M.W. Stirling
GNS Science, 1 Fairway Drive, Avalon 5010, New Zealand
© The Author(s) 2016
K. Kamae (ed.), Earthquakes, Tsunamis and Nuclear Risks,
DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55822-4_3
43
log L ¼ 0:6MJMA  2:9 ð3:1Þ
In Matsuda’s Equation, the fault parameter length L might be regarded as sub-
surface. On the contrary, the length of an active fault recognized on the surface from
tectonic geomorphology must be used for magnitude estimation prior to the occur-
rence of the next earthquake. However, a problem occurs in estimating magnitudes
of isolated active faults with lengths significantly shorter than the thickness of the
seismogenic layer, which is estimated to be roughly 15–20 km in Japan. Thus,
another empirical equation for estimating earthquake size is the following empirical
equation between seismic moment Mo and fault area by Irikura and Miyake [4] as:
S ¼ 2:23 1015Mo2=3 for Mo < 7:5 1025dyne-cm
S ¼ 4:24 1011Mo1=2 for Mo≧7:5 1025dyne-cm ð3:2Þ
This equation is also widely used especially in strong ground motion prediction in
Japan.
However, the question of large uncertainties in the earthquake scaling relation
remains in both equations. To resolve the above issues, multiple regressions are
developed using world earthquake data and active fault data, and the regressions are
then evaluated with AIC (Akaike’s Information Criterion, Akaike, 1974). The AIC
method enables selection of the regression formula with the best fit while taking
into consideration the number of parameters. By using parameters relevant to
earthquakes and active faults such as stress drop, average slip rate, and recurrence
interval, in the regression analysis, we develop a new empirical equation for
magnitude estimation.
3.2 Data
The database used in this paper is compiled from the intraplate earthquake datasets
listed below.
1. Earthquake and active fault data of Wells and Coppersmith [5]:
These data were compiled to develop empirical relationships between earth-
quake magnitude and various fault parameters. The data are for the years
1857–1994, and the number of data items is 244. The data fields include earthquake
location, name, date, slip type, magnitude (surface wave magnitude Ms, moment
magnitude Mw, seismic moment Mo), subsurface and surface rupture length, fault
width, fault area, and maximum/average surface slip amount. Values thought to
have low reliability are given in parentheses.
44 T. Kumamoto et al.
2. Earthquake data of Anderson et al. [6]:
These historical earthquake data were used to estimate earthquake magnitude as
a function of the length and slip rate of the causative fault. The earthquake data
were collected for the time period 1811–1994, and the number is 43 in total. The
data fields include location, Mo, Mw, fault length, and slip rate.
3. Earthquake and active fault data of Mohammadioun and Serva [7]:
The characteristic aspect of this dataset is a list of variations in stress drop for
different slip types, including strike-slip, normal, or reverse faults in the 1857–1994
earthquakes worldwide, plus the Umbria earthquake in 1998 (Ms 5.7), the Chi-Chi
earthquake in 1999 (Ms 7.6), and the Izmit earthquake in 1999 (Ms 7.4). The
number of earthquakes in the dataset is 90, and the data fields include maximum
surface slip amount, static stress dropΔσ1, dynamic stress dropΔσ2, and the ratio of
dynamic stress drop to static stress drop.
4. Earthquake and active fault data of Stirling et al. [8]:
The number of data items is 389, and several scaling laws are developed in this
paper to compare instrumental and pre-instrumental data. The data fields include
slip type, magnitude (Ms, MJMA, Mw, and Mo), minimum/maximum seismogenic
fault length, minimum/maximum surface rupture length, minimum/maximum fault
width, and maximum/average surface slip amount.
3.3 Parameters for Analysis
We first examine whether the strength of asperities on the fault plane can be
quantified by the stress drop Δσ. Cotton et al. [9] showed the importance of Δσ
for strong ground motion and also showed large variability ofΔσ. The 90 data items
for static stress drop Δσ1 and dynamic stress drop Δσ2 compiled from [7] are used
here as stress drop Δσ. The static stress drop Δσ1 is a value calculated from the
average slip amount Dave and coseismic rupture length L from geological/seismo-




The dynamic stress drop Δσ2 is a value from the spectrum of the seismic wave
record.
The recurrence interval R of a fault is estimated directly from the observed
displacement of layers and the dating of layers on the historical earthquake record
or trench excavation results. However, this estimation is not always possible, and
calculated estimation is conducted by dividing the average slip amount on the fault
by the average slip rate Save as the following formula.




The average slip rate Save is also an indirect value derived from the cumulative slip





The average recurrence interval R is calculated for the average slip rate Save by
using the dataset of 43 earthquakes in this research (Table 3.1). However, it is
difficult to estimate the average slip rate Save in Eq. (3.5) because the cumulative
slip amount D is not constant along fault traces. Thus, uncertainties of slip rate
might be large, and the simple mean between Smin and Smax leads to an under-
estimation or overestimation which is inappropriate for magnitude estimation. There-
fore, just as in Anderson et al. (1996), 100 random numbers were generated in the
range between Smin and Smax, and the distribution of the average slip rate Save was
determined in Table 3.1 for calculation of R in Eq. (3.4).
3.4 Results and Discussion
Large variances of earthquake magnitude to the same surface rupture length Ls are
observed in Fig. 3.1 from [8]. Then Fig. 3.2 shows the relationship between
earthquake magnitude and surface rupture length from our compiled dataset in
Table 3.1. In Fig. 3.2, the dynamic stress drop Δσ2 was divided with four marks:
50 bars or less, 50–70 bars, 70–90 bars, and 90 bars or more. According to Fig. 3.2,
the stress drop is almost always 50 bars or less for earthquakes the fault length for
which exceeds 100 km, though the data contain many values of 90 bars or more for
fault lengths of 20 km or shorter. For fault lengths between 20 km and 100 km, in
particular, near the fault length of 40 km which corresponds to an aspect ratio of two
seismogenic-layer earthquakes with a large stress drop display large magnitudes,
and earthquakes with a small stress drop exhibit a relatively small magnitude, even
if the surface rupture length is the same. Therefore, it is possible to infer that the
dynamic stress drop Δσ2 could be an additional parameter for estimating earth-
quake magnitude.
Then, a total of six variables were set for regression analysis: surface rupture
length Ls, seismogenic fault length Lsub, maximum slip amount Dmax, average slip
amount Dave, static stress drop Δσ1, and dynamic stress drop Δσ2. Single and
multiple regression analyses were conducted to estimate moment magnitude Mw,
and the goodness of fit arising from varying combinations of one variable, two
variables and three variables were evaluated with AIC, the value of the coefficient
of correlation for single regression analysis and the values of coefficient of
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determination (Table 3.2). Among various combinations, the Akaike’s Information
Criterion [1] value was minimized by taking account of the two variables, surface
rupture length Ls, and dynamic stress drop Δσ2 as Eq. (3.6), though the coefficient
of correlation between Ls andΔσ2 shows 0.69, which means that some multi-










































rupture length with different
marks according to stress
drop in Table 3.1
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Mw ¼ 1:62logLsþ 0:76Δσ2 þ 3:07 ð3:6Þ
However, the dynamic stress drop Δσ2 is a value obtained by the spectrum of the
seismic wave record observed after the occurrence of an earthquake. Therefore, it is
an inappropriate parameter for the estimation of future earthquakes. Our alternative
approach is to find a proxy parameter of dynamic stress drop Δσ2. Figures 3.3 and
3.4 show the relationship between slip rate andΔσ2 and between recurrence interval
and Δσ2, respectively. Figure 3.3 shows that the dynamic stress drop Δσ2 is large
when the average slip rate S is small and the dynamic stress drop Δσ2 becomes
small when the average slip rate S is large. One problem arising when slip rate is
used for prediction of earthquake magnitude is that the average slip rate S has a
small value of 0.01–1 mm/year in the active fault catalog, and most of them that are
calculated from Eq. (3.5) need age and displacement data derived from tectonic
landforms in field surveys. On the other hand, the average recurrence interval R
could be derived in both Eq. (3.4) and trench excavations in field surveys. Figure 3.4
shows a relationship between recurrence interval and dynamic stress drop Δσ2 in
which longer recurrence intervals correlated with larger stress drops.
We next conducted regression analyses with the average recurrence interval R
determined from average displacement Dave and average slip rate in Table 3.1.
Moment magnitude Mw was set as the response variable, and surface rupture length
Ls and average recurrence interval R were set as the explanatory variables. The
Table 3.2 Comparison of goodness of fit from single and multiple regression analyses
Response variable Explanatory variable AIC Coef.
Mw logΔσ1 168.00 0.12
logΔσ2 160.00 0.04
Response variable Explanatory variable AIC Coef. Coef. in variables
Mw logLs-logΔσ2 26.16 0.90 0.69
logLsub-logΔσ2 29.65 0.78 0.36
Dmax-logΔσ2 96.00 0.59 0.17
Dave-logΔσ2 61.32 0.64 0.18
logLs-logΔσ1 28.34 0.81 0.05
logLsub-logΔσ1 29.05 0.78 0.18
Dmax-logΔσ1 102.53 0.56 0.43
Dave-logΔσ1 68.36 0.60 0.23
logLs-Dmax-logΔσ2 26.08 0.90 0.41, 0.69, 0.17
logLs-Dave-logΔσ2 22.15 0.90 0.66, 0.72, 0.18
logLsub-Dmax-logΔσ2 18.17 0.82 0.67, 0.36, 0.15
logLsub-Dave-logΔσ2 13.56 0.80 0.66, 0.44, 0.11
logLs-Dmax-logΔσ1 22.73 0.83 0.64, 0.05, 0.41
logLs-Dave-logΔσ1 5.68 0.84 0.66, 0.26, 0.22
logLsub-Dmax-logΔσ1 19.99 0.82 0.67, 0.18, 0.48
logLsub-Dave-logΔσ1 13.59 0.80 0.66, 0.08, 0.29
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following regression equation was obtained based on the average and standard
deviation for each regression coefficient:
Mw ¼ 1:13logLsþ 0:16Δσ2 þ 4:62 ð3:7Þ
This Eq. (3.7) is then compared to Matsuda’s Equation (Eq. 3.1) in Fig. 3.5.
Equation (3.7) includes the average recurrence interval R in its explanatory
Fig. 3.3 Relationship
between average slip rate
and the dynamic stress drop
Δσ2 in Table 3.1
Fig. 3.4 Relationship
between recurrence interval
and the dynamic stress drop
Δσ2 in Table 3.1
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variables, and thus 1000, 3000, 5000, and 10,000 years are given as typical
examples of the average recurrence intervals in Fig. 3.5. For surface rupture length
Ls of 20 km, we find that the magnitude obtained with Eq. (3.7) is larger than
Matsuda’s Equation, for all recurrence interval estimates. In contrast, the magni-
tude is smaller than that of Matsuda’s Equation when Ls is 80 km for average
recurrence intervals of less than 3000 years and larger than Matsuda’s Equation for
average recurrence intervals more than 3000 years. Furthermore, the magnitude is
smaller than Matsuda’s Equation for an average recurrence interval of 1000 years or
less. A difference of 0.2 in magnitude corresponds to a difference of 1000 and
10,000 years in recurrence interval. Therefore, earthquakes of different magnitude
in faults of similar lengths can be explained by different recurrence intervals.
3.5 Summary and Conclusion
We have developed new regressions for estimating earthquake magnitude from the
fault parameters such as stress drop and recurrence interval. The resulting equation
was obtained. The equation shows that for a fault possessing an average recurrence
interval of 1000 years or less and a length of 30 km or more, the magnitude
estimated from our equation is less than that produced by Matsuda’s Equation.
Conversely, the magnitude is larger than that of Matsuda for a fault length of 80 km
and an average recurrence interval of 3000 years or more. A difference of 0.2 in
Fig. 3.5 Comparison of the
multiple regression
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magnitude between average recurrence intervals of 1000 years and 10,000 years
was also shown.
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Chapter 4
Coseismic Tsunami Simulation Assuming
the Displacement of High-Angle Branching
Active Faults Identified on the Continental
Slope Around the Japan Trench
Shota Muroi and Takashi Kumamoto
Abstract The aim of this study is to demonstrate the tsunami potential caused by
high-angle branching faults with relatively low net slip compared to that of the 2011
off the Pacific coast of Tohoku (Tohoku-oki) earthquake of Mw9.0, located in the
upper part of the mega-thrust along the Japan Trench where the Tohoku-oki
earthquake ruptured, as deduced from the distribution of active faults illustrated
by a bathymetric geomorphological study and seismic profile records (Nakata
et al. Active faults along Japan Trench and source faults of large earthquakes.
http://www.jaee.gr.jp/event/seminar2012/eqsympo/pdf/papers/34.pdf. 19 Dec 2012).
The results show that the expected tsunami from high-angle branching faults
becomes about one and a half times as high as the case of low-angle thrust faults.
This demonstrates the importance of the distribution of high-angle branching faults
on the continental slope and their subsurface structure in tsunami hazard
assessment.
Keywords Japan Trench • High-angle branching faults • Tsunami potential
4.1 Introduction
The recent development of a detailed digital bathymetry dataset in Japan enables
the interpretation of offshore tectonic landforms and the identification of the
distribution of active faults, especially around plate boundaries, such as the Japan
Trench and the Nankai Trough. For example, Nakata et al. [1] reported several
newly identified tectonic landforms and active faults on the continental slope
situated parallel to the axis of the Japan Trench where the 2011 off the Pacific
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Fig. 4.1 Tectonic landforms identified off the coast of Tohoku. (a) The submarine active fault
distributions of Nakata et al. (2012), (b) typical tectonic landform profiles of the sections in (a), (c)
multichannel seismic profile record (top, Kato [3]; bottom, our interpretation)
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coast of Tohoku (Tohoku-oki) Earthquake of Mw9.0 ruptured, by using
3D-anaglyph figures derived from a 150-m resolution Digital Bathymetry Model.
The present study demonstrates (a) the tsunami potential produced by a future
earthquake due to active faults on the continental slope identified in the
fault distribution map of Nakata et al. [1] (Fig. 4.1a, hereafter, Nakata map) and
(b) the influence of high-angle branching faults. Although there is a lack of
consensus regarding the type of tectonic landforms and active faults on the conti-
nental slope along the Japan Trench from the interpretation of seismic profile
records (e.g., Okamura [2]), we discuss the tsunami potential based on the Nakata
map produced from geomorphological studies because the existing planar sub-
surface structural dataset is still insufficient to provide an unequivocal representation
of these continental slope features.
4.2 Active Fault Distribution
The earthquake source fault model in this study is constructed from the active faults
on the continental slope along the Japan Trench displayed in the Nakata map with a
total length of more than 400 km. These active faults can be roughly divided into
the following two groups: The first group consists of faults situated at the base of the
continental slope along the axis of the Japan Trench offshore between Kuji, Iwate
Prefecture (40N) and Mito, Ibaraki Prefecture (36N) displaying a relatively linear
form along their strike with fresh scarps indicating recent activity (Fig. 4.1b,
sections of type Y). The second group consists of faults situated on the continental
slope continuing outward on both sides of the first group faults that display a
relatively sinuous form with slope breakpoints (Fig. 4.1b, sections of type A,
B, C, and D).
The second group active faults in the Nakata map can be recognized in the
seismic profiling record of Kato [3]. The upper figure of Fig. 4.1c shows an example
of a seismic profile record along the X-X0 traverse line in Fig. 4.1a, and the lower
figure of Fig. 4.1c shows our interpretation of type C high-angle branching faults
with surface slope break on the continental slope. In this seismic profile record, the
type C fault branches from the decollement plane between the continental and
oceanic crusts with a relatively high angle of 25–28 compared to the low-angle
decollement plane of approximately 14. Ueta and Tani [4] performed an experi-
mental simulation of thrust fault development and demonstrated the deformation
process of strata with the creation of high-angle branching faults from low-angle
thrust. Thus, the combination of low-angle decollement plane with high-angle
branching faults is a universal phenomenon, and it is important to assess the
earthquake and tsunami potential of the high-angle branching faults around a
subduction zone in addition to that of plate-boundary-type earthquakes.
According to the Nakata map, the height of the tectonic scarp along the high-
angle branching faults varies from 2 to 3 km along the strike. We considered that
the height difference of the tectonic scarp corresponds to the difference in
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cumulative displacement of previous repeating earthquakes and therefore is related
to both the coseismic displacement and relative activity of the faults. From a
viewpoint of interpretation of tectonic landforms, it is characterized that type Y
section shows the highest tectonic scarp in the Nakata map, and types A to D
sections show the difference of tectonic scarp height in descending order.
4.3 Fault Parameters
The parameters of location, length, strike, dip angle, depth of fault upper edge, and
fault width for the earthquake source fault model were determined using the fault
distribution and character of the tectonic scarps in the Nakata map. First, the
location, length, and strike were determined from the type differences in the Nakata
map from ten linear sections with different lengths between 30 and 80 km and the
individual strike (Fig. 4.2a) Second, the dip angle and the depth of the fault upper
edge were examined by comparing the Nakata map with the seismic profile records
(e.g., Kato [3]; Fig. 4.1c). The dip angle of type Y section in the Nakata map
corresponds to the decollement of the plate boundary, and the average of 14Wwas
assigned to the parameters from several seismic profile records ranging from 12W
to 16W. The depth of the fault upper edge was assigned as 0 km since the
decollement of the plate boundary reaches the sea bottom.
The dip angles of types A to D sections of high-angle branching faults were
assigned as 26W from several seismic profile records ranging from 25W to 28W.
The tectonic landforms of these sections display a humped form with a relatively
long wavelength of 20 km, and such hump-shaped tectonic landforms have been
observed empirically when the upper fault edge was buried beneath the subsurface.
Thus, the depth of the fault upper edges of these types was 5 km beneath the
tectonic scarps on the sea bottom, as shown in Fig. 4.1c. For the fault width, the
parameters of low-angle decollement plane (e.g., Fujii and Satake [5], Fig. 4.2a) for
the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake were referred since the high-angle branching
faults in this study converged to the decollement of the plate boundary (Fig. 4.1c).
Subsequently, the average slip value of 11 m was calculated from the empirical
equation of fault area and average displacement given in “A Formula for the
Prediction of Strong Ground Motion of Subduction-Type Earthquakes” [6]. Finally,
the slip distribution of 25 sub-faults was assigned using a trial-and-error method
under the following four constraint conditions: (1) the total seismic moment is
preserved, (2) the maximum slip is almost twice the average slip according to the
formula of HERP [6], (3) the area of maximum slip is almost 20 % of the total fault
area according to the formula of HERP [6], and (4) the slip distribution of the
section of decollement is close to that of the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake since our
model shared the deep part of the low-angle fault plane with that of the 2011
Tohoku-oki earthquake as the decollement of the plate boundary.
The resulting model parameters (Model1) are summarized in Table 4.1 and
Fig. 4.2b. The amount of slip and the area of the asperity of the formula [6] were
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in close agreement with those of the shallow part of the sub-faults along the type Y
section in the Nakata map. It is important to note that the location and depth of the
upper fault edge of the type A to D sections as high-angle branching faults in
Fig. 4.2 Earthquake source fault models. (a) The 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake from Fujii and
Satake [5]; (b) Model1, the high-angle branching fault model of this study; (c) Model2, sub-faults
of Model1 without high-angle branching part; (d) Model3, sub-faults of Model2 and extended
sub-faults to the sea bottom with same low-angle and same slip amount. The epicenter of the 2011
Tohoku-oki earthquake is indicated by an asterisk
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Fig. 4.2b differed from those of the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake (e.g., Fujii and
Satake [5], Fig. 4.2a). In addition, the slip amount of type Y section and type A to D
sections are empirically average values compared to the exceptionally large value
estimated for the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake (Fig. 4.2a) compared to the empir-
ical average value of the type Y section in Fig. 4.2b. In order to clarify the influence
of high-angle branching faults in this study, two additional models are compared;
one is Model2 displayed in Fig. 4.2c consisting of Model1 sub-faults without high-
angle branching parts (ID; 1, 4, 7, 16, 19 in Table 4.1) and the other is Model3
displayed in Fig. 4.2d replacing high-angle branching parts with extended
low-angle sub-faults to the sea bottom with same seismic moment (ID; a–e in




















1 40.1 144.0 5 190 27 90 36 20 6
2 40.2 143.7 15 190 14 90 36 32 6
3 40.2 143.4 23 190 14 90 36 121 0
4 39.8 143.9 5 190 27 90 71 20 10
5 39.8 143.7 15 190 14 90 71 49 10
6 39.9 143.1 27 190 14 90 71 109 0
7 39.1 143.9 5 190 27 90 73 20 14
8 39.2 143.6 15 190 14 90 73 78 14
9 39.3 142.8 34 190 14 90 73 92 0
10 38.5 143.8 0 190 14 90 46 129 21
11 38.7 142.3 31 190 14 90 46 74 0
12 38.0 143.8 0 190 14 90 46 145 21
13 38.3 142.2 35 190 14 90 46 73 0
14 37.6 143.6 0 190 14 90 30 140 21
15 37.9 142.1 34 190 14 90 30 70 0
16 37.4 143.3 5 190 27 90 45 20 10
17 37.4 143.1 15 190 14 90 45 111 10
18 37.6 141.9 42 190 14 90 45 61 0
19 37.0 143.0 5 190 27 90 35 20 6
20 37.0 142.8 15 190 14 90 35 111 6
21 37.2 141.6 42 190 14 90 35 54 0
22 36.7 142.6 0 190 14 90 78 113 5
23 36.9 141.3 27 190 14 90 78 55 0
24 36.1 142.0 0 190 14 90 34 74 5
25 36.2 141.2 18 190 14 90 34 56 0
a 40.10 144.21 0.10 190 14.0 90 36 75 4
b 39.75 144.22 0.10 190 14.0 90 71 96 7
c 39.11 144.05 0.10 190 14.0 90 73 117 12
d 37.34 143.54 0.10 190 14.0 90 45 155 8
e 36.95 143.30 0.10 190 14.0 90 35 156 5
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Table 4.1). The moment magnitude and average slip amount of these three models
are calculated as Mw8.9 and 6.6 m in Model1, Mw8.8 and 6.0 m in Model2, and
Mw8.9 and 5.5 m in Model3.
4.4 Tsunami Simulation and Results
A simulation of tsunami propagation was performed using the TSUNAMI-K
software developed by Kozo Keikaku Engineering, Inc., which applies an equation
of motion and an equation of continuity including nonlinear long-wave theory with
an advective term and a sea-bottom friction term in the Staggered Leapfrog
Method. The initial condition of tsunami production was derived from the static
tectonic movement calculated from the fault displacement model using the para-
meters in Table 4.1. The Manning roughness coefficient was assigned the typical
value of 0.025 [m(1/3) s]. A Digital Elevation Model of 50-m grid interval for
onshore areas from the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan and a Digital
Bathymetry Model of 500-m grid interval for offshore areas from the Hydrographic
and Oceanographic Department, Japan Coast Guard were used in the simulation.
The grid size for the simulation was assigned as 1350 m, and the duration period for
the tsunami simulation was 2 h with an interval of 1 s to satisfy the stability
condition of the simulation.
Several indices, such as tsunami height, trace height, and run-up height, were
adopted from observed tsunami evaluations. However, observational data from
onshore and shallow-sea points are directly influenced by local undulation and
landforms and were inappropriate for comparison with the simulation results of the
Digital Bathymetry Model with its 500-m resolution. Therefore, we compared our
simulation results with observed tsunami records from sea-bottom pressure sensors
located at points P02 and P06 [7] and tsunami recorder at points TM1 and TM2 [8]
in Fig. 4.1a situated off the coast of Iwate to demonstrate the maximum tsunami
height. Figure 4.3 shows the comparison of tsunami heights of Model1, Model2,
and Model3. The maximum heights obtained from high-angle branching fault
simulation (black line) were 2.8 m at P02, 2.9 m at P06, 2.7 m at TM1, and 3.0 m
at TM2. These values are approximately 60 % of the observed maximum height of
5 m recorded at the 2011 Tokoku-oki earthquake. However, when we used the
estimated fault parameters of Fig. 4.2a in our tsunami simulation software to
simulate the 2011 Tokoku-oki earthquake, the maximum heights are 0.8 m smaller
with Model1 at TM1 and TM2 though almost same with Model1 at P02 and P06.
This means that the sea-bottom deformations of Model1 with high-angle branching
fault and average slip amount calculated using the fault dislocation model show
almost equivalent potential as the estimated model for the 2011 Tokoku-oki
earthquake if we consider the accuracy and limitations of the tsunami simulations.
The comparison between three models and observed tsunami height at TM1 and
TM2 where these recorders are located at the back of the sections of high-angle
branching faults also suggests that earthquakes produced by branching faults with
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average slip possess a tsunami potential comparable to that produced by the
exceptionally large slip of the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake at several points
along the coast. In other words, the observed severe tsunami of the 2011 Tohoku-
oki earthquake may not be exceptional for the eastern coast of Tohoku District. The
situation is similar along the eastern coast of Japan where faults exist on the
continental slope parallel to the trench axis, and the tsunami potential of the high-
angle branching faults should be considered in the design of disaster prevention
measures.
Fig. 4.3 Comparison of simulated tsunami height at points P02, P06, TM1, and TM2 (Fig. 4.1)
where the observed data of the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake are recorded. Model1, black line;
Model2, orange line; Model3, green line
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4.5 Summary and Conclusion
The potential of a tsunami produced by a future earthquake due to active faults on
the continental slope was identified from the 3D tectonic landform analysis com-
piled in the Nakata map. Some of these faults display relatively high-angle dipping
estimated from seismic profiling records. Thus, the simulated tsunami potential is
almost equal to that of the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake under limitations of the
simulations since faults of high angle with average slip produce effects similar to
sea-bottom deformation compared to low-angle faults with exceptionally large slip
as in the 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake.
These active faults on the continental slope are recognized not only along the
Japan Trench examined in this study but also the Nankai Trough in the western part
of Japan. To evaluate the tsunami potential including both “plate-boundary mega-
thrust” and high-angle branching fault type earthquakes, the Digital Bathymetry
Model should be developed further, and the use of combined comprehensive
interpretations of geophysical and geomorphological analysis should be promoted.
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Chapter 5
Extensive Area of Topographic Anaglyphs
Covering Inland and Seafloor Derived Using
a Detailed Digital Elevation Model
for Identifying Broad Tectonic Deformations
Hideaki Goto
Abstract Topographic anaglyph images were viewed with red-cyan glasses
enabled to recognize topographic relief features easily. Anaglyphs produced from
digital elevation model (DEM) data are a very effective technique to identify
tectonic geomorphology. The aim of this paper was to introduce an extensive
area of topographic anaglyph images produced from the 5-m-mesh and 10-m-
mesh inland DEM of Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, as well as the
1-s-mesh DEM on the seafloor. In this paper, we present two examples which show
that the extensive area of anaglyph produced from combined detailed DEM is
advantageous for identifying broad tectonic geomorphology near a coastal area,
as well as in urban areas, to view “naked” topography exaggerated vertically. For
instance, the NW-SE trending active flexure scarp on the Musashino surface to the
north of Tokyo Metropolis has been identified by means of interpretation of these
images. The tectonic deformation on the shallow seafloor near Kisakata has also
been identified, where the emergence of the lagoon associated with the Kisakata
earthquake (M7.0) of 1804 was recorded in the historical documents. When ana-
glyphs from detailed DEM are extensive and have emphasized vertical exaggera-
tion, they are valuable for recognizing long-wave (one kilometer to several hundred
meter scaled) deformations.
Keywords Active fault • Anaglyph • Tectonic geomorphology • Digital elevation
model • Submarine topography • Kisakata • Musashino surface • Arakawa fault
5.1 Introduction
Topographic anaglyph images viewed with red-cyan glasses enables one to recog-
nize the features of topographic relief in three dimensions. Anaglyphs produced
from a digital elevation model (DEM) are very useful material for identifying
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tectonic geomorphology. For instance, Goto and Sugito [1] revealed the discovery
of several unknown inland active faults. Furthermore, Izumi et al. [2] revealed the
distribution of submarine active faults along the eastern margin of the Japan Sea.
The Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) has published inland DEM
data since the Basic Act on Promotion of Utilization of Geographical Information
implemented in 2007. Goto [3] introduced anaglyph images to study inland geo-
morphology of Japan produced by the use of the 10-m-mesh DEM of GSI. How-
ever, high-resolution topographic anaglyph images covering both onshore and
offshore areas have not been published because of a lack of detailed topographic
data. Goto [4] has presented the topographic anaglyph images of the seafloor around
Japanese Islands that were produced by using the 1-s-mesh (approximately 30 m)
DEM provided by the Japan Coast Guard.
The aim of this paper is to introduce extensive area of topographic anaglyph
images produced from the 5-m-mesh and 10-m-mesh inland DEM of GSI, as well
as the 1-s-mesh DEM (Goto [4]) on the seafloor. We identified active faults that
have deformed alluvial plains, terrace surfaces, and seafloors by means of interpre-
tation of these anaglyph images. Smaller fault scarps and fault-related broad
deformations were newly identified in numerous inland sites as well as on the
shallow seafloor. In this paper, we present two examples that show that the
extensive area of topographic anaglyphs produced from combined detailed DEM
is quite advantageous for identifying broad tectonic deformation near a coastal area,
as well as in urban areas, when the “naked” topography is exaggerated vertically.
5.2 Data and Methods
Detailed DEM of the shallow seafloor obtained from direct data acquisition, such as
acoustic prospecting/seismic profiling, is only available for a limited area of the
coast. Thus, we reprocessed the 1-s-mesh DEM from digital bathymetric charts
(M7000 series), with 1- to 2-m interval counters of the Japan Hydrographic
Association (Goto [4]) (Fig. 5.1 A–D). Currently, the published area for inlands
at 5-m-mesh DEM of GSI is still about 45 % of the territory of Japan, as of
November 2013. Therefore, the 5-m- and 10-m-resolution meshes that are at
present the most detailed DEM open to the public were combined for inland
geomorphology (Fig. 5.1 E, F).
We imported both inland and seafloor data that ranges from 2 in longitude and
1 200 in latitude to a Simple DEMViewer®. Then, we produced an anaglyph image
to be overlapped on the base map of the black and white slope shading map and the
black and white shaded relief map. We produced 65 map sheets under these
conditions with less than 35,000 pixels on one side of each sheet. We also provided
topographic anaglyph overlaid active fault maps (Nakata and Imaizumi eds. [5]) to
facilitate a reexamination of active fault geomorphology (Fig. 5.2).
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5.3 Fault-Related Broad Deformations in an Urban Area
Identified on the Anaglyph
Airborne LiDAR (light detection and ranging) surveying has been developed to
detect detailed geomorphic features (e.g., Nelson et al. [6]). Airborne LiDAR has
the capability of revealing the “bare earth,” with vegetation and buildings removed,
because the ground emits a laser pulse that can be separated from canopy returns
through a filtering process. Thus, these data can be used to explore quantitatively
the characteristics of tectonic geomorphology (e.g., Arrowsmith and Zielke [7]).
The data also revealed small-scale fault scarps in the urban area (e.g., Kondo
et al. [8]) as well as on the mountain slopes beneath the dense forest vegetation
(e.g., Lin et al. [9]). However, fault-related broad deformations were invisible on
the usual topographical maps (slope shade map, hill shade map, and contour map),
even if airborne LiDAR data was adopted. Topographical anaglyphs produced from
Fig. 5.1 The data processing flow. Box A is a part of the bathymetric chart (M7012) provided by
the Japan Coast Guard from which we reprocessed 1-s-mesh DEM. The interval of counters on the
chart is different from place to place. The distance between counters is under 50 m as shown in the
Box B. Anaglyph (C) produced from 1-s-mesh (ca.30 m) DEM reprocessed from bathymetric chart
(M7012) is quite finer than anaglyph (D) produced from 500-m-mesh DEM (J-EGG500). The
published area of 5-m-mesh DEM of GSI is limited as of November 2013 (F). The 65 sheets of
detailed topographic anaglyph within the range of 2 in longitude and 1200 in latitude are
produced (E)
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DEM based on LiDAR data are easily observed in three dimensions like stereo-
paired aerial photographs, when wearing red-cyan glasses. Broad deformation
related to recent faulting could be identified on the extensive area of the topographic
anaglyph because it can be emphasized in vertical exaggeration and rescaled on a
PC monitor. Here, newly identified tectonic geomorphology to the north of Tokyo
Metropolis is shown as an example (Fig. 5.2).
The Arakawa River flows from the Kanto Mountains into Tokyo Bay through the
northwestern part of the Kanto basin, where the Pleistocene terraces are well
developed. The terraces situated on the left and right banks in the middle reaches
of the river are called the Omiya surface and the Musashino surface, respectively
(Fig. 5.2). Kaizuka [10] suggested that the northern part of the Musashino surfaces
was inclined to the northeast, compared to the east and south slope of this surface,
based on an analysis of a contour line map. For this reason, the NW-SE trending
east side up the Arakawa fault that is buried beneath the alluvial plain would be
extended along the southwestern side of the Omiya surface (Kaizuka [10]). On the
contrary, Hirouchi [11] supposed that the displacement of surfaces across the

















Fig. 5.2 Extensive area of a topographic anaglyph around Tokyo Metropolis. It is one of the
65 sheet maps produced from 5-m-mesh and 10-m-mesh DEM of inland of GSI and 1-s-mesh
(ca.30 m) DEM of the seafloor. The dotted-line box indicates the area of Fig. 5.3
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Musashino surface and Omiya surface. The Headquarters for Earthquake Research
Promotion [12] assessed that the east-side-up buried fault was not distributed along
the Arakawa River. Therefore, the geomorphological evidence of tectonic crustal
movement has not been clarified in this area.
When we interpreted the detailed topographic anaglyphs of this area, the west-
side-up several-hundred-meter-long convex slopes were found on the northern part
of the Musashino surfaces (Fig. 5.3). These scarps must have been flexure scarps
































































Fig. 5.3 Deformation of the Musashino surfaces to the north of Tokyo Metropolis showing on the
detailed topographic anaglyph. The purple arrows indicate the flexure scarps on the Musashino
surface (Musashino flexure zone). The newly identified small scarps related to recent faulting are
marked with small arrows (a–a0 to e–e0). The small scarps (b–b0 to c–c0) on this figure are called the
Tsurugashima fault. The active fault lines depicted in the previous paper show black lines
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different heights of Musashino surfaces (M2, M3) and Tachikawa surface
(Tc) (Figs. 5.3 and 5.4) and are designated here as the Musashino flexure zone.
To the northwest of this zone, the small fault scarps facing the mountain (the
Tsurugashima fault) were also newly identified on the Iruma surface (Fig. 5.3 b–b0,
c–c0). Other small fault scarps on the surfaces are also detected using the anaglyphs
(Fig. 5.3 a–a0, d–d0, e–e0). The Musashino flexure zone extends as a series of the
Tsurugashima fault although showing the reverse sense of the downthrown side.
The upthrown side along the strike-slip fault is, in general, located on the relative
strike-slip motion side of the faulted block (e.g., Nakata and Goto [13]). Thus, the
active tectonic movement forming these features may have a left-lateral compo-
nent, although at present we failed to find any geomorphological evidence for
strike-slip faulting along these scarps. Furthermore, a series of the Musashino
flexure zone and the Tsurugashima fault might relate to the Hirai left-lateral fault
system situated to the northwest along the foot of Kanto Mountain (Fig. 5.2).
Fig. 5.4 Topographic profiles across the Musashino flexure zone and the Tsurugashima fault,
based on the DEM. The measured lines are shown in the Figs. 5.3 and 5.5
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5.4 Coastal Geomorphology on the Anaglyph
Coastal geomorphology, such as the distribution of the Holocene marine terraces
and differences in the heights of the shoreline of the Pleistocene marine terraces
along the coastline, could be a clue for not only sea-level changes but also active
tectonics (Earth crustal movements). However, the number of published geo-
morphologic reports is limited because of the lack of extensive topographic maps
covering both the onshore and offshore area seamlessly. One of the technical
methods to overcome such difficulties is to make seamless anaglyph images as
shown in this paper. Such an approach to tectonic topography including for
unknown active faults come to light around the coastline. Here, submarine active
tectonic geomorphology off Kisakata, Akita Prefecture, is shown as an example,
in order to indicate the usefulness of the anaglyph images for better understanding
of active tectonics in a coastal region.
Tectonic deformation on the shallow seafloor has been newly identified near
Kisakata, where the emergence of the lagoon associated with the Kisakata earth-
quake (M7.0) of 1804 was recorded in the historical documents (Usami [14]).
According to the historical pictures and documents, the hummocky hills caused
by the debris avalanche from Mt. Chokaisan were distributed in the lagoon around
Kisakata before the earthquake. We could observe so many different sizes of hills to
the northwestward of Mt. Chokaisan on the anaglyph (Fig. 5.5). We could also
recognize the paleo-lagoon in Kisakata by the scattered small hills surrounding the
flat plains.
To the 10–14 km west of Kisakata and Yuri-Honjo, the NS trending continental
shelf slope divides the Tobishima basin from the continental shelf. Although
several anticlinal axes of deformed Quaternary sediment are estimated to be
striking parallel to this slope beneath the continental shelf (Osawa and Suda
[15]), no surface evidence of tectonic deformation has not been recognized off
Kisakata.
However, the NNE trending steep flexure slope on the continental shelf along the
coastline neighboring to the paleo-lagoon is illustrated in the seamless anaglyph
image (Fig. 5.5). The slope extends for at least 15 km in the middle of the 10-km-
wide shallow seafloor, with a gentle sloping toward WNW. These topographic
features are consistent with subsurface structure recorded by the acoustic explor-
ation (Geological Survey of Japan [16]). The active anticline axis parallel to the
coastline was identified in the south extension of this slope by seismic reflection
profiling (Horikawa et al. [17]). This long-wave deformation would most likely be
caused by a subsurface fault, which is the most probable candidate for the source of
the 1804 earthquake, because the uplifted area associated with the earthquake
(Usami [14]) is parallel to this deformation.
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5.5 Conclusions
We produced detailed topographic anaglyphs from inland DEM measured by
LiDAR data as well as 1-s-mesh DEM from digital bathymetric charts. We could
easily observe macro- to micromorphology in three dimensions on a seamless
anaglyph image covering both onshore and offshore using red-cyan glasses.
Although it is difficult to detect a broad deformation related to recent faulting on











Fig. 5.5 An anaglyph showing the broad deformation on the shallow seafloor near Kisakata, Akita
Prefecture. The newly identified broad scarps related to recent faulting are marked with small
arrows
72 H. Goto
when it is emphasized in vertical exaggeration. Future research combining seamless
anaglyph images and well-trained personnel, to identify tectonic geomorphology
around nuclear power plant sites, will provide important datasets for seismic safety
evaluation.
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Part II
Seismic Source Modeling and Seismic
Motion
Chapter 6
Relation Between Stress Drops and Depths
of Strong Motion Generation Areas Based
on Previous Broadband Source Models
for Crustal Earthquakes in Japan
Toshimi Satoh and Atsushi Okazaki
Abstract To aim at the advancement of strong motion predictions, we develop
empirical relations between stress drops on strong motion generation areas
(SMGAs) and depths of SMGAs based on previous broadband source models
estimated by the empirical Green’s function method. A total of 25 source models
for 13 crustal earthquakes of Mw from 5.7 to 6.9 in Japan are used in this study. It is
found that stress drops on SMGAs for reverse faults are larger than those for strike-
slip faults on average. The average stress drops are 21.2 MPa, 13.3 MPa, and
18.0 MPa for reverse, strike-slip, and all types of faults, respectively. In the derived
empirical relation for all types of faults, the stress drops increase by about 1 MPa
every 1 km in depth. This depth dependency is similar to the relation between stress
drops on asperities and the depths of asperities derived by Asano and Iwata (Pure
Appl Geophys, 168:105–116, 2011), and the absolute value is 4 MPa larger than
that by Asano and Iwata (Pure Appl Geophys, 168:105–116, 2011). The depth
dependency of stress drops for reverse faults is stronger than that for strike-slip
faults. The total area of SMGAs is about 0.8 times of the total area of asperities by
Somerville et al. (Seismol Res Lett, 70:59–80, 1999). The result can be interpreted
by frequency-dependent source radiations, since asperities are estimated from
longer-period (>2 s) strong motions than SMGAs, which are mainly estimated
from strong motions in the period range from 0.1 to 5 s.
Keywords Stress drop • Strong motion generation area • Crustal earthquake •
Focal depth • Empirical Green’s function method • Reverse fault • Strike-slip fault •
Source model
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Kamae and Irikura [1] estimated a broadband source model for the 1995 Hyogoken-
Nanbu earthquake (Mw6.9) to fit near-field strong motion records by forward
modeling using the empirical Green’s function method (e.g., Irikura [2]). Since
Kamae and Irikura’s pioneering work, many researchers have estimated broadband
source models in the period range from about 0.1 to 5 s for the other big earthquakes
using the empirical Green’s function method. The broadband source models were
composed of a few strong motion generation areas (SMGAs).
Irikura and Miyake [3] proposed the recipe for strong motion predictions. In the
recipe, the source model was expressed by a few rectangular asperities and sur-
rounding background areas. Here asperities were characterized from long-period
heterogeneous kinematic slip models estimated by waveform inversion method
using strong motion records in the period longer than about 2 s [4]. Asano and
Iwata [5] studied on the relations between stress drops on asperities and depths of
asperities for crustal earthquakes. Miyake et al. [6] showed that asperities coincide
to SMGAs defined as areas that mainly generate strong ground motions. However,
the period ranges to estimate asperities based on the waveform inversion results are
relatively longer than those to estimate SMGAs by the empirical Green’s function
method. Therefore, we develop empirical relations between stress drops on SMGAs
and depths of SMGAs based on the previous broadband source models estimated by
the empirical Green’s function method for crustal earthquakes in Japan to aim at the
advancement of strong motion predictions.
6.2 Data
Data used in this study are shown in Table 6.1 [1, 6–34] and Fig. 6.1. A total of
22 articles on SMGAs [1, 6, 13, 16–34] for 13 crustal earthquakes of the moment
magnitude Mw from 5.7 to 6.9 in 1995 to 2011 are used. The numbers of the strike-
slip, reverse, and normal faults are six, six, and one, respectively. We independently
treat each source model for the same earthquake, and so the total 25 source models
are examined. We also independently treat each strong motion generation area. The
stress drops on SMGAs estimated by Miyake et al. [6] are calculated assuming the
single-asperity model. The others are calculated assuming single-crack models.
6.3 Results
Figure 6.2 shows the relations between stress drops on SMGAs and the top, center,
and bottom depths of SMGAs for strike-slip faults and reverse faults. The number
of SMGAs of each earthquake is one to three except for five by Hirai et al. [16]. The
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stress drops are less than 30 MPa except for those for the 2007 Noto Hanto
earthquake estimated by Maeda et al. [27]. Although source models for the same
earthquake are different among researchers, large SMGAs tend to be located at
deep places.
Figure 6.3a shows the relations between the stress drops and the center depths of
SMGAs for all types of earthquakes including a normal-fault earthquake and
regression relations. The average stress drops are 21.2 MPa with standard error of
9.2 MPa, 13.3 MPa with standard error of 5.3 MPa, and 18.0 MPa with standard
error of 8.6 MPa for reverse, strike-slip, and all types of faults, respectively. The
average stress drop on SMGAs of 18.0 MPa in this study is larger than average
Table 6.1 List of earthquakes and references [1, 6–34]











Kamae and Irikura [1]
Hirai et al. [16]
2 1997 Kagoshima-ken-
Hokuseibu (March)
6.0 Kuge et al. [8] Strike
slip





Miyake et al. [6]
4 1998 Iwate-ken Nairiku
Hokubu
5.9 F-net Reverse Miyake et al. [6]




Ikeda et al. [17]





Reverse Kamae et al. [19]
Satoh et al. [20]







Suzuki and Iwata [22]
Miyake et al. [23]
Satoh and Kawase [24]
Ikeda et al. [25]
9 2007 Noto Hanto 6.6 Horikawa [12] Reverse Kurahashi et al. [26]
Maeda et al. [27]
Ikeda et al. [25]
10 2007 Niigata-ken
Chuetsu-oki




Kawabe and Kamae [30]
11 2008 Iwate-Miyagi
Nairiku
6.8 Horikawa [14] Reverse Kamae [31]





Somei et al. [33]
13 2011 Fukushima-ken
Hamadori
6.6 Hikima [15] Normal Somei et al. [34]
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Fig. 6.1 Epicenters by JMA and focal mechanisms by the Global CMT Project for No.1
earthquake and by F-net for the other earthquakes
Fig. 6.2 Relations between stress drops and depths of SMGAs for strike-slip faults (left) and
reverse faults (right). Large symbols denote the center depth of each SMGA. Small symbols denote
the top and bottom depths of each SMGA
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stress drop on asperities of 10.5 MPa in the recipe by Irikura and Miyake [3]. The
average center depths are 8.90 km, 8.65 km, and 8.65 km for reverse, strike-slip,
and all types of faults, respectively. The relations between stress drops Δσa [MPa]
on SMGAs and the center depths h [km] are written as
Δσa ¼ 0:63hþ 7:88 standard error ¼ 5:26ð Þ for strike-slip faults; ð6:1Þ
Δσa ¼ 1:42hþ 8:54 standard error ¼ 8:39ð Þ for reverse faults; ð6:2Þ
Δσa ¼ 1:15hþ 7:98 standard error ¼ 8:05ð Þ for all types of faults ð6:3Þ
The depth dependency for reverse faults is stronger than that for strike-slip faults.
The stress drops for reverse faults is larger than those for strike-slip faults at the
same depth. Although the standard errors [MPa] of the empirical relations are large,
Eq. (6.3) means that stress drops increase by about 1 MPa every 1 km in depth. The
empirical relations between stress drops on asperities Δσasp and the center depths
derived by Asano and Iwata [5] for crustal earthquakes in Japan shown in Fig. 6.3a
is
Δσasp ¼ 1:10hþ 4:2 standard error ¼ 7:2ð Þ for all types of faults ð6:4Þ
The depth dependency of the equations of (6.3) and (6.4) are similar, and the
absolute value of the stress drop on SMGAs is about 4 MPa larger than the stress
drop on asperities.
We also derive the relations between seismic moment Mo [Nm] and total area of
SMGAs Sa [km
2] as shown in Fig. 6.3b in which Sa is the average for each
earthquake. The equations derived by constraining the slop to be 1/3 are written as
Fig. 6.3 (a) Relations between stress drops and the center depths of SMGAs. (b) Relations
between Mo and total area of SMGAs
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Sa ¼ 4:57 1016 Mo  107
 2=3
common logarithm of standard error ¼ 0:18ð Þ
for strike-slip faults ð6:5Þ
Sa ¼ 3:64 1016 Mo  107
 2=3
common logarithm of standard error ¼ 0:09ð Þ
for reverse faults ð6:6Þ
Sa ¼ 4:02 1016 Mo  107
 2=3
common logarithm of standard error ¼ 0:15ð Þ
for all types of faults ð6:7Þ
The scaling law for total area of asperities Sasp by Somerville et al. [4] shown in
Fig. 6.3b is written as
Sasp ¼ 5:00 1016 Mo  107
 2=3 ð6:8Þ
Sa for strike-slip, reverse, and all types of faults are about 0.91, 0.73, and 0.80 times
of Sasp by Somerville et al. [4]. Although the standard error is large, Sa for each
reverse fault is smaller than Sasp by Somerville et al. [4]. SMGAs are source models
for strong motions in the period range from 0.1 to 5 s, while the asperities are source
models for strong motions in the period longer than about 2 s. Therefore, the result
that total area of SMGAs is smaller than total area of asperities is interpreted by
frequency-dependent source radiations [35].
Short-period spectral level A which means the flat level of acceleration source
spectrum [36] is proportional to stress drop and square root of total area of SMGAs
(or asperities). Considering the equations of (6.1), (6.2), (6.5), and (6.6), A for
reverse faults is larger than A for strike-slip faults. Satoh [35] showed the same
results from strong motion records for big crustal earthquakes in Japan using the
spectral inversion method. McGarr [37] showed that peak ground velocities PGVs
normalized by Mo
1/3 and hypocentral distances depend on focal depths and are
larger for reverse faults than normal faults. He pointed out that these results are
expected from frictional laws. In addition he pointed out that data of strike-slip
faults were insufficient in his analysis, but the normalized PGVs for strike-slip
faults would lie between those for reverse and normal faults. Our results are quali-
tatively consistent with McGarr’s results, although site effects were not considered
in McGarr’s results.
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6.4 Conclusions
We developed empirical relations between stress drops on SMGAs and depths of
SMGAs based on previous broadband source models estimated by the empirical
Green’s function method. A total of 25 source models for 13 crustal earthquakes of
Mw from 5.7 to 6.9 in Japan are used in this study. As a result it is found that stress
drops on SMGAs for reverse faults are larger than those for strike-slip faults on
average. The average stress drops are 21.2 MPa, 13.3 MPa, and 18.0 MPa for
reverse, strike-slip, and all types of faults, respectively. In the derived empirical
relation for all types of faults, the stress drops increase by about 1 MPa every 1 km
in depth. The depth dependency of stress drops for reverse faults is stronger than
that for strike-slip faults. We also showed that the total area of SMGAs is about 0.8
times of the total area of asperities by Somerville et al. [4]. This result can be
interpreted by frequency-dependent source radiations, since asperities are estimated
from longer-period strong motions (>2 s) than SMGAs. The empirical relations
derived in this study would be useful for advancement of strong motion predictions
for crustal earthquakes by considering together with regional differences and
uncertainties.
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Chapter 7
Heterogeneous Dynamic Stress Drops
on Asperities in Inland Earthquakes Caused
by Very Long Faults and Their Application
to the Strong Ground Motion Prediction
Kazuo Dan, Masanobu Tohdo, Atsuko Oana, Toru Ishii,
Hiroyuki Fujiwara, and Nobuyuki Morikawa
Abstract We compiled the stress drops on the asperities in inland earthquakes
caused by strike-slip faults. Then, we applied the log-normal distribution to the data
and obtained the medium of 10.7 MPa and the logarithmic standard deviation of
0.45. Also, we compiled the stress drops on the asperities in inland earthquakes
caused by reverse faults and obtained the medium of 17.1 MPa and the logarithmic
standard deviation of 0.39.
By using the obtained log-normal distributions, we examined a procedure for
assigning the heterogeneous dynamic stress drops to each asperity. We adopted
12.2 MPa, which had been estimated by Dan et al. (J Struct Constr Eng (Trans
Archit Inst Japan), 76:(670):2041–2050, 2011) for long strike-slip faults, as the
medium, and 18.7 MPa, which had been estimated by Dan et al. (J Struct Constr
Eng (Trans Archit Inst Japan), 80(707):47–57, 2015) for long reverse faults.
Moreover, we truncated the log-normal distributions of the dynamic stress drops
on the asperities at the value of 3.4 MPa for strike-slip faults and of 2.4 MPa for
reverse faults because they should be larger than the dynamic stress drop averaged
over the entire fault.
Finally, we proposed a procedure for evaluating fault parameters taking into
account of the heterogeneous dynamic stress drops on the asperities and calculated
strong ground motions. The results had wider variations of the peak ground acceler-
ations and velocities than those with uniform dynamic stress drops on the asperities,
while the averages were almost the same.
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7.1 Introduction
Dan et al. [1, 2] proposed a procedure for evaluating the parameters of long strike-
slip faults, evaluated fault parameters based on the proposed procedure, and calcu-
lated strong ground motions. Also, Dan et al. [3] carried out the same study for long
reverse faults. In these studies, they treated the dynamic stress drops on the asper-
ities as the uniform ones. But, it is hard to assume that all the dynamic stress drops
on the asperities would be uniform in the actual earthquakes. Especially, in long
faults, the number of the asperities is thought to be large, and the heterogeneity of
the dynamic stress drops is easier to be observed. This tendency should cause large
effects on the spatial distribution of the predicted strong motions.
Hence, in this paper, we proposed a procedure for evaluating fault parameters
taking into account the heterogeneous dynamic stress drops on the asperities and
calculated strong ground motions to compare the results with ground motion
prediction equations by Si and Midorikawa [4] and with the results with uniform
dynamic stress drops on the asperities.
7.2 Statistics of the Heterogeneous Stress Drops
on the Asperities
7.2.1 Strike-Slip Faults
At first, we compiled heterogeneous stress drops on the asperities in the past inland
earthquakes caused by strike-slip faults. Table 7.1 shows stress drops on the asper-
ities or SMGAs (strong motion generation areas) in the past earthquakes obtained
by previous studies [5–9]. In Table 7.1, when the stress drops on the asperities in
one earthquake were different from each other, each value was adopted indepen-
dently, but when all the values of the stress drops on the asperities in one earthquake
Table 7.1 Stress drops on the asperities in the past inland earthquakes caused by strike-slip faults
Earthquakes References
Stress drops on the asperities (MPa)
Δσasp1 Δσasp2 Δσasp3
1995 Hyogo-Ken Nanbu Kamae and Irikura [5] 8.6 16.3 8.6
1999 Kocaeli, Turkey Kamae and Irikura [6] 12.0 5.0 10.0
2000 Tottori-ken Seibu Ikeda et al. [7] 28.0 14.0 –
〃 Muto et al. [8] 8.7 7.3 –
2005 Fukuoka-ken Seiho-oki Satoh and Kawase [9] 11.3 11.3 –
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were the same, that value was adopted as one data. Here, the stress drop Δσ, also
called static stress drop, is the difference between the initial shear stress on the fault
before the earthquake and final shear stress after the earthquake at the time all the
rupture on the fault terminates and the stress status becomes stable, and the dynamic
stress drop Δσ# is the difference between the initial shear stress and the shear stress
at the time the rupture terminates at a certain point on the fault while the rupture
may not terminate at other points. Although the stress drop Δσ and the dynamic
stress drop Δσ# are different from each other in general, we assumed the difference
to be negligible in this paper.
When the number of the stress drops was K, we adopted Hazen plot and assigned
a cumulative probability (non-exceeding probability) Pk as follows:
Pk ¼ 1 k  0:5
K
: ð7:1Þ
We calculated a logarithmic mean and a logarithmic standard deviation of the
data and fitted a log-normal distribution to the data. Figure 7.1 shows the result. The
logarithmic mean of the stress drops was calculated to be 2.37 (the
median¼ 10.7 MPa) and the logarithmic standard deviation to be 0.45.
7.2.2 Reverse Faults
Next, we compiled heterogeneous stress drops on the asperities in the past inland
earthquakes caused by reverse faults.
Table 7.2 shows stress drops on the asperities or SMGAs (strong motion
generation areas) in the past earthquakes obtained by previous studies [6, 10–18].
We calculated a logarithmic mean and a logarithmic standard deviation of the
data and fitted a log-normal distribution to the data. Figure 7.2 shows the result.
Fig. 7.1 Fitting of the
log-normal distribution to
the stress drops on the
asperities in the past inland
earthquakes caused by
strike-slip faults
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The logarithmic mean of the stress drops was calculated to be 2.84 (the
median¼ 17.1 MPa) and the logarithmic standard deviation to be 0.39.
7.3 Procedure for Evaluating Fault Parameters
We examined how to assign the heterogeneous stress drops to each asperity based
on the cumulative probability distribution obtained in Sect. 7.2 for the strong
motion prediction.
The median of the stress drops on the asperities in strike-slip faults is consistent
with the value of 12.2 MPa estimated by Dan et al. [1] as the geometrical mean of
the dynamic stress drops on the asperities in strike-slip faults and that for reverse
Table 7.2 Stress drops on the asperities in the past inland earthquakes caused by reverse faults
Earthquakes References
Stress drops on the asperities (MPa)
Δσasp1 Δσasp2 Δσasp3 Δσasp4
1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan Kamae and Irikura [6] 10.0 10.0 10.0 –
2004 Niigata-Chuetsu Kamae et al. [10] 7.0 20.0 – –
〃 Satoh et al. [11] 26.7 13.4 – –
2007 Noto-Hanto Kamae et al. [12] 20.0 20.0 10.0 –
〃 Kurahasi et al. [13] 25.8 10.3 – –
2007 Niigata-Chuetsu-oki Irikura et al. [14] 23.7 23.7 19.8 –
〃 Kamae and Kawabe [15] 18.4 27.6 27.6 –
2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Kamae [16] 13.8 13.8 – –
〃 Irikura and Kurahashi [17] 17.0 18.5 – –
2008 Wenchuan, China Irikura and Kurahashi [18] 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2
Fig. 7.2 Fitting of the
log-normal distribution to
the stress drops on the
asperities in the past inland
earthquakes caused by
reverse faults
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faults is consistent with the value of 18.7 MPa estimated by Dan et al. [3] as the
geometrical mean of the dynamic stress drops on asperities in reverse faults. Hence,
we adopted 12.2 MPa as the median for strike-slip faults and 18.7 MPa for reverse
faults. As for the variation, we adopted 0.45 as the logarithmic standard deviations
for strike-slip faults as shown in Fig. 7.1 and 0.39 for reverse faults as shown in
Fig. 7.2.
Figure 7.3 shows the cumulative probability function for strike-slip faults indi-
cated by the red line. Here, we truncated the function less than 3.4 MPa because the
averaged dynamic stress drop on the entire fault is 3.4 MPa [1]. For reverse faults,
we truncated the function less than 2.4 MPa because the averaged dynamic stress
drop on the entire fault is 2.4 MPa [3].
We chose the stress drop at the middle point in the line divided equally of the
vertical axis for the cumulative probability function, as shown in Fig. 7.3 based on
the idea of Hazen plot, and assigned it to the dynamic stress drop on each asperity.
When we apply the heterogeneity to the dynamic stress drops on the asperities,
the seismic moment and the short-period level would become different from those
of the original fault model with the uniform dynamic stress drops on the asperities.
Here, the short-period level is the flat level of the acceleration source spectrum in
the short-period range. Also, the relationship would not be preserved that the slips
on the asperities should be proportional to the dynamic stress drops on the asperities
and the equivalent radii of the asperities if the slips on the asperities obey the similar
trend as the equation of the constant stress drop on a circular crack. Hence, we
preserved the seismic moment by adjusting the areas of the asperities so that the
averaged dynamic stress drop on the entire fault should be preserved. Also, we
reevaluated the slips on the asperities so that the relationship was preserved that the
slips on the asperities should be proportional to the dynamic stress drops on the
asperities and the equivalent radii of the asperities.
Because it is impossible to preserve the short-period level, we just confirmed that
the value of the short-period level did not change largely. In this paper, we assigned




stress drops on the asperities
in the strike-slip fault
(N¼ 21)
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When we evaluate fault parameters with heterogeneous dynamic stress drops,
we first assume the parameters with the uniform dynamic stress drop such as the
areas Saspi of the i-th asperity, the dynamic stress drop Δσ#asp, and the averaged slip
Dasp on the asperities.
We put the heterogeneous stress drop on the asperity as Δσ# hetaspi , which is
generated by the way of Fig. 7.3. When we write the area of the i-th asperity with
heterogeneous dynamic stress drop as Shetaspi and its ratio to Saspi as p as follows:






































The Shetaspi can be evaluated by substituting p of Eq. (7.4) for Eq. (7.2).
On the other hand, the slip Dhetaspi on the asperity should be proportional to the
dynamic stress drop on the asperity and the equivalent radius of the asperity. Hence,










































TheDhetaspi can be evaluated by substituting q of Eq. (7.7) for Eq. (7.5). In addition,
in the case that the Dhetaspi is not larger than the averaged slip D on the entire fault, we
should assign again the heterogeneous dynamic stress drops to the asperities
randomly.
It is also necessary to evaluate the parameters for the background, and we can
adopt the same procedure as those by Dan et al. [1] and Dan et al. [3] for evaluating
the parameters of the fault model with the uniform dynamic stress drops on the
asperities.
Figure 7.4 shows the evaluation procedure of the fault parameters mentioned
above.
Fig. 7.4 Evaluation procedure of the fault parameters in the case of the heterogeneous dynamic
stress drops on the asperities
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7.4 Examples of Strong Motion Prediction Under
Heterogeneous Dynamic Stress Drops on the Asperities
For the active strike-slip fault 360 km long along the Median Tectonic Line, Japan,
shown in Fig. 7.5, we made two models with the uniform dynamic stress drops on
the asperities and with the heterogeneous dynamic stress drops.
Figure 7.6 shows the fault model with the uniform dynamic stress drops on the
21 asperities. Figure 7.7 shows the fault model with the heterogeneous dynamic
stress drops evaluated by the procedure in Fig. 7.4. We confirmed that the short-
period level of the model in Fig. 7.7 was 10 % larger than that of the model in
Fig. 7.6.
Next, we calculated strong ground motions at 10-km-mesh points around the
faults by the stochastic Green’s function method [19].
Figure 7.8 compares the peak ground accelerations and velocities for the model
with the uniform dynamic stress drops on the asperities and the ground motion
prediction equations by Si and Midorikawa [4]. Figure 7.9 compares the peak
ground accelerations and velocities for the model with heterogeneous dynamic
stress drops and the ground motion prediction equations by Si and Midorikawa
[4]. We find that the accelerations and velocities in Fig. 7.9 have larger deviation
than those in Fig. 7.8. Especially, in the vicinity of the fault trace, while most of the
peak ground accelerations and velocities for the model with the uniform dynamic
stress drops are within the mean plus/minus standard deviation of the ground
Fig. 7.5 Median Tectonic Line, Japan, and a fault model for strong motion prediction
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motion prediction equations by Si and Midorikawa [4], some of those for the model
with the heterogeneous dynamic stress drops are beyond the mean plus standard
deviation. However, the averages are almost the same.
Fig. 7.6 Fault model with uniform dynamic stress drops on the asperities
Fig. 7.7 Fault model with heterogeneous dynamic stress drops on the asperities
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Fig. 7.8 Comparison between the strong motions predicted by the fault model with uniform
dynamic stress drops on the asperities and ground motion prediction equations by Si and
Midorikawa [4]
Fig. 7.9 Comparison between the strong motions predicted by the fault model with heterogeneous
dynamic stress drops on the asperities and ground motion prediction equations by Si and
Midorikawa [4]
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7.5 Conclusions
We proposed a procedure for evaluating fault parameters taking into account of the
heterogeneous dynamic stress drops on the asperities and calculated strong ground
motions. The results had wider variations of the peak ground accelerations and
velocities than those with the uniform dynamic stress drops on the asperities,
while the averages were almost the same.
The procedure proposed in this paper can be applied not only to very long faults of
MW 8 class earthquakes but also to medium-sized faults of MW 7 class earthquakes.
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Chapter 8
Simulation of Broadband Strong Motion
Based on the Empirical Green’s Spatial
Derivative Method
Michihiro Ohori
Abstract In our previous studies (Ohori and Hisada, Zisin 2(59):133–146, 2006,
Bull Seismol Soc Am 101:2872–2886, 2011), we simulated the strong-motion
records of the mainshock (MJ5.4) of the 2001 Hyogo-ken Hokubu earthquake,
Japan, on the basis of the empirical Green’s tensor spatial derivative (EGTD)
estimated from data of 11 aftershocks (MJ3.5–4.7). The agreement between the
observed and calculated waveforms at the closest station in source distance was
satisfactory over a long duration, and the amplitude was well reproduced. But
considering the lowest corner frequency of about 1.0 Hz for the mainshock, we
targeted 0.2–1.0 Hz band-pass-filtered velocity waveforms. In the present study, we
tried to simulate the broadband strong motions beyond the corner frequencies for
the same events as in our previous studies mentioned above. To correct the
discrepancies among the corner frequencies of events, we assumed the scaling
law based on the ω2 model (Aki, J Geophys Res 72:1217–1231, 1967) and
compensated the spectral amplitude decay beyond the corner frequency. After
estimating the EGTD from 11 aftershock events using 0.2–10 Hz band-pass-filtered
waveforms, we simulated the strong-motion records for the mainshock and after-
shocks. In simulation of each event, the EGTD elements were multiplied by the
moment tensor elements followed by summation and corrected in the spectral
amplitude, taking the corner frequency of each event into account. As example
results, the simulated waveforms at the closest epicentral distance was compared
with the observed ones. The agreement between the calculated and observed
waveforms was acceptable for most of events.
Keywords Empirical Green’s tensor spatial derivative • Broadband strong
motion • ω2 model • Corner frequency • Source time function • Waveform
inversion
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The empirical Green’s function (EGF) method, proposed by Hartzell [1] and
extended by Irikura [2], has been recognized as one of the most practical techniques
to predict the strong idground motion produced by large earthquakes. The use of
this method is limited to the case when the focal mechanism of a small event is
identical or similar to that of a targeted event. On the other hand, the empirical
Green’s tensor spatial derivative (EGTD) method, proposed by Plicka and
Zahradnik [3], has the potential to deal with the difference in focal mechanisms
between small events and a targeted event and predict the ground motion for an
event with an arbitrary focal mechanism. The EGTD elements are estimated
through a kind of single-station inversion using waveform data for several small
events whose focal mechanisms and source time functions are well determined.
This technique is expected to provide considerably accurate and stable prediction
results, but discussion of its application has been limited in the literature [4–8]. In
the previous studies [6, 8], considering the lowest corner frequency of about 1.0 Hz
for the mainshock, we targeted 0.2–1.0 Hz band-pass-filtered velocity waveforms.
In the present study, we simulate the broadband strong motions between 0.2 and
10 Hz for the same events as in the previous studies [6, 8].
8.1.1 Targeted Events and Stations
In this study, we targeted the mainshock (MJ5.4, labeled as “Event 1”) and
25 aftershocks (MJ3.1–4.7, labeled as “Events 2-26”) of the 2001 Hyogo-ken
Hokubu earthquake. We used the strong motion records at the target station,
HYG004, one of the K-NET stations operated by the NIED (National Research
Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention). The source information of
these events was determined by the united hypocenter catalog of the JMA (Japan
Meteorological Agency). In Fig. 8.1, we show the distribution of focal mechanisms
and source time functions as well as location of the station. Details of source
parameters can be found in Ohori and Hisada [8]. Data for the mainshock and
15 of the aftershocks (MJ3.5–4.7) were recorded at HYG004. As one of the K-NET
stations, HYG004 was chosen as the target station because of the data quality. It is
on a rock site located at the closest epicentral distance (6–10 km) from the fault
zone, whose range was 4 km in the east–west direction and 6 km in the north–south
direction. The observed acceleration records at HYG004 for the mainshock and
15 aftershocks were integrated into velocity waveform data with a band-pass filter
of 0.2–10 Hz. To enhance the accuracy of simulation by the EGTD method, it is
desirable to know the focal mechanisms and source time functions accurately as
much as possible. In this study, we used the source model which was reevaluated in
our previous work [6]. Among 15 events, 4 aftershock events, 3, 7, 19, 26, are
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excluded in the following EGTD inversion because of the relatively large discrep-
ancy in waveform matching between the observation data and synthesis.
8.1.1.1 Estimation of the EGTD
The estimation method of the EGTD has been fully explained by Ohori and Hisada
[6, 8]. It is applicable to simulation of the strong motion in a frequency range below
the corner frequency. Hereafter, we summarize briefly the method and provide
additional explanations on how to compensate the spectral amplitude decay beyond
the corner frequencies and how to simulate the broadband ground motion.
8.1.1.2 Basic Equations
Ground motion displacement ui(xo, t) (i¼ x,y,z) excited by a double-couple point
source is theoretically expressed as the convolution of moment tensor elements
Mpq(xs,τ) (p,q¼ x,y,z) and Green’s tensor spatial derivative elements Gip,q (xo, t |
xs,τ)
ui xo; tð Þ ¼ Mpq xs; τð Þ  Gi p,q xo, t
xs, τ
  ð8:1Þ
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Fig. 8.1 Map showing the focal mechanisms and source time functions of 16 events (mainshock
and 15 aftershocks) as well as location of the station HYG004 used in present study
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Explicit expressions of Mpq for a double-couple point source are found in the
literature (e.g., Aki and Richards [9]). Considering symmetrical conditions
(Mpq¼Mqp) and no volume change [(Mxx¼(Myy+Mzz)] of the moment tensor
elements, we can rewrite Eq. (8.1) as
ui ¼
X5
j¼1 M j  Gi j ð8:2Þ
where Mj ( j¼ 1,2,. . .,5) is defined by M1¼Mxy, M2¼Myy, M3¼Myz, M4¼Myz,
M5¼Mzz, and Gij ( j¼ 1,2,. . .,5) is defined by Gi1¼Gix,y+Giy,x, Gi2¼Giy,yGx,x,
Gi3¼Giy,z +Giz,y, Gi4¼Gix,z +Giz,x, Gi5¼Giz,zGix,x. In the moment tensor inver-
sion, ui and Gij are given and Mj are the unknowns to be solved in a least-squares
sense. Conversely, in the EGTD inversion, ui and Mj are given and Gij are the
unknowns to be solved. Note that the EGTD inversion is carried out for each
component at each station using data from several events simultaneously, whereas
the moment tensor inversion is done for a particular event using data of all possible
components at all possible stations simultaneously. It should be emphasized that the
moment tensor elements are determined by the source parameters and the Green’s
tensor spatial derivative elements are by the underground structure of the area
surrounding the source and the station.
8.1.1.3 Correction of the Focal Mechanisms
The differences in source locations between the mainshock and aftershocks are
significant in the EGT inversion. To compensate for this discrepancy and treat each
event as a point source at the same location, we horizontally and vertically rotate
the focal mechanisms, referring to the literature [4, 5]. Through the horizontal
rotation, the station azimuths of the mainshock and aftershocks are set to 90 deg. as
measured from north [6]; thus, the number of Green’s tensor spatial derivative
elements is reduced to three (Gi1¼Gi4¼ 0) for the radial component (i¼ y) and
vertical component (i¼ z) and two (Gi2¼Gi3¼Gi5¼ 0) for the transverse compo-
nent (i¼ x). Through the vertical rotation, the discrepancy in the takeoff angles
between the mainshock and aftershocks is corrected, following the horizontal
rotation. The moment tensor elements derived from focal mechanisms should be
evaluated after horizontal and vertical rotations. Details of these rotations applied to
focal mechanisms should be referred to Ohori and Hisada [6, 8].
8.1.1.4 Correction Applied to the Waveform Data
To adjust the timing between the mainshock and aftershocks, we apply a time-shift
to the observation data of aftershocks to fit their S-wave arrival time with that of the
mainshock. In addition, to remove the discrepancy in the source time function, we
deconvolve the observation data. The observed waveforms used in the estimation of
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the EGTDs are corrected such that the source time function has a constant seismic
moment (1.0 1015 Nm, nearly equal toMw4.0) and a single-isosceles slip velocity
function with a rise time of 0.32 s. It is noted that the timing between the mainshock
and aftershocks and the source time function mentioned above are estimated from
0.2 to 1.0 Hz band-pass-filtered velocity waveforms. We estimated the corner
frequencies of events from the records at HYG004, assuming that source spectrum
obeys the ω2 model [10]. The corner frequency of the mainshock is about 1.0 Hz,
while those of 11 aftershocks are distributed in a frequency range between 1.2 and
3.0 Hz. To simulate the broadband ground motion up to the frequency beyond the
corner frequency, we must remove the effect of the differences among corner
frequencies. In the present study, to correct the difference in the corner frequency
of each event, we assumed the scaling law based on the ω2 model [10] and
compensated the spectral amplitude decay beyond the corner frequency of each
event so that we can assume that each event has the same corner frequency as that of
the mainshock.
8.1.1.5 EGTD Estimation
The observation data for 11 aftershocks are corrected in terms of the timings, source
time functions, the seismic moments, and corner frequencies, and they are inverted
for the estimation of the EGTD elements. On the basis of the focal mechanisms of
aftershocks rotated as mentioned above, simultaneous linear equations for each
component are constructed and solved for each of the sampling data. No constraints
such as smoothing or minimization for unknown parameters were included in the
EGTD estimation in this study. In Fig. 8.2, we show the transverse component
elements of the EGTD as example. Each element is scaled for an event with a
seismic moment of 1.0 1015 Nm with a corner frequency of 1.0 Hz as the same of
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the mainshock. It is noted that as the Green’s tensor spatial derivative elements are
determined not by the source characteristics but by the underground structure, the
EGTD elements could be useful for the structural study in future work.
8.1.1.6 Simulation of the Strong Ground Motion Using the EGTD
In Fig. 8.3, we compare radial and transverse component observed velocity wave-
forms with a 0.2–10 Hz band-pass filtering and corresponding syntheses calculated
from the EGTD. For each trace, the source time function, seismic moment, and the
corner frequency of each event are taken into account. The top trace for the
mainshock (Event 1) is not included in the EGTD inversion. Considering the
complexity included in high-frequency components, the broadband synthesis
from the EGTD reproduced acceptably the observed waveforms. Figure 8.4
shows the comparison of the maximum amplitude ratio between the synthesized
velocity waveforms and observatory data. Three frequency ranges of band-pass
filter are compared in Fig. 8.4: 0.2–1.0 Hz, 1.0–10 Hz, and 0.2–10 Hz. From this
figure, it is found that simulation results from the EGTD show high accuracy in a
frequency range of 0.2–1.0 Hz, except that the radial components of the Event 14 is
somewhat overestimated. We also find that results for a frequency range of
1.0–10 Hz are acceptable. For most of the events, the maximum amplitude ratio
between the synthesized velocity waveforms and observatory data is between 0.5
and 1.5. We note that results for a frequency range of 0.2–10 Hz are very similar to
those of 1.0–10 Hz. On the whole, our simulation of broadband ground motion from
the EGTD method reproduced successfully the observed waveforms.
8.2 Conclusions
We demonstrated the applicability of the EGTD method to simulate near-field
strong-motion records. In the previous studies [6, 8], considering the lowest corner
frequency of about 1.0 Hz for the mainshock of the 2001 Hyogo-ken Hokubu
earthquake (MJ5.4), we targeted 0.2–1.0 Hz band-pass-filtered velocity waveforms.
In present study, we simulate the broadband strong motions between 0.2 and 10 Hz
for the same events as in the previous studies [6, 8]. The upper limit of the target
frequency range in the EGTD estimation is extended to 10 Hz, while the corner
frequency of the events is in a range of 1.0 Hz to 3.0 Hz. So as to correct the
discrepancy among the corner frequencies of events, we assumed the scaling law
based on the ω2 model [10] and compensated the spectral amplitude decay beyond
the corner frequency. The agreement between the observed and calculated wave-
forms for the mainshock is satisfactory over a long duration, and there is a good
match of the amplitude. To enhance the applicability of the EGTD method, further
data accumulation and investigation should be required.
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Fig. 8.3 Comparison of 0.2–10 Hz band-pass-filtered observed velocity waveforms (thick lines)
and corresponding syntheses calculated from the EGTD (thin lines)
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Part III
Probabilistic Risk Assessment with
External Hazards
Chapter 9
Development of Risk Assessment
Methodology Against External Hazards
for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors
Hidemasa Yamano, Hiroyuki Nishino, Yasushi Okano,
Takahiro Yamamoto, and Takashi Takata
Abstract In this study, hazard evaluation methodologies were developed for the
decay heat removal of a typical sodium-cooled fast reactor in Japan against snow,
tornado, wind, volcanic eruption, and forest fire. In addition, probabilistic risk
assessment and margin assessment methodologies against snow were developed
as well. Snow hazard curves were developed based on the Gumbel and Weibull
distributions using historical records of the annual maximum values of snow depth
and daily snowfall depth. Wind hazard curves were also evaluated using the
maximum wind speed and instantaneous speed. The tornado hazard was evaluated
by an excess probability for the wind speed based on the Weibull distribution
multiplied by an annual probability of the tornado strike at a target plant. The
volcanic eruption hazard was evaluated using geological data and tephra diffusion
simulation which indicated tephra layer thickness and tephra diameter. The forest
fire hazard was evaluated based on numerical simulation which contributed to
creating a response surface of frontal fire intensity and Monte Carlo simulation
for excess probability calculation. After developing an event tree and failure
probabilities, the snow PRA showed the order of 107/year of core damage
frequency. Event sequence assessment methodology was also developed based on
plant dynamics analysis coupled with continuous Markov chain Monte Carlo
method in order to apply to the event sequence against snow. Furthermore, this
study developed the snow margin assessment methodology that the margin was
regarded as the snowfall duration to the decay heat removal failure which was
defined as when the snow removal speed was smaller than the snowfall speed.
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9.1 Introduction
External hazard risk is increasingly being recognized as important for nuclear
power plant safety after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station accident.
To improve nuclear plant safety, risk assessment methodologies against various
external hazards are necessary, although a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
methodology against an earthquake has been developed as a priority because of
the importance of consequence of an earthquake. The Atomic Energy Society of
Japan published a seismic PRA standard in 2007 [1] and a tsunami PRA standard in
2012 [2] which was vigorously developed as an important issue after the Fukushima
Daiichi accident caused by a tsunami. Except for the two external hazards, there are
no PRA standards against various external hazards in Japan. An alternative meth-
odology different from the PRA was developed in Europe for complementary safety
assessments, so-called stress tests [3]. This methodology was useful to show a
margin to core damage against earthquake and flood. Since the most challenge in
developing external PRA methodologies is to quantify the intensity of the external
hazards for the assessment, the stress test methodology would be useful and
effective to suggest safety measures and accident managements that can extend
margins to core damage against external hazards.
This study aims mainly at a contribution to the risk assessment and safety
improvement of the decay heat removal function of a prototype sodium-cooled
fast reactor (SFR) in Japan. It is well known that an earthquake is the most
important external hazard that would have a potential structural impact on system,
structure, and components of plants. In typical light water reactors (LWRs),
flooding including tsunami is an important hazard because its heat sink is sea
(river), which is also well known after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station
accident. On the other hand, the external flooding is not so significant in SFRs of
which heat sink is air. The decay heat removal system (DHRS) of the SFR utilizes
air coolers (ACs) located at high elevation, which might be affected by above-
ground hazards. This study also takes into account effects on ventilation and
air-conditioning system, emergency power supply system, and so on, for which
air is usually taken.
This study addresses extreme weathers (snow, tornado, wind, and rainfall),
volcanic phenomena, and forest fire as representative aboveground external haz-
ards, which was selected through a screening process [4]. In the first screening, after
all foreseeable external hazards were exhaustively identified, a wide variety of
external hazards were screened out in terms of site conditions, impact on plant,
progression speed, envelop, and frequency. In the second screening, the external
hazards were selected on a basis of the scope of this study (aboveground natural
hazards). Similar hazards were also merged; e.g., hail can be enveloped by tornado-
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induced missiles. Combination of external hazards is very important in the risk
assessment. For instance, in terms of aboveground hazards, this study would
address the following hazards: strong wind and heavy rain, snow and cold temper-
ature, volcanic eruption and rain, and so on.
When an extreme external hazard occurs, the nuclear plant is expected to be shut
down normally. Therefore, only the decay heat removal function was taken into
account, assuming success of reactor shutdown in this study. Although the
Fukushima Daiichi accident lessons suggested the importance of a spent fuel
pool, this study focuses as a first step on event sequences resulting in reactor core
damage because a grace period of accident management is short under hot condi-
tion in a full-power operation. The developed methodology is applied mainly to
SFRs, though it would also be basically applicable for LWRs in which air is
necessary for emergency diesel generators.
The objective of this study is to develop both the margin assessment and PRA
methodologies against the representative external hazards. The overview of this
study is schematically illustrated in Fig. 9.1. The PRA would indicate a core
damage frequency (CDF), which calculates a summation of conditional heat
removal failure probabilities multiplied by hazard occurrence frequencies which
is based on a hazard curve representing relation between the frequency and the
hazard intensity. The margin assessment would show the extension of margins from
a design basis to the core damage by introducing several measures including
accident management. An advantage of the margin assessment methodology is
un-necessity of quantitative external hazard evaluation. Since the event sequence
evaluation is needed both for the margin assessment and PRA, a difference between
them is quantification of external hazards.
Fig. 9.1 Overview of methodology development
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The present paper is intended to develop hazard evaluation methodologies
against snow, tornado, wind, volcanic eruption, and forest fire. This paper also
describes the PRA and margin assessment methodologies against snow.
9.2 External Hazard Evaluation Methodologies
9.2.1 Snow
The snow hazard indexes are the annual maximum snow depth and the annual
maximum daily snowfall depth. Snow hazard curves for the two indexes were
developed using 50-year historical weather records at the prototype SFR site
which is located in Japan Sea side central area [4].
In this study, a snow hazard evaluation methodology was developed according to
the following procedure. At first, the annual maximum data of the snow depth and
daily snowfall depth were collected. Using these data, the annual excess probability
was evaluated by plotting position formula Weibull, Hazen, and Cunnane for
general use. Of the three formulas, it is said that the Cunnane is the best suitable
and applicable to all probability distributions. Next, the parameters of Gumbel or
Weibull cumulative probability distributions were determined by a least square
method. Using the annual excess probability, the snow hazard curves were suc-
cessfully obtained after checking the conformance and stability evaluations in terms
of the annual maximum snow depth and the annual maximum daily snowfall depth.
Figure 9.2 shows the snow hazard curves using the Gumbel and Weibull distribu-
tions. It should be noted that the difference between the two distributions becomes
large in a low-frequency range exceeding the measured data (~102/year). This
may be caused by epistemic uncertainty (i.e., lack of knowledge). Considering this
uncertainty, conservative evaluations or sensitivity analysis is useful and
recommended in the risk assessment.
Fig. 9.2 Snow hazard
curve
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9.2.2 Tornado
Wind scales estimated based on structural damage caused by a tornado are usually
represented by Fujita scale, which is defined as F0¼ 17–32 m/s (average time:
~15 s), F1¼ 33–49 m/s (~10s), F2¼ 50–69 m/s (~7 s), F3¼ 70–92 m/s (~5 s),
F4¼ 93–116 m/s (~4 s), and F5¼ 117–142 m/s (~3 s).
The procedure of estimation for the tornado hazard curve is as follows. The first
step is to select an area for estimating a tornado hazard curve in Japan and to analyze
historical tornado data recorded in the selected area. This study selects one of the areas
along the seashore of Japan Sea includingHokkaido, which includes the SFR site. The
range to collect tornado data is 5 km inland and sea from the seashore in this area. The
second step is to estimate the annual probability of the tornado strike at the target
nuclear plant. The third step is to estimate the excess probability for maximal wind
speed calculated from Weibull distribution. The final step is to multiply the annual
probability estimated in the second step by the excess probability estimated in the third
step. By this calculation, the tornado hazard curve was successfully estimated [5].
9.2.3 Strong Wind
The wind hazard index is the annual maximum instantaneous wind speed which is
used to estimate missile speed [6]. Likewise the snow hazard curve, a basic concept
of this methodology is a generalized estimation way, which is characterized by
obtaining appropriate probability distribution through the conformance and stabil-
ity evaluations.
After the collection of wind speed data, an annual excess probability distribution
can be evaluated by using wind data based on plotting position formula. The strong
wind hazard curves were developed using the Gumbel and Weibull distributions, of
which parameters were calculated by a least square method. Figure 9.3 shows the
hazard curves based on the Gumbel and Weibull distributions. In the Gumbel
distribution, the estimated curve decreases linearly less than 0.1 of the annual
excess probability. In the Weibull distribution, on the other hand, the curve
decreases like a quadratic curve. From this figure, the larger the difference between
the two estimated distributions is, the lower the excess probability is.
9.2.4 Volcanic Eruption
Volcanic ash was identified as the key phenomena of the volcanic eruption hazard
in the vicinity of the plant site, so that the volcanic ash hazard evaluation method-
ology is being developed using geological data and numerical simulations of ash
diffusion. Geological data survey indicated about 2 104/year of volcanic ash
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fallout around the site, which was based on boring data of 22 ash fallouts since
110,000 years ago. This includes thin ash layers. For thicker ash layers than 5 cm,
the volcanic ash fallout frequency was estimated about 2 105/year.
From the geological data, the maximum thickness of the ash fallouts around the
plant site is about 50 cm of the Daisen-Kurayoshi tephra that erupted about
50,000 years ago. This study carried out numerical simulation of theDaisen-Kurayoshi
tephra diffusion using the Tephra2 code [7]. The simulation showed well-reproduced
ash fallout distribution in awide area. Figure 9.4 shows calculated fallout thickness and
tephra diameter along the distance from the crater. A discharge rate of fallout was
estimated about 1019 kg/s, and eruption duration was 4–8 104 s [8].
One of crucial issues of volcanic eruption is to investigate characterization of
volcanic particle, in particular fine volcanic ash less than 0.06 mm in diameter,
which could disperse vast area from the source volcano and be easily remobilized
by surface wind and precipitation after the deposition. In order to quantify quanti-
tative characteristics of fine volcanic ash particle, we sampled volcanic ash directly
falling from the eruption plume from Sakurajima volcano before landing on ground.
A newly introduced high precision digital microscope and particle grain size
analyzer allowed us to develop hazard evaluation method of fine volcanic ash
particle [9].
Fig. 9.3 Wind hazard
curve
Fig. 9.4 Calculated tephra
layer thickness and tephra
diameter
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9.2.5 Forest Fire
The phenomena of a forest fire that would give potential impacts on nuclear plants
are identified as fire, flame, smoke, and flying objects. To evaluate their impacts,
numerical simulations are utilized by using the FARSITE code with appropriate
numerical conditions: fire breakout, fire spread condition including extinguishing,
weather data, vegetation data, and simulation conditions. For these conditions,
branch probabilities are provided based on a logic tree. The simulation showed
that the wind speed and relative humidity were sensitive to the forest fire
hazard [10].
A preliminary hazard evaluation was carried out using a response surface of
frontal fire intensity with regard to the wind speed and relative humidity. The
evaluated hazard curve is such that the annual excess probability is about
1.0 104/year for the frontal fireline intensity of 200 kW/m and about
1.3 105/year for 300 kW/m [11].
Smoke is also important in the forest fire hazard evaluation. The ALOFT-FT
code was applied to the smoke transport analysis in order to investigate potential
impact on air filters for the DHRS. The total amount of particle matters estimated
was estimated well below the operational limit of the air filter [12].
9.3 Risk Assessment Methodologies Against Snow
9.3.1 PRA
Snow hazard categories were obtained from a combination of the daily snowfall
depth (snowfall speed) and snowfall duration that can be calculated by dividing the
snow depth by the snowfall speed [13]. For each snow hazard category, accident
sequences were evaluated by producing event trees that consist of several headings
representing the loss of the decay heat removal. Air ventilation channels must be
ensured for the important components in this PRA: emergency diesel generator,
ACs in the decay heat removal system. The natural circulation decay heat removal
is expected in the SFR, so that manual operation of the AC dampers is required in a
total blackout situation (the loss of direct current-powered equipment). Snow
removal operation was introduced into the event trees as the accident managements.
To succeed in the snow removal, plant personnel have to be able to reach the door to
open on the building roof and then have to remove accumulated snow from the door
to the air inlets. The failure probabilities were evaluated as a function of hazard
intensity.
The decay heat removal failure probability of each event sequence was obtained
by introducing the failure probability into the event tree. The CDF by the snow
hazard category can be calculated by multiplying each heat removal failure prob-
ability and each snow hazard occurrence frequency. In total, the CDF brings the
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order of 107/year. Figure 9.5 shows the CDF by the snow hazard category, in
which the dominant snow hazard category was a combination of 1–2 m/day of
snowfall speed and 0.5–0.75 day of snowfall duration (1–1.5 m of snow depth). The
dominant sequence was that the personnel failed the door opening on the roof after
the 1st awareness of the snow removal necessity, resulting in the loss of decay heat
removal system due to snow. Importance and sensitivity analyses indicated a high
risk contribution to secure the access routes.
Looking at Fig. 9.2, the dominant snowfall speed of 1–2 m/day is approximately
102/year of annual access probability (at 1 m/day of snowfall), and the dominant
snow depth of 1–1.5 m is approximately 101/year (at 1 m of snow depth). Such
frequencies are not so low that we are aware of the importance of relatively high
frequent hazard through this study. The PRA results would be served for the
development of safety measures and accident management. In general, although
careful attention may be often paid to extremely low-frequency events bringing
high consequence, significant hazard intensity could be clarified through PRA
studies.
The event tree methodology is well known as a classical manner for the PRA;
however, it is difficult to express time-dependent event sequences including recov-
ery. Therefore, a new assessment technique was also being developed for the event
sequence evaluation based on a continuous Markov chain Monte Carlo method with
plant dynamics analysis [14].
9.3.2 Margin Assessment
We introduced an effective snow removal speed which is defined as a daily snow
removal speed multiplied by a performance factor of the snow removal work so that
plant personnel can remove accumulated snow in a certain time. If this effective
Fig. 9.5 Core damage frequency by snow hazard category
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snow removal speed exceeds the snowfall speed, the scenario leads to no heat
removal failure. On the other hand, if the effective snow removal speed falls below
the snowfall speed, the heat removal failure scenario appears as a result of gradual
continuous accumulation of snow. The margin (day) can be defined as the snowfall
duration until when the accumulated snow depth reaches the snow depth
corresponding to the heat removal failure. In this definition, the accumulated
snow depth can be calculated as a difference between the snowfall speed and the
effective snow removal speed.
This study assumed the failure to secure the access routes when the snow depth
reached 1 m as well as conservatively assumed 1 m for the snow depth
corresponding to the heat removal failure in the decay heat removal system. The
performance factor of the snow removal work was set 1/3, assuming totally 8 h per
day for plant personnel to remove the snow. These assumptions were applied to the
margin assessment. The margin assessment result is presented in Fig. 9.6, in which
the parameter is the effective snow removal speed. No heat removal failure appears
if the snow removal speed is higher than 3 m/day (1 m/day of effective snow
removal speed) when the snowfall speed is 1 m/day. Even if the same snow removal
speed is applied, the heat removal failure scenario appears to indicate 1 day of
margin when the snowfall speed is 2 m/day. Considering such a situation, it is
important to flexibly strengthen a snow removal action plan such as an increase in
the performance factor of the snow removal work.
9.4 Conclusion
In this study, hazard evaluation methodologies were developed for the decay heat
removal function of a typical sodium-cooled fast reactor in Japan against snow,
tornado, wind, volcanic eruption, and forest fire. In addition, PRA and margin
Fig. 9.6 Margin
assessment against snow
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assessment methodologies against snow were developed as well. Snow hazard
curves were developed based on the Gumbel and Weibull distributions using
historical records of the annual maximum values of snow depth and daily snowfall
depth. Likewise this snow hazard evaluation, wind hazard curves were also devel-
oped using the maximum wind speed and instantaneous speed. The tornado hazard
data were used based on the Fujita scale in a wide area along the seashore of Japan
Sea. Using the historical records, the tornado hazard curve was estimated as an
excess probability for the wind speed based on the Weibull distribution multiplied
by an annual probability of the tornado strike at the target nuclear plant. The
volcanic eruption hazard was evaluated using geological data and tephra diffusion
simulation which indicated tephra layer thickness and tephra diameter. The forest
fire hazard was evaluated based on numerical simulation which contributed to
creating a response surface of frontal fire intensity with regard to the wind speed
and relative humidity, etc., and Monte Carlo simulation for excess probability
calculation. For the snow PRA, the accident sequence was evaluated by producing
event trees which consist of several headings representing the loss of decay heat
removal. Snow removal action and manual operation of the air cooler dampers were
introduced into the event tree as accident managements. In this paper, the snow
PRA showed the order of 107/year of core damage frequency. The dominant snow
hazard category was the combination of 1–2 m/day of snowfall speed and
0.5–0.75 day of snowfall duration. Event sequence assessment methodology was
also developed based on plant dynamics analysis coupled with continuous Markov
chain Monte Carlo method in order to apply to the event sequence against snow. For
the snow margin assessment, the index is the combination of a snowfall speed and
duration. Since snow removal can be expected for the snowfall, this study devel-
oped the snow margin assessment methodology that the margin was regarded as the
snowfall duration until when the accumulated snow depth reaches the snow depth
corresponding to the decay heat removal failure.
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Chapter 10
Effectiveness Evaluation About the Tsunami
Measures Taken at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS
Masato Mizokami, Takashi Uemura, Yoshihiro Oyama,
Yasunori Yamanaka, and Shinichi Kawamura
Abstract All of the nuclear power stations of TEPCO had experienced huge exter-
nal events. One of which is the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in 2007 at
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (NPS), and the other is the Great East
Japan Earthquake in 2011 at Fukushima Daiichi NPS and Fukushima Daini NPS.
Especially, the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 experienced severe accident, since
prolonged station blackout (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) were
induced by the huge tsunami which was generated by the Great East Japan Earth-
quake. The most important lesson learned was that the defense-in-depth for external
event was insufficient. Therefore, we are implementing many safety enhancement
measures for tsunami in our Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station. Thus, in
order to confirm the effectiveness of these safety enhancement measures, TEPCO
performed tsunami PRA studies. The studies were conducted in accordance with
“The Standard of Tsunami Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for nuclear power
plants” [1] established by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan. TEPCO conducted
two state (the state before the implementation of accident management
(AM) measures and the state at the present) evaluations to confirm the effectiveness
of the safety enhancement measures. In this evaluation, TEPCO were able to confirm
the effectiveness of safety enhancement measures carried out towards plant vulner-
abilities that were found before these measures were implemented.
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All of the nuclear power stations of TEPCO had experienced huge external events.
One of which is the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in 2007 at Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa Nuclear Power Station (NPS), and the other is the Great East Japan
Earthquake in 2011 at Fukushima Daiichi NPS and Fukushima Daini NPS. Espe-
cially, the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 experienced severe accident, since
prolonged station blackout (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) were
induced by the huge tsunami which was generated by the Great East Japan
Earthquake. One of the lessons learned is “defense-in-depth for tsunami was
insufficient.” In terms of safety enhancement of nuclear power plant from this
lesson, countermeasure for each layer of defense-in-depth against tsunami is
enhanced in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS. Then, we perform tsunami PRA in
order to understand plant vulnerability and to check validity of deployed counter-
measure against tsunami for Unit 7 (ABWR) of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS. This
paper describes the evaluation result completed by applying to states before and
after the implementation of the tsunami countermeasures.
10.2 Outline of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
Station
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (see Fig. 10.1) is located in Kariwa
Village and Kashiwazaki City in Niigata Prefecture facing on the coast of the Japan
Sea, and seven nuclear reactors (Unit 1–5: BWR5, Unit 6, 7: ABWR, a total of
8212 MWe) are built.
The ground elevation is T.P. 5 m (Tokyo Peil: sea-level of Tokyo Bay) at the
north side (Units 1–5) and T.P. 12 m at the south side (Units 5–7).
South Side (unit 1 –4) North Side (unit 5 –7)
Fig. 10.1 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS
124 M. Mizokami et al.
10.3 Tsunami PRA for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Power Station
In Japan, from the lesson of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, development of
tsunami PRA method was accelerated immediately after the accident, and Atomic
Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) issued tsunami PRA guideline in February 2012
[1]. Then, TEPCO started to perform tsunami PRA to evaluate the effectiveness of
tsunami countermeasures. In the state before the implementation of tsunami coun-
termeasures, since there is no means to prevent flooding to building and function
failure of important equipment assuming generation of tsunami exceeding the 1st
floor height of the building, each flooding propagation evaluation and fragility
evaluation is done with a simple method, and the core damage frequency (CDF)
for each accident sequence is calculated.
10.3.1 Tsunami Hazard Evaluation
Tsunami hazard for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS is evaluated based on the
“method of probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis” [2] issued in 2009 by the Japan
Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE). However, the occurrence frequency and the
scale of earthquake, assuming multi-segment rupture of the faults which is the latest
knowledge acquired in the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake, are
also taken into consideration.
10.3.1.1 Tsunami Source Model
Regarding the tsunami-induced source area, the tsunami induced by earthquake,
originated by faults which exist in the area, is determined in terms of whether they
have significant influence on the tsunami hazard of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS.
As a result, the following areas are selected:
1. The fault which is considered in seismic design and is identified by geological
survey, etc.
2. The fault which is unidentified by investigation, but indicated by an external
organization (epicenter at coast of the Niigata southwest earthquake).
3. The east edge of Japan Sea; Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS is considered to be
affected significantly when tsunami occurs there.
Regarding these tsunami occurrence areas, the tsunami occurrence scenario is
created by setting up the magnitude range and the earthquake recurrence interval.
10 Effectiveness Evaluation About the Tsunami Measures Taken at Kashiwazaki. . . 125
10.3.1.2 Uncertainty
Random uncertainty in a numerical computation model and epistemic uncertainty
regarding some issues such as the existence of active fault and magnitude range,
etc., are considered in tsunami hazard evaluation. Epistemic uncertainty is dealt
with as number of branch of tsunami occurrence scenario, and given weighting to
each scenario. Weights of discrete branches that represent alternative hypotheses
and interpretations were determined by the JSCE guideline basically. In this
evaluation, the magnitude range, earthquake occurrence probability, probability
of multi-segment rupture of the faults, and probability distributions of random
uncertainty are taken into consideration.
10.3.1.3 Hazard Curve
The annual probability of exceedance of tsunami wave height is created for each
tsunami occurrence scenario defined in Sects. 11.3.1.1 and 11.3.1.2. Next, for each
curve, with consideration for the weighting corresponding to each scenario, statis-
tical processing is performed, and hazard curve is created for weighted average as
arithmetic average for weighted accumulation sum as fractal curve. As mentioned
above, the tsunami hazard curve (tsunami run-up area at the north side) is shown in
Fig. 10.2. In evaluation of the state before the implementation of tsunami counter-
measures, when tsunami exceeds height of the 1st floor of building, it is simply
assumed that flooding in the building occurs and equipment function is lost, and it





































Fig. 10.2 Tsunami hazard curve
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height is T.P.12.3 m, when the tsunami beyond this height strikes, it is evaluated as
core damage occurs.
10.3.2 Tsunami Fragility Evaluation
Regarding influence of tsunami on equipment, damage by flooding and by tsunami
wave force is considered. Regarding equipment on yard and door on outer wall of
the buildings such as yard tank, yard watertight door, etc., the failure probability
against tsunami wave force is set by flooding depth based on tsunami run-up
analysis result. Regarding equipment and door inside building, the damage proba-
bility is set by flooding propagation analysis result for building. Regarding tsunami
run-up analysis, it is performed for multi-case of tsunami height. For each case,
fragility curve is evaluated from the equipment damage probability with consider-
ation for the uncertainty in the flooding depth of the installation location for each
equipment. The main assumptions in the fragility evaluation are shown below:
1. Embankment, tidal wall
When tsunami exceeds the height of the embankment or tidal wall, these failures
are assumed.
2. Watertight door, general door
Regarding protection doors installed on building outer wall, fragility evaluation
is conservatively performed with consideration for tsunami wave force.
3. Yard tanks (light oil tank, pure water storage tank)
Since these tanks are on the ground, damage evaluation by tsunami wave force is
performed, but evaluation for flooding and function affected by water level by
submersion is also performed.
4. Fire protection system piping
Fracture evaluation is performed for bending load of piping changed by tsunami
wave force. Branch piping which has high failure possibility is also taken into
consideration.
5. Equipment in building (reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC), power
panel, etc.)
Flooding propagation evaluation in building is performed, and when the
concerned equipment and required support system are inundated, the function
failures are assumed.
However, in evaluation of the state before the implementation of tsunami
countermeasures, fragility evaluation with consideration for uncertainty is not
performed, but method that the events induced by the tsunami of a certain height
are deterministically evaluated is adopted.
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10.3.3 Accident Scenario Identification
10.3.3.1 The State Before the Implementation of Tsunami
Countermeasures
At the state before the implementation of tsunami countermeasures, it is assumed
accident scenarios considering flooding according to the tsunami wave height. In
addition, if the tsunami height is below the site level (T.P. 12 m), it is assumed that
inundation starts via maintenance hatch (T.P. 3.5 m) in the heat exchanger area in
the turbine building when tsunami height exceeds T.P. 3.5 m. Also, it is conserva-
tively assumed that all the buildings connected to turbine building are flooded to the
tsunami height.
0. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.2 m and T.P. 4.8 m
The support system (e.g., reactor cooling water system (RCW) pumps, reactor
sea water system (RSW) pumps) is located in basement 1st floor of turbine
building (T/B). When tsunami height exceeds T.P. 4.2 m, the support system is
flooded, and it causes LUHS by the function failure. In addition, non-safety-
related metal-clad switch gear (M/C) in basement 2nd floor of T/B is also
flooded.
1. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.8 m and T.P. 6.5 m
Emergency M/C in basement floor of reactor building (R/B) is flooded and lost
its function. It causes SBO by the function failure of emergency M/C and non-
safety-related M/C, because it cannot be powered by off-site power and emer-
gency diesel generators (D/Gs).
2. Tsunami height between T.P. 6.5 m and T.P. 12.3 m
DC power panel in the basement floor of control building (C/B) is flooded and
loses its function. It causes loss of DC power.
3. Tsunami height exceeding T.P. 12.3 m
Tsunami runs up to the site level, low-voltage start-up transformer located at the
site level is flooded and loses its function, and inundation into the main buildings
occurs via entrance of each building.
10.3.3.2 The State After the Implementation of Tsunami Measures
Using the results of tsunami fragility analysis as a reference, initiating events which
are induced by tsunami are adopted and accident scenario analysis is conducted.
The extracted initiating events are shown below:
1. Loss of off-site power (LOOP)
• Flooding of low-voltage start-up transformer
2. Loss of function of emergency D/G
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• Flooding of emergency D/G(A,B,C) by inundation of R/B
• Fuel transport failure by damage of light oil tank
• Fuel transport failure by damage of fuel transport pump
• Operation failure of emergency D/Gs operation failure by loss of support
system function by T/B flooding
• Flooding of emergency power panel room in R/B
3. Loss of ultimate heat sink
• Loss of support system function by T/B flooding
• Loss of support system function by D/G failure (in case of LOOP)
4. Loss of instrumentation and control system function
• Flooding of main control room (MCR) in C/B
• Flooding of DC power panel in C/B
Plant walkdown in R/B, T/B, and yard is implemented by analysts and designers
to confirm the result of fragility analysis and assumed accident scenario. As a result,
validity of the fragility and scenario is checked.
10.3.4 Accident Sequence Evaluation
10.3.4.1 The State Before the Implementation of Tsunami
Countermeasures
Accident scenario changes according to tsunami height. So, initiating events and
credited mitigation systems are changed as well.
1. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.2 m and T.P. 4.8 m
Initiating event is set as LUHS. In identified accident scenario, the relief valve
function of SRV and RCIC are credited as mitigation systems. Event tree is
shown in Fig. 10.3. CDF for this tsunami height is calculated as 8.8E-5(/RY),
and dominant sequence is TQUV (transient with loss of all ECCS injections).
2. Tsunami height between T.P. 4.8 m and T.P. 6.5 m
Initiating event is set as LUHS and SBO. Credited mitigation system is the same
as (1). Event tree is shown in Fig. 10.4. CDF for this tsunami height is calculated
as 1.0E-4(/RY) and dominant sequence is TQUV.
3. Tsunami height exceeding T.P. 6.5 m
Initiating event is set as LUHS, SBO, and loss of DC power. No credited
mitigation system is set because it is assumed loss of DC power. Event tree is
shown in Fig. 10.5. CDF for this tsunami height is calculated as 2.5E-5 (/RY),
and dominant sequence is TBD (transient with loss of all AC and DC powers).
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Tsunami PRA results at the state before the implementation of countermeasures
is shown in Fig. 10.6. Total CDF is calculated as 2.1E-4(/RY) in average value. As







TW: Transient with loss of decay heat removal
 Containment vessel failure before core damage
TQUV: Transient with loss of all high pressure and low pressure ECCS injections.
























TW: Transient with loss of decay heat removal
 Containment vessel failure before core damage
TQUV: Transient with loss of all high pressure and low pressure ECCS injections.


















Fig. 10.4 Event tree (tsunami height T.P. 4.8 m–6.5 m)
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TQUV: Transient with loss of all high pressure and low pressure ECCS injections
TBD: Transient with loss of all AC & DC powers
Fig. 10.6 Contribution of each accident sequences for CDF in tsunami PRA (the state before the
implementation of tsunami countermeasures)
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10.3.4.2 The State After the Implementation of Tsunami
Countermeasures
Based on the result of tsunami fragility analysis, in the accident sequence analysis,
failure rate which is relevant to initiating events or equipment relevant to credited
mitigation system is calculated, and combination of tsunami height and damaged
equipment is considered.
Regarding the accident sequence analysis, tsunami initiating hierarchy event tree
is constructed. In this event tree, yard equipment whose failure is directly connected
to the initiating event is set as heading. The hierarchy event tree is shown in
Fig. 10.7. In event tree for each initiating event which is expanded from the
hierarchy event tree, yard equipment which is not considered as heading is set as
mitigation systems.
The outline of accident sequence analysis is described below:
1. Tsunami height between T.P. 15 m and T.P. 17 m
Because, as shown by the fragility analysis result, the watertight doors of each
building are not broken by tsunami of this height, inundation into the buildings
does not occur, but the fuel transport pumps on yard are destroyed by tsunami. In
this state, random failure of temporary oil transport pump which is installed
thereafter is assumed. Because of this, all emergency D/Gs lose their function,
and it causes the SBO.
2. Tsunami height between T.P. 17 m and T.P. 18 m
Because, as shown by the fragility analysis result, the watertight doors of T/B
and R/B are broken by tsunami of this height, inundation into the T/B and R/B
























To LOOP: To child event tree for initiator event "Loss of Offsite Power", (the CDF of this sequence is 7.1E-11)
To SBO1: To child event tree for initiator event "Station Black Out with loss of emergency DC", (CDF: 2.8E-09)
To SBO2: To child event tree for initiator event "Station Black Out with loss of support system", (CDF:1.2E-09)
TBU: Transient with loss of all AC powers and ECCS(RCIC) injections
TBD: Transient with loss of all AC & DC powers
Fig. 10.7 Hierarchy event tree
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RCW and RSW pumps) and the loss of its function, and then LUHS occurs.
Also, inundation into the R/B causes the flooding of RCIC control panel and the
loss of RCIC function. Then all of the water injection function failure is
occurred.
3. Tsunami height exceeding T.P. 18 m
Because, as shown by the fragility analysis result, the watertight door of C/B is
broken by tsunami of this height, inundation into the C/B occurs, and it causes
the loss of DC power (TBD).
Tsunami PRA result at the state after the implementation of countermeasures is
shown in Fig. 10.8. Total CDF is calculated as 1.0E-7(/RY) in average value. As for
accident sequence rate, TBD is dominant sequence accounting for 74 percentages in
total CDF.
10.4 Effectiveness Evaluation About the Measure Taken
in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant
The validity of the measures against tsunami and power supply reflecting the lessons
learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident will be evaluated by using the
tsunami PRA. Here, the validity for the implemented safety measures is qualitatively







TBD: Transient with loss of all AC & DC powers
TBU: Transient with loss of all AC powers and ECCS(RCIC) injections
TB: Transient with loss of decay heat removal
Fig. 10.8 Contribution of each accident sequences for CDF in tsunami PRA (the state after the
implementation of tsunami countermeasures)
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sequences determined prior to the implementation of additional safety countermea-
sures. Regarding TQUV, probability of LUHS and possibility of inoperability of
RCIC by submersion will decrease due to installation of embankment, tidal wall, and
watertight doors for important equipment rooms such as RCIC room and modifica-
tion for maintenance hatch in T/B. Furthermore, even though all low-pressure water
injection systems are lost by tsunami exceeding the embankment height, water
injection can be done by fire engines located at high elevations. Therefore, in the
state after the implementation of the tsunami countermeasures, it can be presumed
that the occurrence probability of TQUV is reduced substantially. As for TBD,
probability of LOOP and inoperable possibility of DC power by submersion will
also decrease due to installation of embankment and watertight doors of important
equipment rooms. In addition, the enhancement of DC power supplies is
implemented for storage battery extension at higher floor in the reactor building,
additional established storage battery, installation of the small generator, and main-
tenance of the DC power supply means. Accordingly, it is presumed that the
possibility of loss of DC power decreases. Therefore, the present measures can be
presumed as being appropriate against the important accident sequences extracted.
10.5 Conclusion
Tsunami PRA studies for Unit 7 of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS was conducted, and the
dominant accident scenarios that may result in core damage due to flooding were
identified. The important accident sequences were evaluated as TQUV and TBD at
the state before the implementation of countermeasures and CDF calculated as 2.1E-
4 (/RY). This information supports qualitative assessment of the countermeasures
that have been and will be implemented which indicates that these accident sequence
probabilities will be decreased. Hence, the tsunami PRAwas performed with the state
after the implementation of tsunami countermeasures and CDF is calculated as 1.0E-
7(/RY). By comparing these two CDFs, the effectiveness of the tsunami counter-
measures which are implemented in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS is confirmed.
In this evaluation, there are some conservative assumptions, and total CDF is
evaluated conservatively. However, for the purpose of safety enhancement, PRA
should be implemented with more realistic method not to hide important sequences
and equipment. With an emphasis on a sequence whose CDF is large, if the
evaluation is impractical, there is a possibility that determination of safety measures
will not be proper.
For example, countermeasures undetermined at that time of the PRA model
design, such as waterproof treatment against internal flooding and drainage pumps,
are not considered in the present evaluation. As a result, if outside watertight doors
are broken due to wave pressure, the equipment in buildings is flooded and
damaged according to the flooding depth. For the next step, more detail flooding
propagation analyses in buildings with information of additional countermeasures
are needed. The insights of inner flooding analysis will be also available. TEPCO
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will try to improve tsunami PRA continuously and enhance safety of the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS using such results.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Chapter 11
Development of a New Mathematical
Framework for Seismic Probabilistic Risk
Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants – Plan
and Current Status –
Hitoshi Muta, Ken Muramatsu, Osamu Furuya, Tomoaki Uchiyama,
Akemi Nishida, and Tsuyoshi Takada
Abstract After the severe accident in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,
safety improvement and enhancement have been installed. In midterm and long
term, continuous efforts to improve and enhance safety are required, and technical
basis and fundamentals are needed to achieve them.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for seismic event (seismic PRA) is an effective
measure to consider the countermeasures and improvement plans to secure the
further safety of nuclear power plants regarding to seismic risk for the earthquake
exceeding the design basis earthquake ground motion. However, the application of
seismic PRA has not been utilized sufficiently so far. One of the reasons is that there
is not enough agreement among stakeholders regarding to the evaluation method-
ology and consideration of uncertainty for decision-making.
This study proposes the mathematic framework to treat the uncertainty properly
related to the evaluation of core damage frequency (CDF) induced by earthquake,
the methodology to evaluate the fragility utilizing expert knowledge, the probabi-
listic model to cope with the aleatory uncertainty as well as the development of
analysing code including these considerations for the improvement of the reliability
of the methodology and enhancement of utilization of the products of seismic PRA.
This paper presents current status and some results from scoping calculations.
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11.1 Background
After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, safety enhancement of nuclear power plants
in Japan is required by the new regulation. Moreover, continuous efforts to improve
the reinforcement of risk management will be required in the middle or long term,
and technical basis will be needed to support it. The importance of seismic PRA as a
tool to identify potential accident scenarios caused by earthquakes, to estimate their
likelihood and consequences and to support in assessing the effectiveness of
measures to enhance safety against earthquakes has been widely and strongly
recognized. However, seismic PRA has not been applied enough to achieve the
aim above. One of the reasons is that there has been sufficient discussion and
consensus building about the quantification and reduction of uncertainties in
numerical results of seismic PRA and how to consider the uncertainty for deci-
sion-making.
In this study, a new mathematical framework of seismic PRA is proposed.
Reviewing the current status of assessment procedures of accident sequence anal-
ysis in seismic PRA, this study will develop a new mathematical framework for
estimating uncertainty in SPRA results in a more comprehensive way, taking into
account uncertainties related to correlation effect of components failures which has
been difficult to quantify so far. A computer code will be developed to materialize
the proposed framework on the basis of the SECOM2-DQFM developed by JAEA
to estimate the accident sequence occurrence probability and its uncertainty. The
proposed mathematical framework is characterized by the following points:
• Representation of seismic hazard by a set of time histories of seismic motions
using methods currently being developed by Nishida et al.
• Use of probabilistic response analysis by three-dimensional building model for
determining responses of components to the seismic motions including the
correlations among the component responses
• Use of Monte Carlo simulation for quantification of fault trees in accident
sequence analysis
• Use of high-performance computing technology for realizing the use of above
technologies in seismic PRA
Current status and some results from scoping calculations will be presented.
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11.2 Current Framework and Challenges of Seismic PRA
Methodology
In this chapter, firstly, general procedure and mathematical framework current
method of seismic PRA should be reviewed; then issues of current uncertainty
analysis framework will be extracted. Moreover, previous studies possibly to
resolve the issues of mathematical framework.
11.2.1 Current Method of Seismic PRA
11.2.1.1 General Procedure of Seismic PRA
This study focuses the method of level 1 seismic PRA that evaluates the frequency
of core damage accident. In general, the basic procedures of level 1 seismic PRA
are shown in Fig. 11.1 and can be characterized as followings:
(a) Collecting the plant information and analyzing brief accident scenarios
To investigate the seismic source around the target site, characteristics of soil
and structures, and safety system configuration, the brief accident scenarios
induced by earthquakes are extracted.
(b) Seismic hazard analysis
Based on the information about faults around the target site and historical
earthquake, occurrence frequencies of seismic ground motion exceeding a
certain capacity such as maximum ground acceleration.
(c) Fragility analysis
To analyze the response and capacity of structures and components, the failure
probabilities of structures and components can be expressed as fragilities,
i.e. the function of capacity of seismic ground motion.
(d) Accident sequence analysis
To analyze seismic induced core damage accident sequences using event-tree
(ET) and fault-tree (FT) techniques, core damage frequencies are evaluated
based on these accident sequences, results of hazard analysis and fragility
analysis.
Fig. 11.1 Outline of seismic PRA methodology
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11.2.1.2 Mathematical Framework of Current Method
In this study, focusing on the above items (c) and (d), mathematical model consid-
ering uncertainties of components and system failures will be studied. The math-
ematical framework for evaluating frequencies of accident sequences of seismic
PRA is based on the concept by Kennedy et al. [1] and characterized as follows:
• The results of hazard analysis will be expressed as exceeding probabilities, that
is, occurrence frequencies of seismic ground motions depending on the capacity
on the target site. The levels of seismic ground motions are expressed as
maximum accelerations of the surface.
• The wave used for response analysis is one of the time histories of waves such as
design basis seismic ground motion. The impacts of variability of ground motion
spectra are considered as variability of response factors explained later.
• The fragilities of components can be expressed as the probability that response
exceeds capacity of the components, based on the assumption that probability
distributions of response and capacity depending on the levels of seismic ground
motion are the log-normal distribution, respectively.
• The median values of response depending on the seismic level are evaluated by
linear extrapolation for the component response results associated with design
basis seismic motion or interpolation of the results of calculations performed at
several levels of ground motion.
• Standard deviations on the log scale for the response can be evaluated by expert
opinion based on the results of the similar response analysis or comparison
among observation points. Usually, response can be analyzed by the Sway-
rocking model.
• Since responses are usually analyzed based on the design basis framework,
response factors are introduced to consider impacts included in the assumption
to secure conservatives of the design and to describe impacts of the uncertainty
of model or data.
• Component capacities are expressed by median value and standard deviation;
these parameters are set based on the results of structural analysis or verification
test and, if necessary, expert opinion.
• Occurrence conditions of accident sequences are expressed as groups of minimal
cut sets (MCS) equivalent to logical expression of accident conditions expressed
by ET and FT. To calculate occurrence probabilities of these MCSs, the prob-
ability of certain accident sequence can be evaluated associated with the certain
level of seismic ground motion.
• Core damage frequencies can be evaluated by the integration of the product of
the probability of accident sequence associated with the certain ground motion
level and seismic frequencies all over seismic ground motion levels.
Since the most important characteristics of the current framework is the exten-
sive use of design information and the safety factors (response factors and capacity
factors) that express the conservatism in the models used response and capacity
evaluations in design, the current methodology is frequently called “the factors of
safety method”.
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On the other hand, the method of Seismic Safety Margins Research Program
(SSMRP) [2] is the other mathematical framework which adopts more detail model
and input than that by Kennedy et al.; however, SSMRP method has not been fully
used because of its complexity. Based on SSMRP method, new mathematical
framework of this study will be established and presented in the next chapter.
11.2.2 Studies About Uncertainty Analysis Framework
11.2.2.1 Uncertainty Analysis Framework of Current Method
Current method was proposed to evaluate component failure probabilities by
Kennedy et al. in 1980. The characteristics are as follows:
• Uncertainty of seismic hazard is expressed by the fractile curves that are
composed of multiple curves corresponding to the percentage of the confidence
level or aggregate curves corresponding to each set of alternative models and
assumptions in calculating the hazard curve.
• Main causes of variability of model and data expressing response and capacity
are categorized to “aleatory uncertainty” (or “uncertainty due to randomness”)
and “epistemic uncertainty” (or “uncertainty due to lack of knowledge”). The
first one can’t be reduced by the insights of experiments or theoretical studies
because this type of variability is caused by inherent randomness of natural
phenomena. The second one can be reduced by the insights of expansion of
experimental data and enhancement of analysis models because this variability
comes from lack of knowledge or simplification of analysis model.
• Usually, uncertainties in hazard analysis, fragility analysis, and in parameters of
accident sequence models are propagated to the uncertainty in core damage
frequency, while uncertainty of event tree and fault trees used in accident
sequence analysis are considered by sensitivity studies.
11.2.2.2 Issues of Current Mathematical Framework
Seismic PRA is expected to provide useful insights and information for various
decision-making. Important uses include the quantitative evaluation of the safety
level of NPPs by comparing core damage frequencywith quantitative safety goals and
extraction of important accident sequences in a viewpoint of contribution to the total
risk to enhance the safety features and accident countermeasures. So the followings
are desirable and these needs are enhanced after Fukushima Daiichi accident:
• To reduce uncertainty in core damage frequency as far as possible.
• Plant damage states should be analyzed in detail. For example, how many
systems failed simultaneously, how many structures such as buildings or piping
failed or how they failed? What are the impacts of simultaneous occurrence of
accidents in different units in a multiple unit site?
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However, current seismic PRA method (the factor of safety method) has several
difficulties that hinders improvement of its numerical accuracy; in other words
resolution capability, for identifying important contributors, and many of them are
tightly related to the simplification in the mathematical framework described above
and are shown as follows:
(a) Issues Mainly Related to the Hazard Analysis
• The characteristic of seismic motion is expressed by only one parameter,
i.e. peak ground acceleration. This means that dependency between the
characteristic of the seismic source, i.e. distance and magnitude, and
component failures is not modelled precisely enough.
(b) Issues Mainly Related to the Fragility Analysis
• Analytical models used in design calculations, for example,
one-dimensional wave propagation model for the ground and Sway-
rocking model for the building, sometimes may not be sufficient to provide
detailed information to express the failure modes of structures and compo-
nents precisely. The importance of the models to account for the three-
dimensional response characteristics of the reactor building was pointed
out after the Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in Japan.
• In such cases, building response models used in design have to be replaced by
more detailed models such as three-dimensional finite element (3D-FEM)
models. However, the use of such advanced models needs some additional
efforts and information. It needs more detailed input seismic motion which
should better be calculated from three-dimensional ground model using three-
dimensional time history seismic motion data. This information is not pro-
vided from current framework of seismic hazard analysis. Furthermore, the
parameters to express uncertainties in responses (the logarithmic standard
deviation of response factors) have to be prepared. For Sway-rocking models,
such parameters may be determined from existing studies. Since such preced-
ing studies are not available for advanced models, some uncertainty calcula-
tions using the Monte Carlo or other statistical method will be necessary.
Although the required accuracy of response calculations in seismic PRA
may not be as high as that required in deterministic safety assessments, it is
desirable to have quantitative information on the impact of the differences in
response calculations by different approaches.
(c) Issues Mainly Related to the Accident Sequence Analysis
• In case that response factor method is adopted in components response
analysis, coefficients of correlation should be evaluated separately to con-
sider the correlation of component response.
• In case that MCSs are used to evaluate core damage frequencies, since
quantification considering simultaneous occurrence of multiple MCSs or
dependency among multiple MCSs, error of calculation of core damage
frequency tends to be increased.
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• Since the range of correlation will be restricted, uncertainty of core damage
frequency or contribution of each accident sequences tends to be increased.
• In case that initiating events are expressed by using hierarchical event tree,
it is not obvious that the impacts of the simultaneous occurrences of
multiple initiating events are considered sufficiently in the analysis. More-
over, since accident scenario analysis is very rough, resolution of the
method could be reduced.
11.2.2.3 Previous Studies Possibly to Resolve the Issues
of Mathematical Framework
Issues described above are possibly going to be resolved by the several previous
studies. Individual insights and achievements to resolve the issues are the
following:
(a) Previous Studies Related to Hazard Analysis
• Studies related to prediction of seismic motion regarding to modelling of
seismic source using fault model, Green function method, semiempirical
Green function method, and the combination of these methods can provide
time historical wave considering seismic source characteristics.
• Nishida et al. proposed the method expressing seismic hazard by multiple
time historical waves weighted by frequencies based on these above
studies [3].
(b) Previous Studies Related to Fragility Analysis
• 3D response of structures and components evaluated by the techniques of
structure response analysis such as finite element method (FEM) is gradu-
ally used to confirm the validity of seismic design.
• The enhancement of grid-computing method that makes high speed com-
puting of structural response analysis possible using supercomputers makes
large-scale FEM practical.
• Nishida et al. proposed the construction method of large-scale 3D plant
model based on the structural analysis method, and it makes gradually
possible the response analysis of major components of nuclear power
plant using one linked model and the prediction of the failure point by
detailed analysis of local stress of components.
• So many studies about probabilistic structural response analysis of compo-
nents and structures have been done, for example, analysis of primary
containment vessel by Takasaka et al. and failure probability analysis of
piping system by Whitaker et al. Though preparation of time history wave
associated with the level of seismic motion will be needed to link these
insights to seismic PRA, however, those kinds of studies have not been
done so far.
• For correlation of response of components, generic rule that describes how
to evaluate the correlations among many components and to give the
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coefficients of correlation considering the relationship among correlation of
component, specific frequency of each component, and specific location in
the building based on the probabilistic response analysis of structures was
proposed in the SSMRP study. This is applied to the assessment of two
nuclear power plants in NUREG-1150. Moreover, JNES, TSO of the
former regulation body of Japan, studied to evaluate the correlation of
response based on the soil-structure conditions using similar method and
disclosed the results. These studies presented that it is possible to evaluate
the correlation using probabilistic response analysis and implied that it
could be possible to derive the rule to give the correlation coefficient
from a series of detailed calculations in the simplified manner.
(c) Previous Studies Related to Accident Sequence Analysis
• Muramatsu et al. proposed the method that makes many samples of capac-
ity and response by Monte Carlo simulation for quantification of FT in
seismic PRA, named DQFM (direct quantification of fault tree using Monte
Carlo simulation) [4, 5]. DQFM method is possible to quantify FT accu-
rately better than MCS method and to consider the correlation of response
among components in more general way. Moreover, SECOM2-DQFM that
includes DQFM method is disclosed.
• DQFM method can calculate core damage frequency precisely even mul-
tiple initiating events occur simultaneously. So it could be useful to resolve
the issue that accident sequence might be too much simplified by the
hierarchical event-tree method if appropriate improvement is installed.
However, since huge efforts will be needed to make the mathematical treatment
consistently from hazard analysis to accident sequence analysis to develop the new
framework and method and to improve the whole mathematical method thoroughly
in the application of insights and achievements of these above studies, current
method has not been improved so far.
11.3 New Mathematical Framework for Seismic PRA
Enhanced by High-Performance Computing
Based on the previous chapter, this study proposes brand new framework to resolve
the issues above. This framework should be characterized by the following features:
1. Seismic Hazard Analysis
• Seismic hazard can be expressed by set of the groups including a set of
seismic waves weighted by the occurrence frequencies based on the studies
by Nishida et al.
• Uncertainty will be evaluated by expert opinion as necessary and expressed
by the logic tree method.
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2. Fragility Analysis
• Structures and soil are evaluated by 3D response analysis such as FEM or
other method. It calculates a lot of cases associated with all of the set of
seismic waves given to each level of hazard and uncertainty.
• Response and uncertainty of large-scale structures and components are ana-
lyzed coupling with building as a part of building response analysis.
• Floor response spectrum and its uncertainty of other than large-scale struc-
tures and components are analyzed using the results of building response
analysis. Response and its uncertainty, i.e. median and log-scale standard
deviation, are calculated using individual specific frequency and attenuation
factor of each component.
• Current analysing method of capacity and its uncertainty of component are
improved using study insights described in Sect. 11.3.2.
3. Accident Sequence Analysis
• Improving SECOM2-DQFM code that can use the results of 3D probabilistic
response analysis based on the DQFM method, it is possible to analyze the
conditioned core damage probabilities for each input time history
seismic wave.
• Core damage frequencies are calculated to integrate the products of frequen-
cies of occurrence of all of time history seismic waves and conditioned core
damage probabilities, respectively.
These features are represented by the formula which is proposed by Sewell
et al. [6] as follows:
λ Θ½  
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Here,
λ Θ½ : Annual rate of the event
Θ: The event that some generalized “state of interest” is realized
Δ λ x j
  
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X: A grand motion characterization
xj: A specific value of interest at a site of interest
TH: Time history
As shown in Table 11.1, using 3D structure response analysis for fragility
analysis, resolution, i.e. capability of scenario analysis, is enhanced significantly.
This framework requires large-scale calculations in the three fields such as
composing a set of seismic waves of seismic hazard, large-scale probabilistic
structure response analysis and quantification of system reliability model by
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Monte Carlo method. It could be possible to realize considering the recent enhance-
ment of supercomputing and expansion of inexpensive providing supercomputing.
To develop the analyzing system based on the concept of framework, the
following two options are proposed:
11.3.1 Option A: Using High-Performance Computing
Results Directly
Detail processes of this option are as follows:
(1) Seismic Hazard Analysis Including Uncertainty Analysis
Seismic hazard is expressed by seismic motion that is described by a multiple
set of seismic waves. However, to analyze uncertainty, each wave should
include information of occurrence frequency, parameters of seismic source
and propagation characteristics, uncertainty factor of those parameters such
as occurrence probabilities, classification of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty.
(2) Soil-Structure Response Analysis Including Uncertainty Analysis
Probabilistic response of soil structure is analyzed by 3D analyzing method
such as FEM or Sway-rocking model that can treat 3D characteristics to some
extent. In these analyses, factors of uncertainty and probabilistic distributions
are determined by experts. Moreover, to calculate rationally, random variables
treated in the analysis are focused on the dominant parameters. The results
should contain the detailed location in the buildings, calculation input param-
eters such as occurrence probabilities and classification of aleatory and episte-
mic uncertainty.
(3) Accident Sequence Analysis Including Uncertainty Analysis
Conditioned component failure probabilities and core damage probabilities are
calculated using time history floor response obtained from soil-structure
response analysis and component capacities for every time history data for
seismic motions. In these analyses, uncertainties are analyzed as well using
parameters for soil-structure response analysis.
(4) Uncertainty Analysis of CDF
CDF and its uncertainty are calculated using frequencies of time history data for
seismic motions and the results of the above item (3).
Figure 11.2 shows the process described above, and this process is named as “the
direct method”.
In some cases, this option requires more than 10,000 times of calculations of
large-scale 3D structure response analysis, because it is needed to set probabilistic
distributions for soil-structure parameters that can be focused on about 20 parame-
ters, associated with 300 or more of time histories of seismic motions. It is possible
to treat such size of calculations by simplification of 3D detailed model to some
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extent and usage of supercomputers. However, since several sensitivity studies are
required to analyze dominant factors, it is not practical.
11.3.2 Option B: Using Intermediate Parameters such
as Capacity Factors Derived from Building Response
Analysis
In seismic PRA process, so many trial and errors are needed to determine the
analysis model, i.e. level of detail for system model and fragility. This means that
the above “Option A” requires a lot of calculation times and is not practical. So
combination of 3D analysis and response coefficient method is proposed as the
intermediate method.
Preparing a number of calculations enough to simulate the probabilistic distri-
butions of 3D analysis results at a certain degree of accuracy; then median, standard
deviation and coefficient of correlation are determined to reproduce the results by
response coefficient method using statistical analysis such as least-square method.
Details of this method are as follows:
Fig. 11.2 Process of option A: Using high-performance computing results directly
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(1) Seismic hazard analysis including uncertainty analysis:
This is the same as “Option A”.
(2) Soil-structure response analysis including uncertainty analysis:
This is the same as “Option A” as well.
(3) Derivation of seismic hazard curve indexed by maximum acceleration in free
rock surface and response coefficient:
Calculation of the basis ground motion, seismic hazard curve associated with
maximum acceleration in free rock surface, median and standard deviation of
response coefficient, and coefficient of correlation among components are
needed to apply the framework of seismic PRA using conventional response
coefficient method. Response coefficient should be set to express the charac-
teristic of probabilistic distribution very well.
(4) Accident sequence analysis including uncertainty analysis:
Using information determined in the above (3), component failure probabilities
associated with the maximum acceleration in free rock surface and conditioned
core damage probabilities are evaluated. Along with these analyses, uncertainty
is calculated using parameters for soil-structure response analysis as well.
(5) Uncertainty Analysis of CDF:
CDF and its uncertainty are calculated based on the seismic hazard curve
indexed by the maximum acceleration in free rock surface and conditioned
core damage probabilities as well as uncertainties calculated in the above (4).
Figure 11.3a, b shows the optioned process related to the time history grand
motions and floor responses described above, and these processes are named as “the
intermediate method”.
The most important point is that “response coefficient should be set to express
the characteristic of probabilistic distribution very well by statistical analysis of the
results of building 3D response analysis” described in item (3). This point is
considered to be reasonable approximation if the three factors such as median,
log-scale standard deviation and correlation are maintained properly in quantifica-
tion process of CDF.
Based on this proposal, it could be expected that it is possible to model the more
detailed 3D response characteristics of buildings and the more proper correlation
that are the most important advantages of “Option A” by the practical
calculation time.
However, this method is the intermediate and simplified method, and all of the
advantages of 3D analysis could not be obtained. For example, the following issues
need to be considered:
• Is it possible to introduce the index such as displacement, plastic deformation,
other than acceleration in failure decision?
• Can it be suitably applied to the plastic region?
• Can the difference between the seismic source characteristics be reflected well in
the calculation of the core damage frequency?
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Fig. 11.3 (a) Comparison of options: Treatment of floor response (b) Comparison of options:
Treatment of grand motion
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To resolve these issues, it can be considered that a set of response coefficient
associated with maximum acceleration level in seismic center or site will be
introduced and so on.
11.4 Installation of Uncertainty Analysis Function Using
Response Factor Method for SECOM2-DQFM
11.4.1 Improvement of SECOM2-DQFM CODE
The function of uncertainty analysis for core damage frequency (CDF), accident
sequence frequency and intermediate event frequency is installed in SECOM2-
DQFM. In detail, the followings are implemented:
• SECOM2-DQFM can be running on the large computing machine BX900
installed in JAEA.
• Improved to realize the large-scale grid computing.
• The uncertainty analysis function to calculate the uncertainty including aleatory
uncertainty has been generally considered so far. The calculation time will be
dramatically reduced by using hundreds of CPUs, even using proper set of
random number for simulation.
• Improved to realize the uncertainty analysis of importance measurements such
as FV importance.
• Improved to realize the uncertainty analysis, even considering the correlation
among any events; that is one of the advantages of SECOM2-DQFM.
11.4.2 Analysis Results
Results of uncertainty analyses obtained by the improved and enhanced SECOM2-
DQFM using the BWR5 model plant input are shown in Fig. 11.4.
The point estimate values and the mean value of uncertainty analyses are
consistent, and this means that improvement of SECOM2-DQFM by this study is
reasonable. From the uncertainty analysis results, 5 % lower value of 90 % confi-
dence interval could not be obtained because these are too low to plot on the chart.
The error factor of total CDF, which is derived from 95 % upper value of 90 %
confidence interval divided by median value, is 11.0 and is smaller than those of
each accident sequence, which is more than 10,000 in some cases. It is presumed
that EF of the larger contributing accident sequences tends to be smaller than the
smaller contributers relatively because of their small EFs.
Moreover, the EFs of lower frequency accident sequences are relatively larger,
and the EFs of higher frequency accident sequences are relatively smaller. This is
because that smaller contributing accident sequences include the components with
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small fragility or redundancy. Especially, redundant components have complex
relations of uncertainty, and these are cumulated in the calculation, and this is why
the EFs of these accident sequences are so large.
11.5 Conclusions
A new framework is proposed to improve the resolution capability of seismic PRA.
Improvement of computer code SECOM2 for quantification of FTs by Monte Carlo
simulation is done. Based on these, capability of parallel processing was
implemented to allow uncertainty analysis in a reasonable time for seismic PRA
with the current model framework (response coefficient framework).
This study proposed the mathematic framework to treat the uncertainty properly
related to the evaluation of core damage frequency induced by earthquake, the
method to evaluate the fragility utilizing expert knowledge, the probabilistic model
to cope with the aleatory uncertainty, as well as the development of analyzing code
including these considerations for the improvement of the reliability of the method
and enhancement of utilization of the products of seismic PRA.
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Part IV
Nuclear Risk Governance in Society
Chapter 12
Deficits of Japanese Nuclear Risk
Governance Remaining After the Fukushima
Accident: Case of Contaminated Water
Management
Kohta Juraku
Abstract It was found that many deficits of nuclear risk governance in Japan
before and after the Fukushima accident. Not only were they created and embedded
before the Fukushima disaster, but it has been remained or even worsened even
after many accident reports were published and pointed out many problems and
suggested ideas to remedy them.
In this paper, the author would analyze such remained problems found in the
postaccident “on-site management” policy and measures, taking the case of con-
taminated water management at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.
Firstly, the development of contaminated water management policy measures and
institutional framework would be described in a chronological manner, which is
one of the most typical and difficult tasks of “on-site management.” Then, the cause
of their failure trajectory would be analyzed by using a sociological concept
“structural disaster” to understand the malfunctions which are continuously
repeated not by identifiable particular factors but by inappropriate design of the
socio-technical interface. This conceptual standpoint would suggest that the prob-
lems are not solvable by each of technical improvement, superficial institutional
reform, nor prosecution and punishment of relevant individuals or organizations but
by the redesign of that interface as a whole. Finally, based on this perspective, the
author would discuss the ideas to remedy the deficits that might lead to further
continuation of “structural disaster” in nuclear field.
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12.1 Introduction: Failure Trajectory of Postaccident
On-site Management
There were many deficits of nuclear risk governance in Japan before and after the
Fukushima accident, as Taketoshi Taniguchi, the leading Japanese scholar in the
field, illustrates by using the framework of “risk governance deficits,” proposed by
IRGC (International Risk Governance Council) [1, 2]. Not only were they created
and embedded in the governance system before the Fukushima disaster, but it has
been remained or even worsened after many accident reports were published and
pointed out many problems which led the worst nuclear catastrophe in the history of
Japanese nuclear utilization and suggested their recommendations to remedy them.
In this paper, the author would analyze such remained problems found in the
postaccident “on-site management” policy and measures, taking the case of con-
taminated water management at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. “On-
site management” includes many recovery works performed at the Fukushima
Daiichi site—“stabilization” work in the language of the government and the
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)—such as setting up building covers to
limit the further dispersion of radioactive substances; reinforcing buildings feared
to have lost structural strength due to the effects of hydrogen explosions; containing
contaminated water with various concentrations of radioactive substances, gener-
ated as a result of continuous water injection and cooling; and collecting and
transporting leftover spent fuel.
It is one of the most difficult problems in the on-site management tasks men-
tioned above that the management of the highly radioactive contaminated water
building up day by day. Due to various technical limitations, the temporary water
injection and cooling system was built as not totally closed-cycle, and the damage
caused by the accident allowed a huge amount of groundwater to flood the build-
ings. Inevitably, as the water gets contaminated with radioactive substances, highly
radioactive contaminated water is continually produced. On top of this, since the
path carrying the contaminated water to sea could not initially be identified or
blocked, there were fears of marine pollution spreading.
Regarding this contaminated water treatment at the Fukushima site, a series of
“follow-up” measures have been taken and caused the delay of underground water
pump-out. Finally, the “ice wall” project to block underground water intrusion
seems to be failed. Failures result in the increase of total amount of contaminated
water and further social distrust about the feasibility and progress of Fukushima
decommission project in Fukushima residents, entire Japanese society, and inter-
national community.
In the following sections, the author would describe the development of con-
taminated water management policy, measures, and institutional framework in
chronological manner and then analyze the cause of their failure trajectory using
a sociological concept “structural disaster” developed and suggested by Miwao
Matsumoto, the pioneering sociologist of science who has shed light on the
problems at the interfaces among science, technology and society, to understand
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the malfunctions which are continuously repeated not by identifiable particular
factors but by inappropriate design of the socio-technical interface. This conceptual
standpoint would suggest that the problems are not solvable by each of the technical
improvement, superficial institutional reform, nor prosecution and punishment of
relevant individuals or organizations but by the redesign of that interface as a whole
[3, 4]. Finally, based on this perspective, the author discusses the ideas to remedy
the deficits that might lead to further continuation of “structural disaster” in nuclear
field.
12.2 Contaminated Water Management at Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
12.2.1 Failure to Build Consensus Through Explanations
After the Fact and Follow-up Measures [1]: Delay
in Addressing the “Groundwater Bypass” Problem
Thinking back now, more than 4 years since the accident, despite the common
perception that the contaminated water problem only rose to prominence after the
“acute phase” immediately following the accident, in reality the challenge of
coping with the increasing volume of contaminated water was an agonizing prob-
lem in the locality from immediately following the accident. In fact, between April
4 and 11, 2011, lightly contaminated groundwater was released into the sea as a
desperate, last-resort measure to secure space for highly radioactive contaminated
water. This move was criticized by a number of neighboring countries. On May
11, 2011, only 2 months after the accident, a newspaper article described the
seriousness of the contaminated water problem in a comprehensive manner [5].
As mentioned in that newspaper article, the factor that attracted attention as the
biggest factor of the buildup of highly contaminated water was the problem of
groundwater flooding [6]. The necessity for drastic measures to address this prob-
lem had already been recognized by the government and TEPCO in 2011 according
to an official document of the first “Steering Meeting Under Government and
TEPCO’s Mid-to-Long-Term Countermeasure Meeting,” but it was not until
April 23, 2012, at the fifth “steering meeting,” that the so-called “groundwater
bypass” plan was officially presented. This was a detailed proposal to radically limit
the buildup of contaminated water by pumping up groundwater before it could flood
into nuclear reactor buildings to be contaminated by contact with radioactive sub-
stances. At the meeting, TEPCO presented a document titled Use of Groundwater
Bypass to Reduce Quantity of Groundwater Flooding into Buildings of Reactors
Nos. 1 to 4. TEPCO publicly announced anew its plan to pump up groundwater
from before the flooding at a press conference on June 18, 2012 [7]. At the same
time, TEPCO began providing explanations to fishing industry representatives, one
of the major stakeholders. Since the problem of the release of the lightly
12 Deficits of Japanese Nuclear Risk Governance Remaining After the Fukushima. . . 159
contaminated water into the sea, mentioned above, the fishing industry representa-
tives in Fukushima Prefecture became very sensitive about the contaminated water
problem, so securing their agreement was vital to the success of TEPCO’s plan.
Even beyond the summer of 2012, TEPCO continued providing explanations to
meetings of the association heads of the Fukushima Prefectural Federation of
Fisheries Co-operative Associations (“Fukushima Fisheries Co-op”).
Apparently, as a result of this process, in January 2013, the Fukushima Fisheries
Co-op agreed to cooperate with TEPCO, reasoning that releasing groundwater was
not the same thing as releasing contaminated water. Between that time, however, a
leak of highly contaminated water occurred at the plant, and there were several
suspected releases of water from the plant into the sea. This made the fishing
industry representatives distrustful of TEPCO and led them to adopt a harder line
in their negotiations. TEPCO proceeded to prepare facilities for their groundwater
bypass, and they were ready to pump up groundwater and release it into the sea at
any time, but a meeting of the association heads of the Fukushima Fisheries Co-op
on May 13, 2013 decided to withhold its official agreement for a groundwater
release [8]. If agreement had been obtained, TEPCO was set to start pumping up
and releasing groundwater on the very next day, May 14, but it ultimately took
another year or so before it could actually start releasing.
The reported reasons for withholding agreement to the plan was that a consensus
could not be built among the co-op members, with members expressing views such
as “only TEPCO is saying this, so we co-op members cannot trust them,” and “we
want TEPCO to clarify (explain to co-op members) that this is the national policy,”
according to the comments of co-op members cited in news paper articles [8, 9].
After this, a system was set up under which the responsible government body,
the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of the Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry (METI), and TEPCO would jointly provide explanations to stake-
holders such as the fishing industry representatives. A number of explanatory
meetings were subsequently held for fishing industry representatives and resi-
dents to gain the positive support to their groundwater bypass plan. Even
though these efforts were made by them, however, multiple incidents of contami-
nated water leakage and newly discovered cases of water contamination were
exposed after that, making it difficult to build a consensus.
Consequently, at an explanatory meeting organized by the national government
and TEPCO for the Soma-Futaba Fisheries Cooperative Association (“Soma-
Futaba Fisheries Co-op”), held on September 3, 2013, a chorus of criticisms
about the release of groundwater was voiced. It was reported that the head of this
association stated that “a decision on whether or not to agree to the bypass plan
would be made no earlier than October, after gaging the reaction of distributors and
consumers”[10].
On the same day as this explanatory meeting, the government’s Nuclear Emer-
gency Response Headquarters issued its “Basic Policy for the Contaminated Water
Issue at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.” This policy
provided for the setup of the “Inter-ministerial Council for Contaminated Water
and Decommissioning Issues,” the “Intergovernmental Liaison Office for
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Contaminated Water and Decommissioning Issues,” the “Intergovernmental Coun-
cil for Fostering Mutual Understanding on the Contaminated Water Issue,” and the
“Fukushima Advisory Board Under the Council for the Decommissioning of the
TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.” In addition, the policy directed
the national government to take, for the first time, direct financial measures toward
contaminated water countermeasures (with provision for total funding of 47 billion
yen). Then, the government and TEPCO continued working to provide explanations
to stakeholders aimed at building a consensus, and on February 3, 2014, METI
publicly disclosed “emission standards” for groundwater from the groundwater
bypass, formulated jointly with TEPCO, stating that METI had explained the
standards to the chairman of the Fukushima Fisheries Co-op.
Some time later, beginning in March 2014, efforts to reach a consensus inten-
sified, but there were still further twists and turns in the process. On March
14, 2014, the government and TEPCO held an explanatory meeting for the Soma-
Futaba Fisheries Co-op. Despite multiple expressions of opposition, the head of the
co-op announced his approval, yet 4 days later, on March 18, the governing council
of the Soma-Futaba Fisheries Co-op deferred a final decision on approval of the
groundwater bypass plan. On the same day, the fishery co-op of Iwaki City decided
to approve the plan at a meeting of its governing council. Finally, on March
24, 2014, the Soma-Futaba Fisheries Co-op officially issued its decision to approve
the groundwater bypass plan, and on the following day, March 25, a meeting of the
association heads of Fukushima Fisheries Co-op decided to approve the plan, with
the submission of a request in writing to the government and TEPCO regarding the
implementation of the plan.
Finally, on April 9, 2014, TEPCO began pumping up groundwater from wells, in
accordance with the groundwater bypass plan, and on May 21, 2014, it released this
groundwater (560 metric tons) into the sea for the first time.
So this groundwater bypass plan took two years to come to fruition, from the
presentation of a detailed plan to the beginning of implementation. It is undeniable
that the delay in executing the bypass plan to drastically control groundwater
inundation greatly impacted the prospects for the overall success of the counter-
measures to contain highly contaminated water. On August 2, 2013, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority’s (NRA) working group on contaminated water countermea-
sures pointed out that the groundwater level might rise suddenly as a sea-side
impermeable wall was constructed and that even on completion, the outflow of
contaminated water might not stop.
It should be viewed especially regrettable that by the spring of 2013, after having
gone so far toward securing a final consensus from the fishing industry representa-
tives, the most influential stakeholder, in fact consensus, could not be obtained and
the process of building consensus process was carried forward anew.
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12.2.2 Failure to Build Consensus Through Explanations
After the Fact and Follow-up Measures [2]:
Postponing “for the Time Being” the Response
to the Problem of Releasing Lightly Contaminated
Water into the Sea
One major factor that influenced the overall ins and outs of this story was the
problem of releasing lightly contaminated water into the sea, which the author
touched on earlier. The sudden buildup of contaminated water immediately fol-
lowing the accident rapidly caused a shortage of space to store contaminated water.
As a result, in order to avoid highly contaminated water being inadvertently
released into the sea, for a period of 1 week starting on April 4, 2011—approxi-
mately 3 weeks after the accident—lightly contaminated water was released into
the sea to free up space to store more highly contaminated water. Given that this
release was an emergency measure, the procedure for securing the approval of
stakeholders was rather inadequate. As a result, there was criticism of the action
from within and outside Japan, giving rise to a distrust of the government and
TEPCO in relation to the handling of contaminated water.
Later too, the contaminated water storage capacity remained chronically insuf-
ficient, so from the same time as the abovementioned groundwater bypass plan, the
idea of “releasing treated and purified contaminated water into the sea” was studied.
However, in this case too, the views of stakeholders were not adequately reflected
in the proposal. This adversely affected the effort to build a consensus on this later,
delaying a response to the problem in terms of time.
When TEPCO publicly disclosed on December 8, 2011, that it was considering
the release of treated and purified contaminated water into the sea, on the same day,
Ikuhiro Hattori, the chairman of the National Federation of Fisheries Co-operative
Associations (“National Fisheries Co-op”), visited TEPCO to express strong oppo-
sition to the proposal, calling it unacceptable. In the end, the idea of releasing
treated and purified contaminated water into the sea was not included in the plan
that TEPCO submitted to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of
METI on that same evening [11].
In a press conference on the same day, Nobutaka Tsutsui, Senior Vice-Minister
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, also stated that the “release is unacceptable,”
indicating that TEPCO had publicly disclosed the plan without prior consultation
with the major stakeholders.
As expected, in a plan submitted anew on December 15, 2011, TEPCO stated
clearly that treated water “would not be released into the sea” by them for the time
being [12]. Also on the same day, the Iwaki City Council in Fukushima Prefecture
formally decided to request the repeal of the release plan.
Yet, according to some experts, the release of very lightly contaminated water
within the limits of specified standards, with due consideration for risk manage-
ment, is unavoidable. In a press conference on July 24, 2013, Shunichi Tanaka, the
162 K. Juraku
Chairman of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, in reference to contaminated water
within the limits of standards—not in reference to highly contaminated water that is
treated and purified—stated that, “My frank opinion is that it’s probably unavoid-
able to release a certain amount” [13]. Also, the review mission of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which investigated the efforts to decommission
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant over 10 days, submitted a “summary
report” to the Japanese government on December 4, 2013, with a recommendation
that the controlled release of lightly contaminated water into the sea should be
considered as an option [14].
While TEPCO put off the release of treated and purified contaminated water into
the sea “for the time being,” this effort cannot be easily excluded from a task list for
appropriately managing the contaminated water problem. The fact that TEPCO
initially tried to deal with the problem without securing a suitable consensus of
stakeholders and that they took the easy option of deferring action “for the time
being” in response to the opposition of stakeholders toward the issue may have
considerably hindered the overall optimization of the contaminated water manage-
ment. If TEPCO recognized that both the groundwater bypass plan and the plan to
release treated and purified contaminated water into the sea were unavoidable and
also that such countermeasures are more effective if taken promptly—and con-
versely, that they are unlikely to be effective and might even irreversibly aggravate
the situation if not taken soon enough—it should have taken greater care in
presenting its countermeasures in a form that ensures definite results, and even in
the face of criticisms and doubts, it should have insisted on the necessity and
effectiveness of the plans and the sufficiency of safety considerations, rather than
simply “withdraw” or “defer” their plan. It is vital that TEPCOmake decisions from
a comprehensive perspective and with a clear commitment and that it presents its
plans accordingly.
12.2.3 Incremental Development of a Governance System
TEPCO is not the only one grappling with these kinds of problems. The effort to
construct a risk governance system for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant,
led by the government, could not be expected to be perfectly conceived from the
start. By its very nature, it is an incremental development process.
The first platform set up by the government to comprehensively tackle measures
aimed at decommissioning the plant, including contaminated water countermea-
sures, was the “Government and TEPCO’s Mid-to-Long-Term Countermeasure
Meeting,” a coordinating body established on December 21, 2011. This body was
set up based on an understanding that the situation would shift from a short-term
recovery phase after the accident toward a medium to long-term decommissioning
phase, in line with a declaration on December 16, 2011, by Prime Minister
Yoshihiko Noda (then) about “recovery” after the accident. In response to a view
of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters that “in order to accelerate
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decommissioning, in addition to reinforcing research and development (R&D)
systems focused on removal of fuel debris, it is important to construct a system to
seamlessly manage on-site work and the progress of R&D,” at the same meeting in
February 2013 a decision was made to transform the coordinating body into the
“‘Council for the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station,’ to include the heads of the main institutes engaged in R&D, in
addition to the government and TEPCO” [15].
Later, in April 2013, the “Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated
Water Treatment” was set up under the “Council for the Decommissioning of
TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” to manage the planning
and progress of government countermeasures to deal with the contaminated water
problem. This committee put together a document, “Direction of Measures to be
Taken (first round),” which was approved by the “Council for the
Decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” on
June 27, 2013. This guideline was organized around three main pillars for
action—introduction of a schedule for each nuclear reactor, enhancement of com-
munication (through the “setup of the Fukushima Advisory Board Under the
Council for the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station (tentative name)” for example), and “full-scale development of a system for
gathering together international expertise.” This third objective regarding “devel-
opment of an international system” led to the establishment of the International
Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID) on August 1, 2013. Fur-
thermore, within the “Committee on Countermeasures,” three “task forces” were
set up between June and December 2013 to deal separately with each of these main
challenges.
It is puzzling, however, that in December 2013 an “R&D Promotion Headquar-
ters” was set up under the “Council for the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” and in that case too four subordinate
bodies were set up to undertake technical investigations—a “Working Team for
Spent Fuel Pool Countermeasures,” a “Working Team for Preparation of Fuel
Debris Removal,” a “Working Team for Radioactive Waste Processing and Dis-
posal,” and a “Joint Task Force for Remote Technologies.”
On top of this, as already mentioned, in September 2013, the government’s
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters issued its “Basic Policy for the Con-
taminated Water Issue at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,”
which called for the establishment of four subordinate bodies—the “Inter-ministe-
rial Council for Contaminated Water and Decommissioning Issues,” the “Intergov-
ernmental Liaison Office for Contaminated Water and Decommissioning Issues,”
the “Intergovernmental Council for Fostering Mutual Understanding on the Con-
taminatedWater Issue,” and the “Fukushima Advisory Board Under the Council for
the Decommissioning of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.”
A “Decommissioning and contaminated water countermeasures team” was set
up within the “Inter-ministerial Council for Contaminated Water and
Decommissioning Issues” to investigate “studies of decommissioning and contam-
inated water countermeasures policy,” “process management and risk clarification
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of decontamination and contaminated water countermeasures,” “R&D needed for
decommissioning and contaminated water countermeasures,” and “collecting accu-
rate information rapidly, providing it to residents, reporting it internationally, and
addressing damage caused by rumors” [16].
The “Intergovernmental Council for Fostering Mutual Understanding on the
Contaminated Water Issue,” was set up at the same time, for the purpose of
“enhancing information sharing in the locality” by TEPCO and the government
regarding the contaminated water problem and the status of investigations into how
to address the problem, “enhancing collaboration in the locality” between relevant
bodies regarding contaminated water measures, and conducting “studies on how to
proceed specifically with countermeasures, process management, and coordination
between stakeholders.”
The third new body, the “Fukushima Advisory Board Under the Council for the
Decommissioning of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” was
set up in February 2014 under the chairmanship of (then) State Minister of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry Kazuyoshi Akaba (in charge of the abovementioned
“Decommissioning and contaminated water countermeasures team”), with a mem-
bership including the deputy governor of Fukushima Prefecture; the heads of
relevant municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture; representatives of local com-
merce, industry, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries interests; NPO representatives;
and local community representatives.
In addition to all this, the NRA also set up its own “Specific Nuclear Facility
Monitoring and Evaluation Committee” (set up in December 2012), along with a
subordinate body, the “Working Group on Contaminated Water Countermeasures”
(set up in August 2013), and also a “Team on Marine Monitoring” (set up in
September 2013).
12.3 Discussion: Contaminated Water Management
as a Case of “Structural Disaster”
Of course, the challenge of responding to this nuclear power plant accident was an
extraordinary one. It would have been difficult to put in place any organizational
system ahead of time, so this situation can be understood to be the outcome of the
government proceeding flexibly to set up a system in accordance to the issues
emerging along the way. Regrettably, however, there are too many deliberative
bodies, and it is unclear how they all relate to each other. And even with this
complicated system, it was not until 2013, approximately two years after the
nuclear power plant accident, that the system was finally accelerated to be set up
and operational. Considering, for example, that it was late 2011 when TEPCO
presented and later withdrew its plan to release treated and purified contaminated
water into the sea, as mentioned before, I can’t help thinking that if at this point in
time a system had been set up to enable TEPCO to work together with the
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government to pursue decision-making based on comprehensive investigation and
coordination, and careful and open consensus building, the outcome could have
been different.
This author’s regret should not be considered as just a hindsight criticism.
Rather, it must be understood as a result of the deficits of Japanese nuclear
governance as Taniguchi demonstrates [1]. As mentioned earlier in this paper, his
analysis adopts the “risk governance deficits” framework formulated by IRGC
[2]. For example, the failures of contaminated water management described in
this paper are counted as results of “Lack of adequate knowledge about values, risk
perception, interests” deficit. He points out that another deficit, “Provision of
biased, selective or incomplete information,” is also found and the cause of it is
something to do with the previous deficit. The problem is, thus, continuation or
even reproduction of deficits after the accident. Why did the impact of worst
accident not become an opportunity to stop it and change the Japanese nuclear
governance better?
Matsumoto suggests a sociological concept that could shed light on the mech-
anism behind such persisting wrong trajectory: ““structural disaster” of the science-
technology-society interface” [3, 4, 17]. This type of disaster is caused not by some
failure of science, of technology or of society as separated manner. He argues, it
should be considered as “the failure of the science-technology-society interface”
[17]. There is no single technical failure, no obvious scientific misunderstanding, or
no single person to be blamed. Rather, the interface among those heterogeneous
elements of society as a whole suffers from serious problems. This understanding
strongly suggests the possibility that “Efforts to pursue the perfect science cannot
prevent the next problem. The perfect technology cannot, too. Society also cannot
prevent it by ethical regulations” as Matsumoto points out. This perspective sug-
gests us that the problems centering on Japanese nuclear policy and practices are
not solvable by each of the technical improvement, superficial institutional reform,
nor prosecution and punishment of relevant individuals or organizations but by
redesign of that interface as a whole.
Of course, such a systematic view on technological failure has been developed,
even before the Matsumoto’s concept, for many years. There are many famous
concepts to analyze it, such as “normal accident” [18], “organizational accident”
[19], and so on. “Structural disaster” concept integrates such previous works and
makes it clearer the conditions that cause the chain of accidents with similar
characteristics.
According to Matsumoto, “structural disaster” consists of the following five
elements [17]:
1. Following wrong precedents carries over problems and reproduces them.
2. Complexity of a system under consideration and the interdependence of its units
aggravate problems.
3. Invisible norms of informal groups virtually hollow out formal norms.
4. Patching over problems at hand invites another patching over for temporary
countermeasures.
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5. Secrecy develops across different sectors and blurs the locus of agents respon-
sible for the problems in question.
The author does not step into precise and point-to-point review of Fukushima
contaminated water management case to determine if it meets the conditions above
here, due to the limit of pages, but let him just point out some pertinent facts with
those characteristics in the cases described in the previous section.
For example, the several causes of the delay of consensus-building and technical
practice of the contaminated water treatment at Fukushima Daiichi site (both of
groundwater bypass and lightly contaminated water release programs) can be
considered as the cases of these elements. So-called “Kokusaku-Min-ei” (planned
by the national Government, operated by private industry) scheme was not effective
to gain public and stakeholders’ trust for those measures, but TEPCO had acted as
the front-end of those activities especially before the Governmental decision on
September 2013. This fact can be interpreted as a result of elements 1 and
3. “Kokusaku-Min-ei” scheme was considered as the standard format of any
nuclear activity.
This belief was strongly shared by many of the important stakeholders, such as
the governments, TEPCO themselves, other member of industry, and even some of
journalists and the general public. This seemed to be realized not by some formal
consensus explicitly formed after the accident but by shared belief taken over from
pre-Fukushima custom in nuclear industry in Japan. This point can also be
interpreted as a sign of element 5, because the reason of “switch” of initiative
from TEPCO to the government was not clearly discussed in public and
explained well.
Also, too many relevant bodies and complicated network among them due to
incremental development of the governance system for the contaminated water
treatment can be seen as appearance of elements 2. Moreover, the “for the time
being” strategy is a strong sign of element 4, of course.
In this way, the twists and turns story described in this paper shows many signs
of those five conditions. It is obvious that the deficits identified by Taniguchi seem
to be strongly related to the mechanism of “structural disaster.”
12.4 Concluding Remarks: To Remedy Structural Deficits
of Japanese Nuclear Governance
In light of the discussion above, it can be said that sociological analysis of
mechanism behind the series of problems of post-Fukushima accident on-site
management should be important and prospective to think about the remedy for
its failure trajectory, although the author could not demonstrate the result of
detailed analysis in this paper.
Of course, it is essential to promote technical R&D to deal with contaminated
water better. It should be useful to solve many difficult problems at the damaged
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plant site. It is also critical to establish appropriate institutional and legal framework
to support those activities.
However, even such effort might become a part of next “structural disaster” if
we don’t have deliberate and proper understanding on the mechanism that creates
the chain of accidents, incidents, and scandals. “Quick fixes” for superficial layer of
problems often make the problems more complicated, unsolvable, and serious.
Sociological perspectives should be able to make contributions to avoid it and to
enrich our wisdom to tackle the deficits. As an idea for this, Matsumoto suggests his
solution for “structural disaster” that includes the introduction and establishment of
plural channels among science-technology-society by “position-indicated style”
interpreters and research funding scheme to enable open, transparent, and respon-
sibility traceable policy (it is the opposite to the faulty one that create “structural
disasters”).
We can collaborate to stop the chain of “structural disasters” by considering such
proactive suggestion from sociologist as well as other social scientist in various
fields. The problem of structural deficits of Japanese nuclear governance can and
should become the good and pioneering example of interdisciplinary collaboration
between engineering and sociology (and other social sciences). It should be
enhanced and promoted more immediately.
Acknowledgements Part of this paper is based on the author’s book chapter written in Japanese
[20] and supported by the JSPS (Japan Society for Promotion of Science) academic funding
program “Higashi-Nihon Dai-shinsai Gakujutsu Chousa” (Academic Survey Program for Great
East Japan Disaster).
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
1. Taniguchi T (2014) Lessons learned from deficits analysis of nuclear risk governance. Inter-
national symposium on earthquake, tsunami and nuclear risks after the accident of TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations, Kyoto University, 30 October 2014, Kyoto, Japan
2. IRGC (International Risk Governance Council) (2010) Risk governance deficits: an analysis
and illustration of the most common deficits in risk governance. International Risk Governance
Council, Geneva
3. Matsumoto M (2002¼2012) Chi no Shippai to Shakai: Kagaku-Gijutsu wa Naze Shakai ni
Totte Mondai-ka [The structural failure of the science-technology-society interface]. Iwanami
Publishing Co., Tokyo (in Japanese)
4. Matsumoto M (2012) Kozosai: Kagaku-Gijustu-Shakai ni Hisomu-Kiki [The structural disas-
ter: crisis hidden in techno-scientific society]. Iwanami Publishing Co., Tokyo (in Japanese)
5. Asahi Shimbun (2011) Osen-sui, Kuno 9-man ton: Kensho, Fukushima Daiichi Genpatsu no
Chusui to Taio [Contaminated water, agonizing 90 thousand tons: review of water injection
and the other counter measures at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station], 11 May 2011.
(in Japanese)
168 K. Juraku
6. Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (2013a) Basic policy for the contaminated water
issue at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, decided on 3 September
2013. http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20130904_
01a.pdf
7. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) (2012) Genshi-ro Tate-ya-to e-no Chika-sui
Ryunyu ni-taisuru Bapponteki-Taisaku no Kento Jokyo ni-tsuite [The examination progress
of fundamental countermeasures against water flooding into reactor buildings and other
facilities], released on 18 June 2012. (in Japanese)
8. Asahi Shimbun (2013a) Chika-sui Housyutsu, Ryoshi no Fushin: Touden-no Keikaku,
Fukushima-ken Gyoren wa Ryousyo-sezu [Ground water discharge, distrust of fishermans:
TEPCO’s plan was not approved by Fukushima Prefectural Fishery Co-op], 14 May 2013.
(in Japanese)
9. Fukushma Minpo News (2013) Ken-Gyoren Kaiyo-housyutsu-ni Fudo-i: Daiichi Genpatsu
Chika-sui Anzen-e-no Kenen Fussyoku Sarezu [Disagreement of Prefectural Fishery Co-op:
ground water at Fukushima Daiichi NPP, Concern about Safety was not Settled], 14 May 2013.
(in Japanese)
10. Asahi Shimbun (2013b) Bai-pasu Handan Miokuri: Sou-Sou Gyokyo, Shiken-Sogyo Saikai
wo yusen, Osen-sui Taisaku Setsumei-kai [Decision on the By-pass Plan Postponed by
Sou-Sou Fishery Co-op at the briefing session of Contaminated Water Management: trial
operation of fishing comes first] 4 September 2013. (in Japanese)
11. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) (2011a) The report of operation and management
plan for our facilities based on “Policy on the mid term security” for the Units 1 to 4 of
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station(2), 12 December 2011. (in Japanese)
12. Tokyo Electric Power Company (2011b) The report of operation and management plan for our
facilities based on “Policy on the mid term security” for the Units 1 to 4 of Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station(3), 15 December 2011. (in Japanese)
13. Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) (2013) Press Conference Note, 25 July 2013 (in Japanese)
14. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2013) Preliminary summary report IAEA
international peer review mission on mid-and-long-term roadmap towards the
decommissioning Of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1–4 (Second
Mission)
15. Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (2013b) Tokyo Denryoku Fukushima Daiichi
Genshi-ryoku Hatsuden-sho no Hairo-taisei no Kyouka-ni-tsuite [Strengthening the system
for decommission of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station], decided on
8 February 2013. (in Japanese)
16. Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (2013c) Strengthening the system for addressing
contaminated water and decommissioning issues at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station, decided on 10 September 2013. http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/
nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20130910_01a.pdf
17. Matsumoto M (2013) “Structural disaster” long before Fukushima: a hidden accident. Dev Soc
42(2):165–190
18. Perrow C (1984¼1999) Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. Princeton
University Press, Princeton
19. Reason J (1997) Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate Publishing Ltd,
Aldershot
20. Juraku K (2015) Section 4: Post-accident on-site management, a section of Chapter 6: Post-
accident nuclear power technology governance. In: Shiroyama H (ed) Supervised by
M. Muramatsu and K. Tsunekawa, Dai-shinsai-kara Manabu Shakai-kagaku (Vol.3)
Fukushima Gen-patsu Jiko-to Fukugou Risuku-Gabanansu (Social science learnt from the
great earthquake (Vol.3) Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Complex Risk Governance). Toyo
Keizai Inc., Tokyo (in Japanese)
12 Deficits of Japanese Nuclear Risk Governance Remaining After the Fukushima. . . 169
Chapter 13
A Community-Based Risk Communication
Approach on Low-Dose Radiation Effect
Naoki Yamano
Abstract A community-based risk communication approach for risk and risk-
related factors regarding low-dose radiation has been started in 2013. In this
approach, three groups that consist of local citizens, health nurse, midwife and
nutritionist, and media reporters have been coordinated, and they discuss and
examine a guidebook of health effects on low-dose radiation prepared by experts.
Then they will revise the contents and expressions of the guidebook under expert’s
support by themselves. An improved guidebook implementing stakeholders’ input
will be expected through this process. In parallel to the community-based risk
communication, an opinion survey has been conducted for the inhabitants of
Tsuruga City in the Fukui prefecture to obtain people’s cognition about ionizing
radiation and risk on health effects. The inhabitants of about 43 % show strong
anxiety for radiation. They also show strong requirement for the risk criteria that
should be specified by government/specialists. The current status and progress of
the community-based risk communication approach are discussed, and a necessity
of risk education regarding trans-science problem is presented.
Keywords Risk communication • Low-dose radiation • Fukushima nuclear
accident • Public engagement
13.1 Introduction
Even now, after three and a half years or more from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
accident, the health effects of low-dose ionizing radiation have become a national
anxiety. Many activities of risk communication performed by the government are
likely not successful though most inhabitants received estimated dose less than a
few mSv.
Before the Fukushima accident, nuclear risk communication in Japan has been
developed for public acceptance and improvement of nuclear power promotion
understanding under the prerequisite that the safety is ensured. The risk
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communication is expected as an effective method to regain public trust after the
Fukushima accident. There is a good review for the historical background of risk
communication in Japan [1]. However, risk communication for the health effects of
low dose of ionizing radiation is not easy to perform because the low-dose effect
has uncertainty including its sociological and psychological nature. Many special-
ists including radiation scientists, biologists, and health physicists have tried to
explain the low-dose radiation effect to public, but it cannot be said that the public
understanding through dialogue is effective because the specialists are not commu-
nication experts. The difficulties of risk communication for low-dose radiation have
been reviewed by Kanda [2].
The author has started a new risk communication approach concerning health
effects of low-dose radiation in 2013. This approach is intended to establish a
community-based risk communication regarding low-dose radiation. In parallel to
the community-based risk communication, an opinion survey has been done at
September 2013 for inhabitants of Tsuruga City in the Fukui prefecture where
14 nuclear reactors are located in its vicinity. In Chap. 2, a summary of the opinion
survey and the result is described. Chapter 3 describes the community-based risk
communication approach and its progress. Chapter 4 will show insights and dis-
cussion through the community-based risk communication approach.
13.2 Opinion Survey for Tsuruga Inhabitants
The opinion survey was conducted at mid-September 2013 for 300 adult inhabitants
of Tsuruga City in the Fukui prefecture. The aim of this survey is to obtain people’s
cognition about ionizing radiation and risk on health effects.
The survey method was a visit questionnaire placement method to obtain a
sample number of 300 by assigning 15 people each in residential areas of 20.
Questions consisted of (1) the awareness about radiation and radioactivity, (2) the
awareness about “risk” and food safety, and (3) the awareness about health effects
of low-dose radiation exposure. In this study, the authors avoided direct questions
concerning awareness of nuclear power. This indicates that it is not a survey
questioning the pros and cons of nuclear power. Once people recognized it as a
questionnaire relating to approval or disapproval of nuclear power, there is a
possibility that influence of bias occurs in answer.
The detailed analysis of the opinion survey is described elsewhere [3].
In terms of risk cognition, Tsuruga inhabitants have the following thoughts about
risk:
• There is a correlation between experience of risk education and knowing how to
judge risk.
• There is a correlation between knowing the meaning of risk and judging
own risk.
• There is a tendency that knowing how to judge risk leads a sense of security.
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• People do not recognize a risk cognition which has a trade-offs relation between
hazard and benefit.
• There is no correlation between experience of risk education and judging
own risk.
• The requirement of Tsuruga inhabitants for the risk acceptance criteria of
low-dose radiation that should be specified by government/specialists does not
depend on the degree of their knowledge about the risk information of radiation.
The results are obtained from the detailed analysis of the opinion survey, so we
indicate the reference [3]. The tendency of these correlations about risk knowledge
and recognition shows some people have experience of risk education in specific
field, but the knowledge is not for radiation. It is clearly shown that inhabitants have
no experience of risk education on low-dose radiation.
13.3 Community-Based Risk Communication Approach
In terms of low-dose radiation, most of the general public have few knowledge on
what is a probabilistic (stochastic) effect on radiation exposure and the risk. The
risk concept is not uniquely defined yet. Some scientists and engineers have
recognized that risk is “probability consequences.” However, according to the
ISO guidelines on risk management ISO31000:2009 [4], the definition is “effect of
uncertainty on objectives.” The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC)
also defines risk as “an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect
to something that humans value” [5]. Such consequences can be positive or
negative, depending on the values that people associate with them.
There is some confusion about risk concept among specialists in different area.
Also, a consensus of the stochastic health effects of low-dose radiation has not been
established among radiation scientists and biologists.
After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, many Japanese radiation scientists tried to
explain the low-dose radiation effect to the general public. A lot of risk information
on health effects of radiation has been explained to the general public using
persuasive message based on epidemiologic study and the LNT (linear
no-threshold) model. The general public has anxiety for radiation, so the question
to scientists is simple such as “Am I safe? What is health impact to children and
offspring?” However, the answer is not simple because of the uncertainty of
scientific evidence from the epidemiologic study and the LNT hypothesis. It
shows the health effects of low-dose radiation mean a trans-science problem.
General public is not familiar with the “probability.” They also have heard
different opinions for the “probability effect” of the low-dose radiation from
some radiation scientists or commentators. So, the majority of the general public
feels the scientists and commentators untrustworthy. In this situation, it means that
the risk communication for low-dose radiation is not easy to perform because of
lack of credibility of scientists.
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In general, a risk communication method which is designed for promoting
stakeholders’ willingness concerning “the right to know” and “the right to self-
determination” is effective. There is diversity in the values of the general public.
There are stakeholders who think that government/specialists should specify the
risk criteria, but some stakeholders think strongly and want to judge it on their own
based on the right to self-determination.
Based on this insight, a new risk communication approach concerning health
effects of low-dose radiation has started in FY2013. A conceptual diagram of this
approach is shown in Fig. 13.1. This approach is intended to establish public
engagement of risk communication for risk and risk-related factors regarding
low-dose radiation to promote the right to self-determination.
Firstly, a draft of guidebook of health effects on low-dose radiation was prepared
in cooperation with experts of radiation biology, social psychology, risk commu-
nication, public involvement, and social responsibility. The draft consists of
46 pages including six chapters and references. The contents are Introduction (1),
Concept of risk (2), Deterministic effects on radiation (3), What is the low dose?
(4), Low-dose effects on radiation (5), and Conclusion (6).
Secondly, three groups have been coordinated in cooperation with Tsuruga
inhabitants as follows:
• Local community inhabitants (12) who are members of female study group on
nuclear power
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Fig. 13.1 A concept of the community-based risk communication approach
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• Health nurses, midwives, and nutritionists (12) who belong to the Tsuruga City
health care center
• Media reporters (5) who belong to the Tsuruga press club
where the number in parenthesis indicates the number of participants in each group.
Participants of the three groups discuss and examine the draft of guidebook in
workshop as shown in Fig. 13.2. Based on the dialogue and consultation, they will
revise the contents and expressions of the guidebook under specialist’s support by
themselves. An improved guidebook implementing stakeholders’ input will be
expected through this process. The workshop has been held eight times in
FY2013. In FY2014, creating the guidebook for beginner is in progress.
Besides that, we held public forums in the Tokyo metropolitan area and Tsuruga
for the related researchers and general public. There were discussions on the
opinion of the participants about the risk communication approach.
13.4 Discussion
Through the workshop using the draft of guidebook of health effects on low-dose
radiation, the following opinions were obtained from participants:
• It is difficult to understand the risk concept, e.g., definition, probability, and
uncertainty of risk.
• It is difficult to understand jargons such as DNA damage, repair mechanism,
LNT model, EAR, ERR, Sv, Gy, or Bq.
• Epidemiologic study on health effects of low-dose radiation like CT scan is
difficult to understand, but psychological impact after Chernobyl accident is well
understood.
• There is too much information to understand. Avoid detailed contents, and fewer
pages are favorable.
• It should change the order of the chapter because the risk concept is difficult.
• It is favorable to create a beginner’s guidebook with fewer pages.
Fig. 13.2 Participants of workshop, (a) local community inhabitants; (b) health nurse, midwife,
and nutritionist; (c) media reporters
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It seems that the general public does not easily understand the risk concept
including definition and the risk cognition. Risk can be recognized as positive or
negative depending on the values that people associate with them. If ionizing
radiation is hazardous and has no benefit to people, they will not accept it whether
it is low dose or not.
So, a relationship of trade-offs between hazard and benefit is important to
understand radiation risk. Authors describe risk can be recognized as positive and
negative, and the relationship between hazard and benefit as negative versus
positive. We are trying to explain the risk trade-offs using a balance scale between
(negative) hazard and (positive) benefit as shown in Fig.13.3.
Potential risk of low-dose ionizing radiation is “hazard” as cause of cancer, but it
also has “benefit” like early detection of disease. The meaning of radiation risk and
how to judge the risk on own is important to know. Most of the general public has
no experience on learning about risk at education institutions. Some Tsuruga
inhabitants have learned about risk at education institutions, but it seems that the
risk education was for typical application, not for low-dose ionizing radiation. Even
though they have knowledge on how to make typical risk judgment to other
applications, they believe that the knowledge cannot be applicable to their health
effects of ionizing radiation.
Through workshop, participants discussed with each other issues concerning the
importance of understanding health effects of radiation and how to judge the
radiation risk. They have understood that they should judge the risk of low-dose
radiation on own whether the risk criteria specified by government/specialists are
adequate or not. They also understood how to avoid or reduce the risk of artificial
ionizing radiation.
13.5 Conclusion
A community-based risk communication approach concerning health effects of
low-dose radiation has been described. The method is designed to promote stake-
holders’ willingness concerning not only “the right to know” but also “the right to
self-determination.”
The author conducted an opinion survey for Tsuruga inhabitants in order to
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Fig. 13.3 Trade-offs relation between hazard and benefit on radiation risk
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inhabitants of about 43 % people show strong anxiety for radiation and have strong
requirement for the risk criteria that should be specified by the government/spe-
cialists. It is believed that they are not satisfied with the current criteria of low-dose
radiation. From the opinion survey, most of the public have no experience learning
about the risk at education institution. However, it is found a tendency that knowing
how to judge risk leads a sense of security. So, risk education for low-dose radiation
seems to be able to reduce unnecessary anxiety.
The current status and progress of the community-based risk communication
approach have been discussed. Through the community-based risk communication
approach, participants have understood that they should judge the risk of low-dose
radiation by their own, whether the risk criteria specified by government/specialists
are adequate or not. Participants also understood how to avoid or reduce risk from
artificial radiation. An improved guidebook implementing stakeholders’ input will
be expected through this process. The present method will be effective to public
understanding about risk of low-dose radiation.
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